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UNITED STATES

v.
PAYNER
1.

SUMMARY:

~ - ~ A..,Lc.-c~-(...)

Cert to CA 6
(Phillips,
Keith & Peck ;
_Rer cuEJ-am)
Federa17Criminal
The issue bere is whether the DC

possessed and should have exercised supervisory power to

----

suppress evidence obtained as the result of an illegal
s earch that did not violate resp's Fourth Amendment rights.
2.

FACTS & DECISION BELotv :

In 19 76 , rcsp was

· indicted in federa 1 collrt on a charge of knowingly and
wi llfully rnaking a false statement in a matter within t he
j urisdiction of an agency of the Uni.ted States , in particular,

'

'

'\
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of falsely stating on his 1972 federal income tax return that
he did not have a foreign bank account.

It was alleged that

petr in fact had such an account at the Castle Bank & Trust Co.
ln Nassau, Bahamas.
The principal piece of evidence against resp was a
loan guarantee agreement in which resp pledged his Castle account
as security for a loan.

The document was produced by

a

Florida

bank in response to government subpoenas seeking records concerning dealings with the Castle Bank.

Before trial, resp moved to

suppress the loan agreement and related testimony on the ground
that the evidence had been obtained as the result of an illegal
search conducted in Florida in 1973.

The search was of a brief-

case belonging to Wolstencroft, an officer of the Castle Bank.
The person principally responsible for the search was a private
investigator, Casper, working with the encouragement and assistance
of Special Agent Jaffe of the IRSo

There was evidence tending to

show that, as part of a gener:al IRS investigation, Casper and
Jaffe cooperated in a scheme to obtain and photograph lists of
names of persons having deposits in the Castle Bank.

Pursuant to

the scheme, Wolstencroft was distracted, and the lists were
clandestinely obtained from his briefcase, photographed, and then
r eturned.
~

B

~ nts

Resp's name appeared on one of the lists.

These same

indicated that the Florida bank was linked to the Castle

In the course of an investigation into the improper use of

secret foreign bank accounts, the records of the Florida bank were
obtained, and resp's loan agreement was discavered.

As a result

- 3 -

of this new information, the IRS investigated resp and
ultimately indicted him.
In an extensive opinion, the DC ruled that resp
~-------

lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the
legality of the 1973 search of Wolstencroft's briefcaseo

But

i t held that the loan agreement and related testimony \vere
tainted by the search's illegality.

The court further held

that the government's conduct in encouraging and performing the
illegal search demonstrated a "knowing and purposeful bad

fa~th

hostility to [a] person's fundamental constitutional rights."
Petn. 46a, 48a-50a, 56a.

Thus, the c ourt concluded that the

evidence should be suppressed under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.

Alternatively, the court ruled that "the

f ederal courts' supervisory powe1:- over federa 1 prosecutions
s hould be invoked to exclude evidence obtained by

Goverr~ental

c onduct which is either purposefully illegal or motivated by an
i ntentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right. 11
58a-6la .

Petn.

After an initial appeal and decision on -a procedural

issue, the CA affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion.

It held

t hat " the district court did not err in suppressing the evidence
in the exercise of its supervisory powers . . . • Since we base our
decision upon the exercise of supervisory powers, it is not
necessary to reach. the constitutional questions raised on the appeal ."

Petn. 2a .

The CA did not address the government's con-

tention that the disputed evidence was not tainted by the illegal
searcho

- 4 3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG maintains that this case

presents the recurring and substantial question whether or
to what extent a federal district court has supervisory

-

power

to suppress relevant and probative evidence when a

defendant's rights were not violated by its acquisition and
would not be violated by its introduction at trial.

The SG

f the Federal Rules of.Evidence de-

contends th

of such authority.

The rule provides:

All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution . • . , by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Even if Rule 402 left courts free to exercise some supervisory
pm,;rer to suppress evidence, the SG argues, suppression would be
inappropriate here.

The exclusion of relevant evidence should be

resorted to only when it would advance the remedial objectives
the rule was designed to serve.

This Court has held that the

prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of future
unlawful police conduct, and it has held that deterrence is ad-·
equately served if only those with standing under the Fourth
Amendment are permitted to request suppressiono

See Alderman v.

United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-175 (1969) ("we arc not convinced
that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to
other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime");

Moreover,

~<vhen

this Court has invoked its supervisory pGwer outside the trial

- 5 -

context, it has focused on behavior directly affecting the
person urging the application of an exclusionary remedy.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

E.g.,

Finally, says the

SG, theCA's cryptic opinion provides no effective guidance for
future cases and thus condones a standardless judicial veto over
governmental practices.
Resp maintains that the DC properly excluded all evidence
obtained as a result of the willful and outrageous illegal conduct (in violation of state law and the Fourth and Fifth Amendmerits) on the part of government agents.

In any event, suppression

was 'Wlrr anted in order to protect resp 1 s Fifth Amendment ·rights.
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

Moreover, invocatior

of the exclusionary rule is necessary where, as here, the government
demonstr ates "bad faith hostility tm.;rard the strictures imposed
•

•

0

by the Constitution."

Petn. LJ.9a.

As the DC reasoned, since

at the time of the search the government had no intention of taking
any action against Wolstencroft, there was no threat of exclusion
-- and hence no deterrence -- under the Fourth Amendment.
4. .

DISCUSSION:

The r uling below is questionable, on the

view that the government's conduct was not directed against resp.
But the government was interested in the lists of depositors for
purposes of investigating the depositors.

So it is not unreason-

able to prevent admission of the evidence against resp as a matter
of the court's supervisory power, and it is arguable that resp's
own Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by admission of evidence
obtained as a result of blatently improper govet:nmenta 1 conduct.

- 6 -

Still, Wolstencroft) and not petr, suffered the indign i ty
of the search.

And the decision below effectively circumvents

Fourth Amendment stand.i.ng limitations in cases involving a
willful violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of someone who
was not himseli: the target of the investigation.
The existence and . scope

~fa

district court's supervisory

authority to suppress evidence has been repeatedly called into
question.

Jaco~s,

See United States v.

436 U.S. 31 (1978) (dis -

missing cert as improvidently granted); United States v. Caceres.,
No. 76-1309 (Apr. 2, 1979) .

The Court might want to consider

taking this case to provide some guidance in the area.
There is a response.
Opinion in
petition
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Motion of petr to dispense with
appendix

United States
CA 6

v.
Payner
SUMMARY:

On behalf of the parties, the SG asks to dispense

with the printing of a separate appendix (Rule 36(8)).
The case involves questions of law, and the factual setting
of the case is adequately set out in the DC opinion that
appears in the cert. petn.
DISCUSSION:
10/19/79

The request appears appropriate.
Marsel
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Question Presented ~d~cc.#4'AZ::J

~~~Did

the

district

exercised--supervisory

court

power

possess--and

to

suppress

should

physical

it

have

evidence

obtained as the result of an illegal search that did not violate
the rights of this respondent?

Facts

~h~·-'~

.. ~- .,£.., a- ..d.C.I-- ~
obtained e vfden ~e against

The Internal Revenue S

t'

~

\\

resp by stealing a briefcase that belonged to Wolstencroft,
officer of a Bahamian bank in which resp kept an account.
Service's

theft

both

Fourth

the

was

premeditated

Amendment

and

and

the

flagrantly

Florida

illegal

criminal

law.

an
The

under
The

...

2.

district court suppressed the evidence on two grounds.

First,

the court held that Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
required

the

improper

governmental

knowing

and

suppression

evidence

action

purposeful

constitutional

of

bad

rights."

that
faith

Pet.

obtained

"exhibits

[the

host ~1 i ty

App.

46a.

by

to

officers']

any

Second,

grossly

person's

the

court

invoked its supervisory power to suppress evidence obtained as
the

result

of

governmental

action

that

was

"purposefully

illegal" and "motivated by an intentional bad faith hostility to

of supervisory powers."

Id. at 2a.

~ "'(
Claus~

In this Court, resp urges two additional grounds for
affirmance.

~

he

argues

that

the

requires suppression of the evidence.

Due

~,

Process

resp argues that

the Fourth Amendment requires suppression because Bahamaian law
gave him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records
--------~---~--------------_,_,

purloined from
alternative

Wolstencroft~_ s

bas is

before this Court,

for
but

briefcase.

the district

The first ground--an

court's order--is properly

it probably adds little to

the ground

upon which CA6

acted.

The second ground may or may not have

been

to

district

presented

presented,

the

court.

the district court disposed of

See Pet. App. 38a-39a.

If
it

the

argument

was
in one sentence.

I

The procedural history of this case also might raise a
double

jeopardy

issue,

but

that

question

is

not

before

the

administration

of

Court.

Background

criminal

"Judicial

supervision

of

justice

the

courts

establishing
and

and

evidence."

(1943).

in

maintaining
McNabb

v.

civilized

United

implies

the

standards of

States,

318

U.S.

duty

of

procedure
332,

340

This Court has recognized that the federal courts have

supervisory power
law

federal

the

enforcement

to suppress evidence

practices.

"A

secured by overzealous

democratic

society,

in

which

respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards
against the misuse of the law enforcement process."
Thus,

in

(1957),

McNabb
the

confessions

Court

216-1 7

Mallory

invoked

extracted

violated federal
21 4,

and

( 1 956) ,

its

after

statutes.

v.

United

States,

supervisory

over-bearing
In Rea v.

power

Id. at 343.
3 54

U.S.

to

suppress

interrogation

United States,

449

that

350 U.S.

the Court enjoined a federal officer from

testifying in a state criminal trial about evidence seized under
a defective search warrant.
U.S.

206

officers

And in Elkins v. United States, 364

( 1960), the Court held that evidence seized by state
in

violation

of

the

Fourth

admitted in federal criminal trials.

Amendment

could

not

be

You recently alluded to this body of law in Hampton v.
United

concurring).

In

predisposition

was

entrapment

u.s.

425

States,

case.

that
the
You

484,

491

case,

(1976)
plurality

the

only

relevant

some

future

J. '

that

held

consideration

Were

disagreed.

(Powell,

in

an

case

to

present "outrageous police conduct," you wrote, the conviction
of

a

predisposed

person

might

be

barred

Process Clause or the supervisory power.
that

United

States

v.

Russell,

411

by

either

the

Id. at 493.
U.S.

423,

Due

You noted

435

(1973),

"indicated only that we should be extremely reluctant to invoke
the supervisory power in cases of this kind because that power
does not give the 'federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto
over law enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve.'"
4 25 U.S. at 49 4.

Discussion

I. Effect of Fed. R. Evid. 402
The

Government's

~,..'st..~
,~---t

~ ~

primary

argument

~-----------------~~
suppress
"[a]ll

otherwise

relevant

provided by the

admissible

evidence

is

~

evidence.
admissible,

Constitution of

is

The

Rule

except

says

that

as

otherwise

the United States,

by Act of

Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."

Since no rule,

5•

.

•'

statute, or constitutional provision bars the evidence at issue
in

this

case,

the

Government

argues,

Rule

402

prevents

the

federal courts from suppressing the evidence.
Resp correctly points out

This argument should fail.
that

the

language

and

the

legislative

history

of

the

final

clause in the Rule simply show that Congress intended to prevent
this

Court

from

amending

the

evidence

rules

without

--------------------~--------------And the Government
congressional
ap ~g~~.
Brief for Resp 17.
conceeds that Rule 402
degree

of

judicial

11

necessarily contemplates a substantial

latitude

in

deciding

whether

evidence should be suppressed in particular cases...
the U.S. 32.
the

11

effective

449

Brief for

[T]he drafters expected the courts to decide when
enforcement

of

a

particular

constitutional

requires the suppression of relevant evidence ...

provision •
Indeed,

relevant

the drafters

cited Mallory v.

United States,

354 U.S.

(1957), as an example of the sort of rulings that Rule 402

would permit.

Id. at 32 n.13.

s~~~

II. Enforcement of the Fourth

Amendment ~~-~
~

"--- ,~ ~-...,_.

The Government argues that whatever superv1sory power
the federal courts might have to suppress evidence was exercised
improperly

in

this

case.

In

the

first

place,

says

the

Government, the supervisory power should not be used to exclude
evidence

admissible

under

the

Fourth Amendment.

Furthermore,

goes the argument, the courts should not use their supervisory

6.

..

power

to

Branch

regulate

in

ways

Constitution.

investigative
required

not

activities

of

by

statute,

rule,

the

Executive
or

the

These arguments go to the core of the case.

Government's

third

argument--that

CA6

has

given

the

(The

district

courts no guidance on how to exercise the supervisory power--has
no merit; the district court's opinion in this case articulates
a good standard, and this Court can articulate whatever standard
it thinks proper.)
Your view of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to ~
future violations of the Fourth Amendment would allow you to

---------------~-~
either
way on the first argument.

-

so

On the one hand, you could

say that the balance between deterrence and the social interest
in admitting all relevant evidence has been struck by the rule
that excludes

ill-gotten evidence only

person whose rights were

u.s.

128

(1978).

On

injured.

the

from

the

See Rakas v.

other hand,

you

could

trial

of

the

Illinois,

439

say

the

that

federal courts have the power to reweigh the competing interests
in cases where

the unconstitutional

-

-

search was

conducted l}Qth

purposefully and in bad faith.
Certainly in a case like this
-------~-one, the Internal Revenue Service has little incentive to behave
itself.

Since the Service violates the rights of bank officers

solely for the purpose of getting evidence against depositors,
there

never

exclude

the

will

be

fruits

criminal trial.

a

case

of

the

where

the

Fourth Amendment

constitutional

violation

would

from

a

~

7.

In order to accept the Government's second argument,
you would

have

to

take

a

position

somewhat

your theory of the exclusionary rule.
to frame the argument narrowly.

inconsistent

with

The Government has tried

But a deterrence theory cannot

very well distinguish between judicial action to deter searches
that

will

violate

the

rights

of

third

parties

and

judicial

action to deter "future violations," Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465,

492

In

(1976).

violations

that will

In both cases,

the

both

cases,

the

courts

act

to

deter

injure persons other than the defendant.
judicial

goal

is

the

regulation of police

conduct.

III. A Different View
For you, the result in this case probably should turn
To me,

on your assessment of the Government's first argument.
the

---------- __....,_

case

appears

more

difficult.

The

case--particularly

in

light of the Government's second argument--seems to bring into
focus a logical lapse in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
._--...__-,.

established

precedent

holds

that

a

constitutional

Well-

provision

conferring a right on each person should be enforced by a remedy
that protects the rights of others.
U.S. at 482-89, 492.
from

the

(1976).

wrong.

See Stone v.

Powell,

428

In other words, the remedy does not follow

United

The remedy is a

States
naked

v.

Janis,

assertion of

428

u.s.

433,

443

judicial power to

regulate executive officials in a way that the Framers probably

8.
''

did not

contemplate.

The case law then 1 imi ts the deterrence

theory underlying the remedy by somehow recurring to the notion
that the right is personal.

See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128

(1978).

I

( 1)

have thought that the rationale for the Fourth

Amendment exclusionary rule was

'-----------------for reasons that

but

seem

originally had a dual

rationale.

judicial

integrity

and

ill-conceived

from the outset,

to concern no one

to

else.

The

rule

It was designed to preserve

prevent

unconstitutional

searches.

Neither of these rationales seems to be the correct one.
point of the
people

to

The

Fourth Amendment is to protect the "riqht of the

be

secure

effects

II

in

their

persons,

houses,

papers,

and

As Mr. Justice Holmes said, "[t]he essence of

a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before

the

Court

Silverthorne
(1920).

but

Lumber

When

constitutional

Co.

back

right,

remedy.
..__________

equitable
into

the

v.

government

deserves some remedy.
the

that

same

he

it

shall

United

States,

officers

suffers

a

not

be

used

at

251

u.s.

385,

violate

qrave

injury

The exclusionary rule,
It

attempts

to put

position vis-a-vis

the

as

the

392

person's

a

for
I

all."

which

see

injured

Government

would have occupied had the violation never occurred.

it,

he
is

person
that

he

Indeed,

in an old case the style of which I have forgotten, the Virginia
Court of Appeals found that dismissal of the indictment was the

9•

...

equitable remedy for governmental intrusions on the defendant's
rights.
This

view of

the

exclusionary rule

as

an

equitable

remedy often would lead to the same results that the Court has
reached in its recent cases.
right,
right

the remedy would
violated

be

belonged

Since the rule protects a personal
inappropriate

to

someone

in

other

a

case where

than

the

before the court.

See Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S.

On the other hand,

the remedy would be appropriate

defendant

128 (1978).
in quite a

number of situations where the Court has not awarded it.
e.g.,
jury) ;

United

States

Walder

v.

v.

Callandra,

United

414 U.S.

States,

338

u.s.

347

(1974)

62

(impeachment); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)
Given
rule,

however,

the

deterrence

it

would

seem

rationale
logical

for
to

the

the

See,
(grand
(1954)

(arrest).

exclusionary

conclude

that

the

federal courts do have supervisory power to invoke the rule in

'
cases

-

where

~----~---------~-------------------------------------its
deterrent value is obvious even though the
~-------~----'---------------rights have not been violated.

particular defendent' s

Indeed,

deterrence seems most likely in cases, such as this one, where
the Government violates Fourth Amendment rights purposefully and
in bad

faith.

And

the

supervisory power has

been invoked in

situations where neither purpose nor bad faith were as clear as
they are in this case.

See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354

U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318

u.s.

332 (1943).

(2)

It

seems

to

me,

however,

that

the

supervisory

power was overextended by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's decisions in
Mallory,

supra, and McNabb,
The

components.
quality

of

first

justice

supra.

is

by

the

The power properly has two

courts'

regulating

their

power
own

to

proceedings.

second is the courtflo/ power to preserve their own
regulating

the

conduct

of

those

who

uphold

appear

the
The

inteqr i ty by

before

them.

The

first power allows the courts to formulate rules of evidence and
procedure.

The second power allows the courts, for example, to
See generally Hill, The Bill

regulate lawyers and prosecutors.
of

Rights

and

the

Supervisory

Power,

69

Colum.

L.

Rev.

181

(1969).
The power claimed in Mallory, McNabb, and this case is

.

an odd mix of
conduct

of

the

others

--------through

a

rule

affects the quality of justice.
the

exclusion of

The

two basic powers.

the

evidence

court

of evidence

regulates

that

the

profoundly

Since the law does not require
in

this

case,

"justice"

is not

served by the district court's effort to regulate governmental
conduct.

Instead,

regulation

the

reaches

out

to

____ ___________

control

... _____

..._..,........ ....-.
.......
---who are
..., not
, before the court •
future conduct
of those
~

the

The only

l

interest in judicial integrity served by the regulation is the
very

interest

that

Amendment cases.
The

regulation

supported

by

this

See,
may

either

Court

has

rejected

in

e.g. , Stone v. Powell, 428

serve

a

worthy

rationale

for

purpose,
the

but

its

u.s.
it

supervisory

Fourth
at 485.
is

not
power.

I

Instead, the district court's effort to regulate police conduct
aggravates
enforcement

of

the

deterrence theory.
as

problems

separation-of-powers

Fourth

Fourth

Amendment

exclusionary

Amendment

(1977).

In

rule

on

a

But §ee Note, Judicially Required Rulemaking
Policy:

An

Applied

other

words,

I

would

Analysis

u.

Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 72 Nw.
29

from

arising

of

the

L. Rev. 595, 614-

reject

the

assertion of

supervisory power in this case for much the same reason that I
would reject the deterrence rationale for the Fourth Amendment

~-----------------~-------------------------------

exclusionary rule.

Conclusion

Rakus v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), stands for the
proposition
outweighs

that
the

-

the

need

societal

to

deter

interest

unconstitutional

in

admitting

all

searches
relevant

evidence only in those cases where the illegal search violated
the

rights

of

the

defendant

himself.

Unless

the

Court

is

willing to exclude at the inner door evidence that can enter at
the

outer

door,

CA6's judgment.
rule

and

however,

this
will

Rakus probably requires

the

Court

The deterrence rationale for
Court's
support

decisions
an

under

the

affirmance.

to reverse

the exclusionary

supervisory
When

power,

governmental

misconduct is purposeful and in bad faith, an exclusionary rule
should be at its most effective.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Ellen

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 24, 1980

78-1729 -Payner
If you have not done so, you may want to take a
look at the two cases at the end of the argument list for
this week:

79-5146 Rawlings · v; - Kentucky, and particularly

79-244 U;S. - v; - Salvucci.
These cases were granted for the purpose of
considering the "automatic standing" rule.

The SG's brief in

79-244 may possibly be of some assistance, although it really
says nothing new.

~r.t.
L. F. P. , Jr.
ss

..

'

,

lfp/ss

3/24/80
'~ -~

MEMORANDUM
~:·

TO:

Ellen

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATF.:

j;'

'!'.\

March 24, 19AO
,l,C~

78-1729 Payner
If you have not done so, you may want to take a
look at the two cases at the end of the argument list for
this week:
79-244

79-5146 Rawlinqs v. Kentucky, and particularly

u.s.

v. Salvucci.

These cases were granted for the purpose of
considerinq the "automatic standinq" rule.

The SG's brief in

79-244 may possibly be of some assistance, although it really
says nothinq new.

.

..

::Jt

~.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

?-t

>

,_"' fi;l\<

'li!;i

!'.\

;t;

t
~
;,!:

"'

,itqtumt Qtttttd llf tqt ~b .§tzdts
'IJasJringLtn. ~. Qt. 20,?J!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 11, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
In due course I will circulate a dissent in
this one.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

.iu.pumt Q}mtrl llf tlrt ~~ ,ibtttg
._ag!p:ngtlltt. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!~
CHAMBERS OF

April 11, 1980

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

78-1729 - United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

AMr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
erne

~

•

t.

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

Re:

Dear Lewis:

a c
I

Except for the first sentence of the full paragrap
on page 8, I think your opinion is fine.
I am afraid,
however, .that I -cannot agree that evidence should never
be suppressed "without carefully balancing the benefits
of exclusion against its high societal cost." If that
were the test, I would suppress the evidence in this
case. For me, the test is whether the search violated
the defe-ndant's constitutional rights.
If the answer is
yes, I believe suppression is appropriate; if the answer
is no, suppression is inappropriate even if the illegality
is as serious as we find in this case.
If you can see your way clear to deleti~g the language
I have quoted, I will be happy to join you.
Respectfully,

fL
Mr. Justice Powell

..
' ..

£a: Kr. lustioo
Kr. Juetioe
lir . · Juetioe
Xr . Justiee
Xr. JustiBe
Kr. Justioe
Kr. Justioe
11r •.. Justioe

Brennan
Stewart
Whi to,.
Marshall
Blaokmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens

~m :

The Chief Justice
APR 11 198()
Circulated: _____________

llactrnulote'' _ _

Re:

__

~

No. 78-1729, United States v. Payner

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion because Payner -- whose guilt is
not in doubt -- cannot take advantage of the Government's
violation of the constitutional rights of Wolstencroft, who is
not a party to this case.

The Court's opinion makes clear the

reasons for that sound rule.

However, the Internal Revenue

Service conduct in hiring "private investigators" to secure
evidence of Payner's criminal acts, in the manner shown by this
record, is repugnant to fundamental tenets of how our
Government ought to conduct its affairs.
Orderly government under our system of separate powers
should encourage maximum internal self-restraint and discipline
in each Branch.

Although this Court has supervisory authority

with respect to the federal courts, it has no general authority
over the Executive Branch.

In my view,

it is unseemly, to put

it mildly, for a government to conduct its law enforcement
investigations in the way this case reveals.

..

,ju.prtmt <!flturlltf tqt ~nitth ,jtatts
Jfasfringtltn. ~. <!f. 2ll&i'l-~
CHAMBERS OF

April 11, 1980

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

PERSONAL
Re:

78-1729 -United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I agree with your resolution of this case, but raise a
point of concern. I would like to avoid joining any opinion
that can be misread as giving approval to an absolute
Exclusionary Rule in any class of cases. For example, on page
7 the opinion states
" • . . exclusion is a necessary deterrent to
unlawful conduct in appropriate cases . . . "
The remainder of the paragraph qualifies this "approval"
of exclusion, but I would not care to make it easy for
"leopards" to quote the first sentence of the paragraph
out of context.
Your excellent later discussion shows your skepticism
about an absolute Exclusionary Rule but those parts will
not be quoted by lovers of exclusion. Perhaps it is not
always possible to prevent corruption of our opinions, but
may I suggest that changing "is" to "may be" in the quoted
sentence may do its part. For my part, I would add cites
to Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970), and (immodestly)
to my dissent in Bivens.
My proposed chastising of the IRS (attached) is open
to revision; it is not something best said in a Court
opinion.

Mr. Justice Powell
p.s. As my concurring op1n1on indicates, I am
prepared to join your opinion if you can see your way to
the above ideas.

~u.prrmt

<!Jourt o-f t17t ~rittb ~t1dt£1
2ffia.slpngton. ~. <.q. 2!l,SJ~2

CHAMBERS OF

Ap ril 11, 1980

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

PERSONAL
Re:

78-1729 -United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I agree with your resolution of this case, but raise a
point of concern.
I would like to avoid joining any opinion
that can be misread as giving approval to
Exclusionary Rule in any class of cases.
7 the opinion states
" . • . exclusion is a necessary deterrent to
unlawful conduct in appropriate cases . . . "
The remainder of the paragraph qualifies this "approval"
of exclusion, but I would not care to make it easy for
"leopards" to quote the first sentence of the paragraph
out of context.
Your excellent later discussion shows your skepticism
about an absolute Exclusionary Rule but those parts will
not be quoted by lovers of exclusion. Perhaps it is not
always possible to prevent corruption of our opinions, but
may I suggest that changing "is" to "may be" in the quoted
sentence may do its part. For my part, I would add cites
to Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 {1970), and {immodestly)
to my dissent in Bivens.
My proposed chastising of the IRS {attached) is open
to revision; it is not something best said in a Court
opinion.

Mr. Justice Powell
p.s. As my concurring opinion indicates, I am
prepared to join your opinion if you can see your way to
the above ideas.

~npr~uu

<!Jttttrlttf 14~ ~nittb- ~btlt$
~a,glrittghtn. !fl. <!J. 2llgt'!~

OF

JL STEVENS

April 11, 1980

Re:

78-1729 - United States v. Payner

!ar Lewis:

Except for the first sentence of the full paragraph
L page 8, I think your opinion is fine.
I am afraid,
>wever, .that I · cannot agree that evidence should never
' suppressed "without carefully balancing the benefits
: exclusion against its high societal cost." If that
ere the test, I would suppress the evidence in this
tse. For me, the test is whether the search violated
Le defendant's constitutional rights.
If the answer is
Is, I believe suppression is appropriate; if the answer
no, suppression is inappropriate even if the illegality
as serious as we find in this case.
If you can see your way clear to deleting the language
have quoted, I will be happy to join you.
Respectfully,

fL
Justice Powell

r•

·~:t.

•.

l

!i

States v. Payner

Thank you for your personal letter of April
I have eliminated the language in the first full
paragraph on page 11, that you preferred not to leave in the
op1n1on. Also, as you suggested, I have added a reference to
Dallin Oaks' superb article. On balance, I thought it best
not to refer to your excellent discussion of the Exclusionary
Rule in your Bivens dissent. Although you and I are fairly
close together on that rule, I have not yet qone all the way
with you. More importantly, I did not want to qo too far
afield in this case.
appreciate your assistance.
Sincerely,

'.

~up:rtmt

Q):!tllrl of t4t ~tb j\bttts

'~ihtsfringhnt. !fl. <!):. 2llgi,.$
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

April 14, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Sincerely,/

.Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.

;iuprtuu <!Jourl ltf tlyt ~nitt~ ~htttg
._aglyington. !9. <!J. 2llc?'!$
C HAMBERS OF

April 14, 1980

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

I
Re : No . 78-1729 - United States v . Payner
Dear Lewis:
I shall await the dissent .
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc : The Conference

~u:ptmtt

Q}ltUrlltf tlrt ~h ;§f:dtg

'Jfufrhtghtn. ~.

<!}. 2!1~'1-~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Apri 1 14, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1729, United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

'-

arltltrlltf tqt ~b .itatts
Jfasftinghtn. ~. ar. 2.llgt'k~

,itt.ptttttt

CHAMBERS OF

April 15, 1980

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

j
RE:

78-1729 - United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Mr. Justice Powell

~uvumt

<!fltUrl llf f4t ~ua ~bdts

,.as4ittghttt, ~. <If.

2il~'lo.;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 15, 1980

Re:

78-1729 -United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

J

~uvrtntt' <lfcnrl of flrt ~lt ~tatts
~a,g~ ~. <lJ. 20,?'!-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w.. . J .

June 18, 1980

BRENNAN : JR.

RE: No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you
I

I
.,I

have prepared in the above.
Sincerely,

'

I

AJ

l
l
I

!
.. ,

Mr . Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

I

·l

I

~UVrtm.t ~ou.rt cf tqt ~ttittb ~m:f'ts
JJaa: Jrittgtcn. ~. <!f. 2!l.;t'l-.;t
CHAMBERS OF

June 18, 1980

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.

-

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

June 18, 1980

78-1729, United States v. Payner

MEMORANDUM TO THF. CONFERENCE:
I propose to add the following to footnote 8 at
paqe 8 of the proposed opinion in this case:
The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the
balance of interests un~the supervisory power differs
from that con~idered in Alderman and like cases, because
the supervisory power focuses upon the •need to protect
the integrity of the federal courts.• Although the
Distri.ct Court in this case relied upon a deterrent
rationale, we aqree that the supervisory power serves
the •two-fold" purpose of deterring illegality and
protecting judicial integrity. See post, at 7.
.As the
dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule serves precisely the same purposes.
Ibid., citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 u.s.
~ 218 (1979), and Map~ v. Ohio 367 u.s. 643, 659-660
(1961). Thus, the Fourt Amendment exclusionary rule,
like the supervisory power, is applied in part "to
protect the integrity of the court rather than to
vindicate the constitutional riqhts of the defendant
•• • Post, at 10, see generally Stone v. Powell, 428
u.s. ~ 486 (1976)7 United States v. Calandra, 414

u.s.

338, 486 (1974).

In this case, where the illegal conduct did
not violate the respondent's riqhts, the interest in
preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such
conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in
presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact. See
sutra7 see also, e.g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 48548 • None of the cases cited by the dissent, host, at
7-9, supports a contrary view, since none of t ose cases
involved criminal defendants who were not themselves the

victims of the challenged practices. Thus, our
today does not limit the traditional scope of the
supervisory power in any way7 nor does it render that
power •superfluous." Post, at 12. We merely reject its
use as a substitute for-eitablished Fourth Amendment
doctrine.

y_•

•.

lfp/ss

6/20/80

78-1729 United States v. Payner

This criminal case comes to us on certiorari/from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The respondent was indicted on a charge of

falsifyin~n

income tax retur;lby denying that he had a foreign bank
account.
A document critical to the government's case had
been obtained by an unlawful search of a third party's
briefcase.

The facts are

reading even if they

provide interesting

reflect~edit

on the conduct of an

"

/ 1R{ agent.

- ---

biz~rr~nd

~-

The facts are set forth

filed today.

i~

deta~l

in our opinion

In briefest summary,}t was learned that an

.JJ~

officer of a Bahamas bank would be in Miami
records in his briefcase.

~

with~account

The bank officer, not a defendant

£~Sli

"K

in this case, was enticed to dine with a lady, engaged for
the purpose. While he

~~

was~being entertained~an

IRS agent

-

arranged for an illegal entry, and the surreptitious
.

photographing/of the bank account records.
The search clearly violated the Fourth Amendment
rights of the Bahamas bank official,;but no constitutional
rights of respondent were violated.

'·'

2.

The courts below/nevertheless suppressed the
evidence so obtained, exercising their inherent/supervisory
powers.
Although no court would condone the setting up of
the bank

officia~and

the deliberate invasion of his _
Fourth
_...

Amendment rights,/the critical

fac~s

that he is not

,

1

~·-~-~!4~~ ¢-~'YLfkf

involved in this case. /\Ne ~igl'tt ~errdeu~has ~een
violated. aRd

cases

~cordingly-

-~standing

under

be used in this

wa~to

doct!iAe of our

under the Fourth Amendment/to

demand exclusion of the evidence.

~

se6tl8~

"(~

The supervisory power may

deny access to highly probative

evidence.

,

.......-.-..-

responsibility of the Executive

Branch to

, 1by appropriate sanctions, ~compliance

with its own

istence that constitutional rights be

respected. /
l ', Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion
in which Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun have
joined.

> \

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum
-------------------------------------' 19--------

[n.dJ

78-1729-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. PA YNER

In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979),
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960) , the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power.
" [A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
11eed for untramm.eled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. fl .. at 216.
Ree also Nardone v. Uuited States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
\Ye conclude that the sup0rvisory power does not ;;ermit 21
federal c?urt to suppress ('virlt ~~eo~ain~eel 8y 1m tu~tt«!at
~ 'nthfntt 8? ~N:li;y b:rlancmg
of:
·
a~&iHet its high ewi.!tlttl eol!'lte. -Atwt .Qur Fourth Amendment
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.7 The
values assign·ed to the competing interests do not change
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case. the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain precisely the same.
1 "The drterrrnt vnlur:: of prrventing the incrimination of thosr whose
rights the police have violatrcl hnve bern ronsiderecl ~uffieient to ju~tify
11H' supprr::;:;ion of probative r,·idenrr evrn though the ('U~e again:;! tJH•
r1rfendani i;; weakPnecl or clf',;troyPd. We :tdherf' to that jud11:ment. But
we· are not. eonvinrPd that the additional benefit» of rxtendmg the rxrlu~ iomtr~· rul<' t.o other drfendan1 s would justify fmther rnrroarhmrnt tqlon
(])(' pubhr interr~t in JWO:'Pcuting tho:-:r arcusecl of crime a]l(l having tlwm
ac·qnitted or convicted on thr ba::;is of all the cvidPncP wlmh rxpo~r,; t hP
trut h.'' Alderman v. United States, sup,m, nL 174-175. Sec al::;o Stone

•'

78-1729-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. PAYNER

7

that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
~hough exclusion jsAa necessary deterrent i;o unlawful
conduct in appropriate case~ the Court has acknowledged
1
that the suppression of probativ~ but tainted evidence exacts
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;
United States v. Ceccoli,ni, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan
v. ~'Pucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 ( 1974); Kaufman v. United
Qok.s
States, 394 U. S. 217, 237- 238 (1969) (Black, J., dissentingC
J
'
Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending apph- )~ ~~ -!:hg
cation of the exclusionary sanction .to enforce ideals of
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth- b)(~tGMDI>j
finding functions of judge and jury. E. g. , Stone v. Powell,
,·\A S.w ciA
supra, at 485-489; United States v. Calandra,"4U. . S. 338,
.
S.e...t 'Z.W/...
348 Hm). After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial.
~
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal S7 lA (fA 1 L
defelldant invokes the supervisory power to .suppress evidence
~
b6t; 7 )b-7~(, 1
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even #SS-75(, (teO~·
/
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights. 0
J1

Kub.
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I

'
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F ederal courts may Ui:ie their s upervi~ory power in some circum~tances to exclude evidence t<tken from the £lefendant by "willful dii:iobedience' of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; cf. Hampton v. United States, -!25 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorize~; ~; uppre"'=i ion of evidenl'e obt.ained from t hird parties in violation of Con ~titu t ion, ~;t atute or
rule. The supervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise
" the administration of criminal ju:stice" amoug the partie~ before the b ar.
McNab{) v. Unit~d States, supra, !1-t 3'!0.
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(Slip Opinion)
:-<OTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time
the opinion is Issued. 'l'he syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the l'eader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. PAYNER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 78-1729. Argued Frbruary 20, 1980-Decided June 23, 1980
At respondent's nonjury trial for falsifying a federal income tax return
by denying that he maintained a foreign bank account, respondent
moved to suppress a loan guarantee agreement in which he pledged the
funds in the bank account as security. The District Court found
respondent guilty on the basis of all the evidence, but then (1) found
that the Government had discovered the guarantee agreement as the
result of a flagrantly illegal search of a bank officer's briefcase, (2) suppressed all the Government's evidence except for respondent's tax return
and 1 eln1 ed testimony, and (3) set aside the conviction for failure to
demonstrate knowing falsification. The court held, inter alia, that,
although the illegal search did not violate respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts
required it to exclude evidence tainted by the illegal search. The Court
of Appeals affirmed.

Held:
1. Respondent lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress thr documents illegally seized from the bank officer. A defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the challenged
conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that
of a third party, and respondent possessed no privacy interest in the
documents seized in this case. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128;
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435. Pp. 4-6.
2. The supervisory power of the federal courts does not authorize a
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it
was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Under
the Fourth Amendment, the interest in deterring illegal searches does
not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party
who was not the victim of the challenged practices. And the values
assigned to the competing interests of deterring illegal searches and of
I

UNITED STATES v. PAYNER
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously
served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case.
E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U. S. 464, 489'-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974). 6 Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and
not the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights. 7
6 See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969)
(Black, J ., dissenting) ; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755--756 (1970).
7 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evi-
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WASHINGTON BUREAU
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24, 1980

Dear Justice Powell,
I thought the Post story today on your
opinion was a mile off the mark .
Enclosed is a copy of our own story, which
I believe puts the issue in much better perspective.
Jim Mann allowed me to write it since I have covered
Project Haven from start to finish .

Best wishes ,

ROOM 730 / 1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVE ., N.W. / WASHINGTON . D.C. 20006 / TELEPHONE 202-393-2424
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Court Voids Ruling That Crip

nos AnAelea mimes

evidence of U.S. tax evasion contail'led in the briefcase should not
have been suppressed in Payner's
case.
The net result of the Supreme
Court ruling, aside from reinstatement of Pay11er's conviction, may be
the reopening of dozens of civil or
criminal tax cases that grew out of
bank customers' documents found in
Wolstencroft's briefcase, sources said.
The IRS and the Justice Department suspended their wide-ranging
investigation into tax evasion through
Bahamian bank accounts shortly after
the adverse ruling by Manos on April
28, 1977.
Many criminal prosecutions may be
lost altogether because the six-year
statute of limitations on criminal tax
cases has already passed for a number
of taxpayers, some government attor-

neys said.
But Richard E. J
who headed the Pr
tigation and helpe
uments from the b
day he hoped the
make every effort
millions of dolla
through civil fra
limit applies to civi
Jaffe, now retir
from work on Pr
Manos criticized th
stencroft's briefca
Norman L. Casper
gator and IRS info
Casper, who se
the briefcase from
friend of Wolsten
utes in January, 1
preme Court rulin
Miami as "a vict

v~

WAsillNGTON-Nursing home residents have no constitutional right to a hearing before federal funds are cut
off to their home. thus forcing them to move, the Supreme
Court ruled Monday.
The justices, by a vote of 7 to 1. rejected efforts by advo• cates for the elderly to win new legal protections that
would have given nursing home residents a chance to resist efforts by the federal government to close down a
home.
About 1.2 million Americans live in nursing homes. The
median age of the residents is 81, and at least half of them
are dependent on the federal Medicaid and Medicare programs for
their .support.
.
...

Times Staff Writer

By JIM MANN

T'\ ......... ~,.l ..... .-i

c .....

") +'h ..... ~ l" -...J ..... _..,J .:'p..J ..... .- -

\..

the court when the case was heard last
take part in the decision.
In other actions Monday, the court:
-Ruled 5 to 4 that federal judges
magistrate the task of hearinJ pretrial
nal case. The ruling upheld a 1976 fede
a magistrate to listen to all relevant
recommend to a trial judge whether he
tion to suppress evidence.
Under the law and Monday's decisi
Warren E. Burger, the trial judge then
transcript of the magistrate's hearing
own. whether to grant the motion. Just
shall, Potter Stewart and Lewis F. P
(U.S. vs. Raddatz. 79-8).

Rules Residents Can't Seek Hearing to Fight Cutoff of

Court Rejects New Nursing Home

. :WASHINGTON-The Supreme
CQurt ruled Monday that a lowerequrt judge erred three years ago
~th a decision that crippled a massive Internal Revenue Service investigation of \iiealthy Americans who
use secret Bahamian bank accounts.
· :1n a 6-3 ruling, the court held that
U:S. District Judge John M. Manos
\vrongly threw out the income tax
tonviction of an Ohio businessman on
grounds that the IRS had conducted
an illegal search to obtain evidence
against him.
: Since the object searched was a
briefcase belonging to a Nassau
banker, H. ~uchael Wolstencroft, and
l}ot the Ohio businessman, Jack
Payner, the Supreme Court said

T1nMs Staff Writer

By ROBERT L. .JACKSON

~vi~ence Found in Illegal Search of Another Man's B

~~gh

'~- Pirt 1-Tues., June 24, 1980
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DIAL D I RECT (202) 872·5045

Hon. Lewis F . Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20543
RE :

?

1nr

United States v. Payner

Dear Justice Powell:
As Cornnissioner of Internal Revenue from May, 1973 to
March, 1977, I am deeply concerned about certain of the
statements made in Footnote 5 to your majority opinion in
the above case. It seems clear that the Court may not have
been given a fully accurate picture of the facts. These
statements and my comments follow.

1. "We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the
improprieties revealed in this record."
It is true that in 1976 Congress investigated the
"briefcase caper", but it is difficult for me to see how a
person reading the hearings of the two Congressional investigations, that made by Chairman Rosenthal's Subcommittee of
the House Governn1ent Operations Committee and cited in
Footnote 5 and the other by Representative Vanik's Oversight
Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means, could conclude
that the "improprieties" investigated were those involved in
the taking of the briefcase. Instead, the primary interest
of both Subcornnittees was investigating allegations about me.
Certain members of the law enforcement community (including
the people who set up the briefcase caper) joined with their
associates in the media in planting and disseminating the
contention that I called off Operation Have~ using the briefcase incident as a pretext, to protect my former law firm and
its clients. That Congressmen Rosenthal and Vanik were investigating these allegations, and other allegations that I was "soft
on crime" is obvious from a reading of the records. See, e.g.,
Rosenthal's record at pp. 30, 82-99, 112, 116-7, 992-927 and
1265-1323 .
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2. "As a result, the Corrunissioner of Internal Revenue
'called off' Operation Trade Winds."
Neither Operation Trade Winds nor Operation Haven
was called off as a result of any Congressional hearing.
Operation Trade Winds had previously been curtailed when
the Internal Revenue Service reexamined its policy and
practices regarding informants. Operation Haven was temporarily suspended after the "briefcase caper" became known to
the IRS National Office officials, and was resumed, at IRS'
request, through a grand jury convened by the Department of
Justice. Congress had nothing to do with any curtailment;
instead, some in Congress were attacking me for having
attempted to make law enforcement officers abide by the law.
3. "Although
less positive than
with upholding the
practices found to

these measures appear
one might expect from
law, they do indicate
have been implemented

on their face to be
an agency charged
disapproval of the
in this case."

The first half of this statement is deeply disturbing
to me. What more "positive" actions could I have taken? I
find it surprising that anyone aware of the facts in 1975-76,
or willing to inquire into the facts, could speak so slightingly.
I attempted, as strongly as I could and with more vigor than
discretion, to prevent certain overzealous IRS criminal investigators from violating the Constitution and the law. For this
effort, I was subjected to a continuing (and almost successful)
campaign of personal harassment in the media and in Congress.
I was the target of a grand jury investigation in Washington,
and I also had to testify in my defense before a grand jury
in Miami. In the end, thanks to the fact that the allegations
against me were completely false and the fact that Secretary
Simon, President Ford and Attorney General Levi were honorable
men, I was cleared and I remained in office.
Since it appears clear that you and your office were not
acquainted with these facts, I am enclosing some clippings
describing the allegations made and the actions taken.
As I stated i~nediately after the first allegations about
me were carried on national television, this is the price one
has to pay for trying to prevent lawless conduct by law enforcement officials. I think that those who head law enforcement
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agencies are fully aware of what happened to me and why it
happened; and it is unrealistic to assume that they will
deliberately subject themselves to the same treatment.
Sincerely yours,

~~A~
/alt
Enclosures

'

·~

I rr>c:Pi vr~d today the' 1?'1closPd 1 ett~':r from Don[lld C.
Alexander, who was Commissioner of Tn+-.Prnal Rovenuf' nt the
time of the events in the abovP suit . Mr . Alexander objects
to the second, third, and fifth sentences (exclusive of
citations)
j n
footnote
5
of _ thf' Court ooin ion .
Tn
parti<"ulnr, he r1sserts t.h~t. ' hr-> d 'i id ?~11 hr> \'Ould to r'""quire
IRS agents to con form to ~h;n 1 ."-\W, and thAt hr> was sever~'? ly
criticize~
for calling ' off Operation Tr?de Winds when h~
learned of thr> improprieties revealad in the ?ayner c~se .

From
newspaper
cliooinqs
attached
to
Mr.
Alexandr>r's lPttPr, T qather that he was falsely accused of
suspending the Bahamian bank invPstiqation in order to
protect pr>rsons whom hr> knew . Congress 5nvastigated this and
similar a~cusations in the hearinqs cited in footnote 5 .
In
the course of the invest iq;)t ion, how~ve>r , the congressional
C"nmmitti?P delve·d~ at length into the i lleqal acts committed by
Mr . Jaffe and Mr. Casper in th~ "briefcase caper . " Thus, I
beliPVP it was ac~urate to state that "in 1976 Conqress
investigat~~ thP improprieties revealed in this
~cord . " .
~~~,;-'· IP!. Pt?rhaps
the
po1i.tici'tl
climate
orevPnted
Hr .
Alexander from tal< ing more positive measures to discipline
the aqents responsible
for the
briE>fcase
affair .
It
nevertheless remains true that the measures taken "appear on
their face to be less positive than one might expP.ct from an
agency charged with .e.n fore ing the l<;~w . " Therefore , I would
not change the second or fifth sentences in foo~notP 5.

·.

2.

The thi r.d sentence, however, may be innccuratc in
implication .
It
reans :
"~s
a
result
[of
the
congr~ssiona.l
investigation 1 , the Commissioner of Intern~ l
Revenue 'c?lle~ off' Operation Tradewin~s."
The information
submitten by Mr . a.l'-"xand~r shows that l1~ suspr.>nt1<?d th'-"
operation before any congrPssional invPstiqation began.
J+-_
therefore appears appropriate to correct the st<'Jteoment th:=tt
thP Commissioner ' s action was triqa'-"r~~ bv Congress' int~r~st
in tho matt~r.
In fact , it se~ms more likely that Congress'
interest was prompten in part hy the Comm. issioner's "lct:il")ns. l
Thus, I propose that the sentence b~ chanqen to read:
"Moreovf"r, tlJf' Commission~r of Internal Revenue--on his own
initiative--'called off' Op..,.rntion Trade Winds."
its

Unless th'-"re is some obiection I will {nstruct the
RPport'-"r to substitute the languAge au ted above for the
third sentenc'-" of footnot~ 5 .
I plan no ~her chanaes in tho
footnot!: .
L. P'. P . , ,Jr.

July 15, 1qgo

Don~ld C. AlPxan~~r, Rsquire
MorqRn L"''r'is & Bocldus

1800 M Str.PAt, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
?0016

Thank you for vour letter of July 1. Tt may well
be (in light of the clippinqs you sent\ that th~ Court was
not fu 11 y adv isPd of CllJ of thr~ fa~ts surrouno inq th~ events
mentioned in the opinion.
As of rourso you understand,
however, ~~ normally do not go beyond the facts of record,
includinq t~e briofs.
Your Primary ~on~ern r~lat~s to footnote 5. I will
commPnt briP.fly on my un~erstancHng of thE> ooints that. ynu

' .t

question~

1.

As you obsGrVP, the

congression~l

investigation

undertakPn in 1976 foruson uoon acrusRtions - L1ter. shown to

be groundloss - th"t IR~ enforcement efforts had b~Pn
in order to nrotAct highly placed exPcutiveq. The
hearings rPferre~ to in footnote 5 of the Court's opinion
~id, however, include lengthy testimony concerninq thP brief
case t-heft at issll() in the Pi'lyner r.:as(!>. Tt th"'"r~fo'CP se~ms
accuratP to state thRt th~ imoropriRt-ies involve~ in thP
litigation bafore us WPre a subject of the congrPssional
investiqation.
hamoere~

2. The statemPnt that Operation Trade Winds w~s
"as ~ result" of the congr~ssional investigation
upon reoresentations made to us by counsel. As the
inference now appears to be inaccurate, the Court has aqr~c.d
to chanqe the sentence to read: "Moreover, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue - on his own initiative - 'calleo off'
Operation Trade Winds."

curtailP~
was b~sed

.,

·r

3. I have no doubt that your actions were an
example of responsible and courageous aoministration in the
face of unjustified criticism. Yet, the record before the
Court certainly demonstrated serious improprieties by
personnel of thP IRS. Nothing in the record indicated that
appropriet~ measures had been tak~n to discipline or
discharge the individuals responsible for what was certainly
a gross and deliberate violation of constitutional rights.
The rPcord presented to this Court showed, in subst~ncp, only
thBt thP IRS had discontinued the operation and issued new
guidelines. The Court thPrefore stated that these m~asures
"appear on th~ir face to have bePn less positive than one
miqht E>XP~t>Ct fr.om an aqPnt:'V r.harged with upho) d inq the ] aw'
" (EmphAsis oodPri).
,~ u
;.

I do underst~nd your concern, and wish that the
had been pres~nred to us in a way that avoided any
possiblP i.nferenC'"" of improPri~ty on your p;:>rt-. Tt is fajr
to say, T think, that none of us hPrP thought in tP~ms of
such impropriety, exC'ept possibly to thP extent. that the
disciplina~y action was inadequate.
I do hope that the
change the Court has madP in the one troublesome sentPnce
wi 11 be he1 pful.
.. , ""·~ ..
cas~

As you know, the Court nor~ally ma~PS no
explanation of an opinion. Yet, in view of
t.o have this opportunity to r.0spond.

MORGAN, LEWIS
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DIAL 01 RECT (202) 872-5045

Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Washing ton, D. C. 20543
RE:

United States v. Payner

Dear Justice Powell:
Thank you very much for your letter of July 15. I
deeply appreciate your interest in this important matter .
With my letter of July 1, I submitted clippings giving
some detail of what happened to me by reason of my effort
to prevent overzealous actions by IRS criminal investigators
and to impose managerial controls (like those used by the
FBI) upon IRS criminal investigations. Had I attempted to
go further than I did, I am absolutely convinced that, at
a minimum, I would have been removed from office. The
power of the law enforcement community, investigative reporters who work with such community and congressmen (and their
staffs) who work with both the media and the law enforcement
community is almost incalculable. I did not realize this
when I acted to try to bring IRS law enforcement activities
under control, but I surely realize it now.
When I took office, I was firmly opposed to the exclusionary rule. I know better now. This rule is essential
to the protection of American liberties .
Finally, I regret the language in Footnote 5 "[a]lthough
these measures appear on their face to be less positive than
one might expect from an agency charged with upholding the
law . . . " apparently remains. The Oversight Hearings of
Congressman Rosenthal's House Government Operations Subcommittee
were cited immediately above this statement. I would like to
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

August 5, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1729, United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
Your July 3 suggestion re this case is entirely
acceptable to me.

cc:

The Conference

I

Subject:
To:
From:

United States v. Payner

August 12, 1980

Paul Cane
L.F.P., Jr.

Attached hereto is Mr. Alexander's letter of July 28,
and a draft of a proposed letter to The Conference.
You will note my statement that one of my clerks
has examined the affidavit ref~rred to in the Alexander
letter. I would appreciate it if one of you would
undertake this. If the affidavit is not too long, perhaps
a xerox copy could be obtained.
Then, have Sally hold these papers in suspense until
September 8th.

-.
L.F.P., Jr.

<'

Subject:
To:
From:

United States

v.

Paynor

September

I'

1980

The Conference
L.F.P., Jr.

The enclosed copy of a letter dated July 28th from
Donald c. Alexander refers to my letter to him of July 15,
a copy of which I sent to each of you before releasing it.
You will recall that Mr. Alexander was Commissioner
of Internal Revenue at the relevant time. Although I
know Mr. Alexander only casually, he has the reputation
of being a lawyer of character. In any event, I am sure
we would not wish to do him an injustice.
His letters of July 1st (that I believe I also sent
you), and that of July 28, argue that he took the lead in
curbing "overzealous actions" by IRS agents, and that the
new regulations were the most restrictive he could obtain.
One of my law clerks has reviewed Special Agent Jaffe's
a&fidavit on pages 232-238 of the Oversight Hearings of the
House Operations Subcommittee, and it generally is supportive of Mr. Alexander's position.
As the portion of Footnote 5 to which he objects is
gratuitous to some extent, I am willing to delete it from
our opinion if this meets with your approval. There is no
urgenc)' about this, and so I am suspending my file until
September 8th. If I have heard no objection by that date,
I will advise Mr. Alexander that we are deleting the
language which distresses him.

L.F.P., Jr •

.. '

Subject:
To:
From:

United States v. Payner

August 12, 1980

Paul Cane
L.F.P., Jr.

Attached hereto is Mr. Alexander's letter of July 28,
and a draft of a proposed letter to The Conference.
You will note my statement that one of my clerks
has examined the affidavit referred to in the Alexander
letter.
I would appreciate it if one of you would
undertake this.
If the affidavit is not too long, perhaps
a xerox copy could be obtained.
Then, have Sally hold these papers in suspense until
September 8th.

L. F. P. , Jr.

Subject:
To:
From:

United States V. Paynor

The Conference
L.F.P., Jr.

The en losed copy
Donald c. Al ander refe
a copy of whi
I sent to e
You will re all that Mr. Alex
of Internal Reven e at the relevant
know Mr. Alexander only casually,
of being a lawyer o
we would not wish to
His letters of Jul
hat I believe I also se
you), and that of July 2
a ue that he took the lead i
curbing "overzealous action ' by IRS agents, and that the
new regulations were the m s restrictive he could obtain.
One of my law cler
re iewed Special Agent Jaffe's
affidavit on pages 232
the Oversight Hearings of the
House Operations Subc
ittee, and 't generally is suppertive of Mr. Alexand 's position.
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As the
of Footnote 5
he objects ~~
gratuitous to sa e extent, I am willing o delete it from
our opinion if his meets with your appro al. There is no
this, and so I am suspending y file until
If I have heard no objectio by that date,
. Alexander that we are dele 'ng the
distresses him.

L.F.P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
RE:

Mr. Justice Powell
Paul Cane
United States v. Payner

I

examined the House Hearings cited by Mr.

Alexander in his letter to you.

The affidavit to which he

refers does support his assertion that he took the lead in
curbing

overzealous

actions

by

IRS

agents,

to

the

but

does

not

mention any new regulations.
In

your

memo

Conference,

characterized the affidavit as "generally •
of Mr. Alexander's position.

you

• supportive"

That seems accurate.

p. w. c.
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August 22, 1980

DIAL DIRECT (202) 872-5045

Ron. Lewis F. Powell, Jr .
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
l First Street, N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20543
RE:

United States v. Payner

Dear Justice Powell:
After sending my letter of July 28 to you, I realized
that I should have enclosed a copy of the materials to which
I referred.
A copy of Special Agent Jaffe's November, 1979 Affidavit
is attached. Mr. Jaffe states on page 236 that he was the
subject of a criminal investigation and that he was advised
that the Federal Grand Jury in Miami would take his testimony.
This Affidavit was part of the record in the Oversight Hearings
specifically cited in Footnote 5 discussed in your letter of
July 15 in response to mine of July l .
As stated in my prior letters, I don't know what more
IRS or I could have done. Surely IRS should not be blamed
for the unwillingness of the Department of Justice to prosecute
a law enforcement officer.
I hope that after reviewing this material you will modify
the statement in Footnote 5 that "these measures appear on their
face to be less positive that one might expect from an agency
charged with upholding the law, . .
" Mr. Jaffe - and many
others in the IRS, the Department of Justice, Congress and the
media - considered these actions to be much too positive.
Thank you again for your consideration.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,

/alt
Enclosure

r;J;L

c. 1\

.L
L...L-,_ .{_
Donald C. Alexander

MORGAN, LEWIS

Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
RE:

& BOCKIUS

Page 2

July 28, 1980

United States v. Payner

call your attention to Special Agent Jaffe's affidavit on
pages 232-238 of these Hearings. This and other material
in the Subcommittee's Hearings, a part of the record, make
it clear, I believe, what was done and that what was done
was as much as was humanly possible to do.
With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

~. ~1~~
/alt
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

August 22, 1980
78-1729 United States v. Payner
MEMORANDUM TO

a July 28 from
him of July 15, a
e releasing it.

The enclosed opy of a letter
Donald C. Alexander ref rs to my letter
copy of which I sent to each of you bef

You
that Mr. A xander was Commissioner
of Internal Revenue at t e relevant ime. Although I know
Mr. Alexander only casual
he ha the reputation of being a
lawyer of character.
In
, I am sure we would not
wish to do him an injusti
His letters of Ju y
(that I believe I also sent
you), and that of July 28,
gbe that he took the lead in
curbing "overzealous actio
' by IRS agents, and that the new
regulations were the most es rictive he could obtain.
He
objects to the statement 1n fn 5 that implies that the IRS
did not take appropriat actio
One of my 1 w clerks h s
Jaffe's affidavit on pages 232-23
of the House Opera~ions Subcommitt:
supportive of Mr. Alexander's posi

reviewed Special Agent
of the Oversight Hearings
e, and it generally is

ion.

As ihe portion of fn. 5 to \ which he objects may be
g atuitous to some extent, I am willing to delete
it from o
opinion if this meets with your approval. There
is no ur ency about this, and so I am suspending my file
until
ptember 15.
If I have heard n~ objection by that
date, I will advise Mr. Alexander that we are deleting the
language which distresses him.
\
\

-L.r~
L.F.P., Jr.'

ss

'~

.

September 5, 1980
78-1729 United States v. Payner

Although I can understand your sensitivity, I do
not feel justified in recommending, on the basis of the
record before us, a change in the sentence that concerns you.
Nor do I think that the intelligent reader will think that
you were responsible personally. Indeed, I did not. I
regarded the misconduct in the investigation as being wholly
unauthorized, and the action finally taken as the product of
departmental compromise - a result not uncommon in
Washington.
In sum, after the change already made at your
request, I am quite hesitant to make a further change in the
note. If, however, you wish me to submit your correspondence
to the entire Court, I will be happy to do so.
I add that I have heard no Justice speak critically
of you personally.
Sincerely,

Hon. Donald c. Alexander
Morgan, Lewis & Beckius
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. c. 20036
lfp/ss
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NEW YORK
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WASHINGTON , D.C. 20036
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September 15, 1980
DONALD

C.

ALEXANDER

DIAL DIRECT (202) 872-5045

Ron. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street , N. E .
Washington, D. C. 20543
RE: 78-1729 United States v. Payner
Dear Justice Powell:
Thank you for your letter of September 5. I am
grateful for what you said and I fully accept your
conclusion, although, of course, I wish that you had
been willing to change the sentence that concerns me .
Let me again express my gratitude for your patience
and your responsiveness. Perhaps the corr espondence
might be of interest to other members of the Court as an
example of what may happen when the head of a law enforcement
agency attempts to curb excesses. However, I am aware of the
very heavy demands on the Court's time .
With best wishes,
Sincerely,

/alt

~r£~ ~l~aria/r--
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Jlufringht~ ~.

<lf.

2llgt"';l

/

CHAMBERS OF

'HE CHIEF JUSTICE

September 17, 1980

RE:

78-1729 United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I leave this matter in your hands.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.:§u:vr tmt QJou.tt of fire ~Uritt b ,;§tail g

~ct$lp:ttgton. ~. QJ. ZO,?JI-.;1
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

September 17, 1980

78-1729 United States v. Payner

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
You will recall that last July, responding to a
request by Donald Alexander (former Commissioner of the IRS),
we made a small change in footnote 5.
This did not entirely satisfy his concerns and he
wrote me twice during the summer.
I responded in my letter
of September 5, copy enclosed .
I now have his letter of
September 15, in which he suggests that other members of the
Court may be interested in the correspondence.
Accordingly,
I enclose copies of his three letters.
In my view, nothing
further need be done.

ss

'
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September 17, 1980

78-1729 United States v. Payner

TO THE CONFERENCE:
You will recall that last July, responding to a
request by Donald Alexander (former Commissioner of the IRS),
we made a small change in footnote 5.
This did not entirely satisfy his concerns and he
wrote me twice during the summer. I responded in my letter
of September 5, copy enclosed. I now have his letter of
September 15, in which he suggests that other members of the
Court may be interested in the correspondence. Accordingly,
I enclose copies of his three letters.
In my view, nothing
further need be done.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.<

;
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

September 17, 198 0

Re:

78-1729 - United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis :
Thanks for sharing copies of your
correspondence with Donald Alexander .
Although I am sympathetic with his concern ,
I agree with you that nothing further need
be done.
Sincerely yours ,
,' \
I

_)

'.

/
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

5-

I

/

;§u.prtutt Qf1tud 1tf tlft 'Jilnittb ;itatts

.a:sfri:ttgbm. ~. <!f. 2llgi~$
C HAMBERS Or

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

September 18, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1729

United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I concur in the views stated in your memorandum of
September 17th that nothing further need be done in this
case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

_ J'

,;v·

,jnprtntt Qflturl ttf tift
JI'Mlfingt~ J.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR .

RE:

,-mub ,jtattg

Qf.

2llgt,.,

September 18, 1980

No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I agree that nothing further need be done.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.h:p-unu ~ourl trf ttr~ ~ttitt~ ~mug
._-zudtin¢on. ~. ~· 2JJ.;t~'
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

September 23, 1980

No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner

Dear Lewis:
I share your feeling that nothing further need be done.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

it-f
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No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner
MR.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion

of the Court.
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The

vv

question

is

whether

the

District

1

C6urt properly suppressed
that

violated

third

party

the
but

the

Fourth
did

fruits of a

Amendment

not

search

rights

invade)

he

of

a
~ .

criminal

"

defendant's own Fourth Amendment rights l

..

I

Respondent

Jack

Payner

was

indicted

in

September, 1976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972
federal income tax return in violation of 18
§

1001 • ..!J

The

u.s.c.

indictment alleged that respondent

denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time
when he knew that he
Castle

Bank

Islands.

and

had

Trust

such

Company

an account at the
of

Nassau,

The government's case rested heavily on a

loan guarantee agreement dated April
which

Bahama

respondent

pledged

the

funds

28,

1972,

in

in his Castle

Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan.
Respondent
guarantee
trial.

agreement

moved
and

to

waived his

suppress
right

to

the
jury

With the consent of the parties, the United

States District Court for the Northern District of

2.

Illinois took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated

with

court

respondent

found

the

trial

guilty

the

that

guarantee

agreement

illegal
The

the
as

charged

on

exploiting

a

therefore

the

the

flagrantly

search that occurred on January 15,

court

The

discovered

government
by

merits.

The court also found,

basis of all the evidence.
however,

on

suppressed

"all

1973.

evidence

introduced in the case by the Government with the
exception of Jack Payner's

1972 tax return

and the related testimony."

434 F.Supp.

(1978).

As the tax return alone was

113,

136

insufficient

to demonstrate knowing falsification, the District
Court

set~espondent's conviction ~.~/
The events leading up to the 1973 search

are

largely

Revenue

undisputed.

Service

launched

In

1965,

an

the

Internal

investigation

of

foreign tax havens under the code name "Operation
Trade Winds."
in

1972,

Suspicion focused on the Castle Bank

when

investigators

suspected narcotics
had an account there.
who

supervised

learned

that

a

trafficker named Allan Palmer
Special Agent Richard Jaffe,

Operation

Trade

Winds

from

the

3.

Service's Florida offices, knew that a local banker
named F. Eugene Poe served on the Castle Bank board
of directors.
a

private

Jaffe also knew that Norman Casper,

investigator

and

occasional

informant,

was friendly with Poe.

The agent asked Casper to

learn

about

what

Through

he

Poe,

Michael

could

Casper

met

Wolstencroft

account.

Palmer's

vice-president

of

the

Herbert
Bank.

Castle

Wolstencroft told Casper that the balance in Allan
Palmer's account was $25,000.
Casper passed this intelligence along to
agent

Jaffe,

who

computerized
observed
list,

depositor

list

in Wolstencroft' s
Casper

interest

expressed

determined

Casper

that

office.
to

to

among

a

them

Kennedy.

several
private

women

had

his

cultivate

in

a

To obtain the

relationship with the bank officer.
Wolstencroft

in

He introduced
the Miami

investigator

area,

named

Sybil

When Casper discovered that Wolstencroft

intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973,

he

approved
access

went
the

to

to
basic

Jaffe

with

outline

Wolstencroft's

of

a

plan.
a

The

scheme

briefcase,

and

agent

to

qain

Casper

4.

turned to Kennedy for assistance.
Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January
15

and went directly to Kennedy's

apartment.

At

about 7:30p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key
Biscayne.
apartment
removed
Jaffe.
~

Shortly thereafter,
using

the

a

key

briefcase

Casper entered the

supplied
and

by

Kennedy.

delivered

it

to

He
Agent

While Jaffe supervised the copying of
400

documents

"lookout"
dinner.

observed

taken

from

Kennedy

the

and

briefcase,

Wolstencroft

a
at

This observer notified Casper as the pair

left the restaurant, and the briefcase was swiftly
replaced.

Casper received $8,000 in cash for these

services.
The District Court found that the United

a<.~
States

1

~ through

participated

in

Jaffe ) "knowingly
the

unlawful

seizure

Wolstencroft's briefcase •
120 •

..v

According

to

that

and

willfully
of

Michael

" 434 F. Supp., at
court,

"the

Government

affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth
Amendment

standing

limitation

permits

them

to

purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and
seizure

of

one

individual

in

order

to

obtain

5.

evidence

against

132-133.

third

parties

"

Id.,

The loan guarantee agreement was,

District

Court's

intentional

a

view,

constitutional rights.

this

Wolstencroft's

of

violation

in the

of

product

at

Id., at 123.

The District

Court believed that this sort of behavior must be
deterred -- even where, as here, the search did not
impinge

upon

rights.

The court concluded that the Due Process

Clause

of

the

supervisory
the

the

Fifth

power

exclusion of

motivated

by

hostility

defendant's

a

Amendment

of

the

and

federal

and

any

inherent

courts

required

from

purposeful

Id.,

at

a

search

bad

faith

fundamental

person's

constitutional rights."

Amendment

the

evidence obtained

"knowing

to

Fourth

129

(emphasis

in

original); see id., at 133, 134-135.
The
Circuit

affirmed

Court

Sixth

590

F.2d

not

decide

the

Due

Court

Process

order

the

District Court's use of its supervisory power.
The

brief

for

the

(1979).

a

Appeals

endorsing

206

in

of

of

Appeals

question.

certiorari, and we now reverse.

We

did

granted

6.

II
This

Court

discussed

the

doctrine

of

"standing to invoke the exclusionary rule" in some
detail last term.
138
that

(1979).
a

We

reaffirmed

court may

not

the

exclude

or

seizure

constitutional

128,

established

rule

evidence

Fourth Amendment unless it finds
search

u.s.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439

violated

rights.

the

that an unlawful

the

Id.,

under

defendant's

at

133-140~

own
See,

e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229-230
(1973);

Alderman v.

United

States,

394

u.s.

171-172 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390
377,

389

( 1968

0

The

question

challenged

each

in

search

165,

u.s.

case

is

invaded
the

legitimate

expectation

Rakas v.

Illinois, supra, at 143;

(POWELL,

J.,

408

u.s.

u.s.

concurring);

224,

227

Combs v.

of

privacy.

id., at 149-152
United States,

(1972); Mancusi v.

DeForte,

392

364, 369-370 (1968).
These principles were applied to bank
Miller,

425

u.s.

J
I

records

in United States v.

435

(1976).

Miller rejected a depositor's challenge to

the use at trial of information that his bank had

1

(t

lfp/ss

4/1/80

Rider - Ai - p: - 6 - (Payner)

And whether a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated depends upon whether the challenged search or

-

.

seizure invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather
than that of a third party.

' ''

7.

surrendered under an allegedly defective subpoena.
We

held

Fourth

that

the

depositor

Amendment

had

interest,"

~~~ation
"\

no

"protectable

because

he

lacked -e----

of privacy in the copies of

his checks and deposit slips retained by the bank.
Id., at 437; see id., at 442.
simply

"does

not

The Fourth Amendment
of

obtaining

the

prohibit

information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by

him

to

information
will

be

Government

authorities,

even

if

the

is revealed on the assumption that it

used only

confidence placed

for

a

1 imi ted

in the

purpose

and

the

third party will not be

betrayed." Id. at 435.

--------

_JThese

respondent's

authorities

Fourth

District

Court

did

disturb

..._

not

The

District

dispose

Court

of

Court's

of
the

as

claim,

Amendment

recognized.
the

entirely

Appeals

conclusion

that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest in
the

Castle

Bank

Wolstencroft."
Both

courts

court's
suppress

documents

434 F.Supp.,
believed,

inherent
evidence

that

were

at 126.

however,

by

gross

from

Nor do we. 4!

that

supervisory power
tainted

seized

a

permits

federal
it

to

illegalities

lfp/ss

4/1/80
The foregoing authorities establish, as the

District Court recognized) that respondent lacked standing to
urge suppression of the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft.

Ellen:
I have suggested a revision of this ,sentence to
emphasize that Alderman and like cases have spoken in terms
of "standing".
opinion.

We should not lose sight of this in our

This is one place we can refer back to "standing".

You may find other places.

8.

that do not infringe the rights or interests of any
party
that

to

the

this

reach

litigation.

novel

of

the

The

government

doctrine

improperly

supervisory

power

calculated

to

upset

interests

embodied

the

careful

in

decisions of this Court.

expands

in

a

the

manner

balancing

of

Amendment

Fourth

the

argues

We agree.
A

The District Court held that its decision
to suppress the disputed evidence was dictated by
the need to deter deliberate

intrusions

privacy

unlikely

of

persons

defendants

in

a

who

are

criminal

into the
to

prosecution.

become
434

S u pp. , at 1 3 5 ; see i d • at 1 3 4 -1 3 5 n . 7 5 , 1 2 9

F.
&

n.

~

65, 131-133. _J we share that court's ~ desire to deter

the

~~
mrconduct that occurred in

of ~ SR k k~

sort

this

case.

~

behavior

of

"briefcase
Court

J--

No

should

condone

the

unconstitutional and possibly criminal
those

caper."~/

are

court

replete

who

planned

and

executed

~

~ the

Indeed, the decisions of this
with

J::~re:fe-wltdl:y · de::rl:nrt.."""::-iv~.

denunciations

eff~ct!!

ef

of

sue.fl ~ lawless

~~ ~.ul. u.v ~ ~ u7 ~ ~"""~~..u.-ur.d-.
ef~ert~

t s-

~'f'se

tRe

l!aw.

E.g.,

1\ -

Jackson · v.

lfp/ss

4/1/80

Rider - Aj - p: - 8 - (Payner)

We share the Court's commendable desire to deter the
deliberate use of illegal methods by government agents or
officers.

9.

u.s.

Denno,

378

United

States,

dissenting).
principle
today,

368,

for

(1964);

u.s.

277
But

cannot

386

438,

sweeping
decide

the

the principle

issue is whether this

is

see Olmstead v.

485

(Brandeis,

J.,

pronouncements

of

question

not

presented

in dispute.

The

respondent ~ ~he

The suppression of probative but tainted
evidence

exacts

a

costly

~~

toll

the -eettr ts-+

upon

~~~

tnlth .;_~dA eo f't:tl'\ioh the

ability'\ to ascertain the

~~A-~~ gullt;y.

E.g.,

Rakas v.

Illinois,

supra,

138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435
279 (1978).

u.s.

at

137-

268, 275-

Our cases recognize that an unbending

insistence upon the ideal of governmental rectitude
would

impede

performance

to

of

an

unacceptable

degree

~

these

v ~te:i ~ funct ionsl\

~

Thus,

the
the

require the suppression

J1A,t-

~~

~~

rkJjf·~.J

of "anythinq which deters illegal searches • • . • "
Alderman

v.

abhorrence

United
of

States,

illegality

supra,
neither

at

174.

requires

Our
nor

permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in
all

proceedings

or

against

all

persons."

United

1 0.

States

v.

Calandra,

u.s.

414

338,

348

(1974).

Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that
weighs
rule

the
in

Ibid.;

benefits of

a

given

applying

situation

see United States v.

the

~~~J....Q._

its

against
Ceccol ini,

"\

costs.

supra,

u.s.

275-279; United States v. Janis, 428
454-454, 457-460

exclusionary

at

443, 448,

(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428

u.s.

464, 485-489 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422

u.s.

531, 535-539 (1975).
The

rule

that

bars

a

defendant

from

asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers
rests explicitly on just such a balance.
"The

deterrent

values of

the

incrimination

of

preventing

those

whose

rights the police have violated have
been considered sufficient to justify
the suppression of probative evidence
even

though

defendant

the

is

case

against

the

weakened or destroyed.

We adhere to that judgment.

But we

are not convinced that the additional
benefits

of

extending

the

exclusionary rule to other defendants
would

justify

upon

the

public

prosecuting
and

having

convicted

further

on

those

in

interest

accused

them
the

encroachment

of

crime

acquitted

basis

of

all

evidence which exposes the truth."

or
the

11.

Alderman - v; - united - states, supra, at 174-175.
Court

has

applied

E.g., Rakas v.
States

v.

rawn a

this

principle

The

consistently.

Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. United

Calandra,

supra

distinction

have never

at 348.

between deliberate misconduct

faith misjudgment in order to expand the
class of defendants who may invoke the exclusionary

B

The

balance

does

when

change

not

'

~~ ~
exclusion is sought uAeer eRe rabrie oi'I supervisory

.

~ J~~~-~..L~
To be sure, a court may employ that

power ~
to

exclude

evidence

taken

from

the

~~ ~-

powe ~

defendant

by

fl_:.l: :s.t.io~ate

"willful disobedience of law" .. t.hat; 9oee

McNabb v. United States,
318

U.S.

332,

345

States,

364

States,

350 u.s.

v.

United

States,

concurring
never

u.s.

in

the

suggested

authorizes a court
obtained

see

(1943);

206,
214,

223

U.S.

judgment)
that
~ ~ely

v.

United

Rea

v.

United

(1960);

216-217

425

Elkins

cf.

( 1956);

484,

495

Hampton

(POWELL,

J.,

.2_/ But the Court has

the

supervisory

power

to suppress all evidence

in viol at ion of Constitution,

statute or

~

1 2.

rule.

In United States v. Caceres, 440

u.s.

741,

754-757 (1979), we refused to apply a uniform rule
of

exclusion

executive

as

a

remedy

department's

for

violations
And

rules.

in

of

an

Elkins

v.

United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for
a restrained application of the supervisory power
in terms that foreshadowed the language that would
later appear in Alderman v. United States, supra:
"[A]ny

apparent

process

of

federal

trial

limitation

discovering
ought

upon

truth

to

be

the
in

a

imposed

only upon the basis of considerations
which outweigh the general
untrammeled

disclosure

of

need

for

competent

and relevant evidence in a court of
justice."
Thus,
proceed

under

eliminate

the

the
its

364 U.S., at 216.
District

Court's

supervisory

requirement

that

decision

power
it

to

did

not

balance

the

benefits and burdens of applying the exclusionary
rule.

Nor does a change in legal theory alter the

weight to be assigned the elements of the balance.
The need to deter the

underlying

conduct

and

the

cost of excluding the evidence are the same under
the supervisory power as they are under the Fourth
Amendment.

And our Fourth Amendment decisions have

1 3.

established
interest

beyond

in

sufficient

deterring
to

evidence at

any

justify

the

doubt

that

illegal
the

the

searches

exclusion

social
is

of

not

tainted

instance of a party who

was

victimized by the challenged practices.

not

Rakas v.

Illinois, supra; Alderman v. United States, supra.
The District Court
concluded
[bad

that

faith]

~~
~~e .principles
when it

"society's
conduct

by

interest

in

exclusion

deterring

outweigh(s]

society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
with

all

relevant

434

evidence."

F.

Supp.,

at

135.

The District Court's reasoning, which the
Court

of

Appeals

substitution

of

affirmed,
its

own

amounts
judgment

controlling decisions of this Court.

piSOVi

si an..s--..g.gvsrniA9

to

~n:reasonable

a
for

.ffl

the

order to

SQ;a.rcheo ,.... -rhe

courts
Constitution itself withholds: an independent right
"to exclude relevant and probative evidence because
it

was

Fourth

seized

from

Amendment."

another
Alderman

in

violation
v.

United

of

the

States,

I

1 4.

supra,

at

174 •

In

so

doing,

they

slighted

the

. ;.....e

~
~ l.Interests
1

t h at

h ave

led

this

and

other

courts to limit the class of persons who may invoke
the exclusionary rule.
of

the

Were we to accept this use

supervisory power,

judiciary

to

limitations

circumvent

of the

with enforcing.

we would authorize
at

will

substantive

the

the

considered

law it

is charged

We hold that the supervisory power

does not extend so far.7/
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

lfp/ss 4/1/79
Ellen:

What do you think of adding a note along the

following lines, perhaps at or near the end of the opinion:
.
I

I

The "security of persons and property

remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers
must respect.
unscathed".

Nor should those who flout the rules escape
Alderman, sopra, at 175.

Disciplinary or other

appropriate action is, however, the responsibility of the
Executive Branch itself -

in this case the Justice Department

or the Internal Revenue Service.

Nor can we assume that the

lawless conduct practiced in this case, if brought to the
attention of responsible officials, would not be dealt with
severely.

The suppression, in a trial against a third party,

of highly probative evidence only penalizes society; as a
sanction against the offending federal official, it is both
irrational and ineffective.

FOOTNOTES

~/

18

u.s.c.

1001 provides in relevant

§

part:
"Whoever,

in

any

jurisdiction

of

matter
any

within

the

department

or

agency of the United States knowingly
and willfully •
fictitious
or

• makes any false,

or

fraudulent

statements
shall

representations,

fined

not

more

than

be

$10,000

or

imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."

!:.I

The unusual sequence of rulings was

necessitated by the consolidated hearing conducted
by the District Court.

The court initially refused

to enter a decision on the merits.

At the close of

the evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion
to suppress.

After the Court of Appeals

for

the

Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for
want of
the

jurisdiction,

order

entered

granting

a

verdict

the

the
of

District
motion

guilty.

Court

to
The

vacated

suppress

and

court

then

reinstated its suppression order and set aside the
Respondent

verdict.

does

not

challenge

States

argued

these

procedures.

ll

The

United

District Court and the Court of Appeals

in

the

that

the

2.

guarantee

agreement

was

by

discovered

an

investigation independent of the briefcase search.
The

government

also

that

denied

its

agents

instigated or willfully encouraged Casper's illegal
behavior.
the

For purposes of our decision, we accept

District

Court's

contrary

findings

on

both

points.

!/
belated

We are not persuaded by respondent's

suggestion that

the Bahamian law of

bank

secrecy creates a reasonable expectation of privacy
not

present

in

United

States

v.

Miller,

supra.

Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court
addressed
Ch.

this claim,

which

is based entirely on

157.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands

(Rev.

Ed.

1929).

The statute does not on its face

cloak banking transactions in the enveloping cloak
of secrecy that respondent envisions.

It provides

that:
"A bank shall from time to time, if
required by the Governor, furnish to
the
such

Governor
further

Governor
call

for:

may

a

special

return

information
reasonably

Provided,

as

see

that

and
such

fit

the

to

bank

shall not, nor shall anything herein
contained be construed to authorise a

3.

bank

to

account

make
or

whatever

known

accounts

having

the
of

private

any

dealings

person

with

the

bank."
The

proviso

ensures

that

relied
the

upon

by

reporting

respondent

obligation

merely

created

by

the statute will not be thought to require or to
It

permit the disclosure of private accounts.
hardly
the

a

blanket

statute

guarantee

may

of

admit

of

is

privacy.

Although

more

generous

a

construction, we have been directed to no authority
that would
which

support such a

Norman Casper

reading.

learned

Palmer's account, supra, p.

the

The ease

balance

know

that

in Allan

, belies any notion

of strictly enforced confidentiality.
depositors

with

their

own

And American

country

requires

them to report relationships with foreign financial
institutions.

31

U.S.C.

§

1121;

31

C.F.R.

§

103.24. See California Bankers Assn. v. -shultz 416
U.S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974).

These considerations

erode such limited expectations of privacy as might
otherwise be thought to flow from Ch. 157.9.

11
Service has

We

note

that

the

instituted guidelines

Internal

Revenue

in this regard.

4.

IRS

Manual

Supp.

9G-40

3,

(Feb.

1977).

The

guidelines require that agents instruct informants
on the requirements of the law, id., at § 3.03, and
report known illegalities to the appropriate state
authorities, id., at§ 4.

Although these measures

are far less severe than one might expect from an
agency

charged

with

upholding

the

rf~--:-or~~

law,

they

callous

do

polic o /

.

~~~~~~::e.~~~
1\
~/

supports

None

the

of

the

District

cited

Court's

cases
view

directly
that

the

supervisory power may be used to exclude evidence
tainted by unlawful conduct that does not
upon

any

protected

present in court.
supervise
alleged

law
to

interest

the

litigants

Indeed, when a court attempts to

enforcement

have

of

intrude

behavior

infringed

defendant before the bar,

the

that

rights

is

not

of

the

it arguably departs from

the assigned role of the judiciary -- to adjudicate
the rights of litigants.

The

judiciary's efforts

to deter unlawful activity through the application
of an exclusionary rule strain this concept even in
the

ordinary

case.

The

extra

step

taken

by

the

5.

Court of Appeals in this case threatens to divorce
~t±t~ry

the supervisory power from its theoretical

justification.

21

Respondent

judgment may
power

under

be

affirmed

the

Amendment.

also

Due

The

as

a

Process

Court

contends
valid

Appeals

declined to consider this argument.

the

exercise of

Clause of

of

that

the

Fifth

expressly

But even if we

assume that the unlawful briefcase search at issue
in this case was so outrageous as to offend deeply
ingrained "canons of decency and fairness," Rochin
v. California,

342

u.s.

165,

169 (1952), the fact

remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process
Clause

come

Government
protected
United

activity
right

States,

opinion).

of
425

into
in

play

only

question

the

violates

defendant,"

u.s.

484,

when

490

the
some

Hampton

v.

(plurality

One may disagree with the view of the

plurality in Hampton v. United States, supra, that
no protected

interest of a

criminal defendant

is

involved when the police encourage and participate
in

his

crime.

See

id.,

at

concurring in the judgment).

491-495

(POWELL,

J.,

But there can be no

6.

doubt

that

the

search

of

Michael

Wolstencroft 1 s

briefcase -- no matter how outrageous -- did not
intrude upon this respondent 1 s rights in any way.
Thus,

the

Due

Process

The

analysis.

question

whether

a

person

search

may

use

not
it

evidence.

Whatever

balance

interests

of

claim does
for

obtain

label

by

the

may

remains

change

decision

victimized

to

not

be

the

an

is

still

unlawful

exclusion
applied,

same.

the

And

of
the
the

outcome of that balance is determined by the prior
decisions of this Court.

er 4/1/80
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner
MR.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion

of the Court.
The

question

is

whether

the

District

Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful
search that did not invade the respondent's Fourth
Amendment rights.
I
~

Respondent

Jack

Payner

was

indicted

in

September, 1976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972
federal income tax return in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§

1001 • .l/

The indictment alleged that respondent

denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time
when he knew that he had such an account at the
7

· Castle

Bank

Islands.

and

Trust

Company of

Nassau,

The government's case rested heavily on a

loan guarantee agreement dated April
which

Bahama

respondent

pledged~

funds

28,

1972,

in

in his Castle

Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan.
~

guarantee
trial.

Respondent
agreement

moved

to

suppress

and waived his right to

the
jury

With the consent of the parties, the United

States District Court for the Northern District of

} C l.,'o

1

Il{ino'rs took evidence on the motion at a hearing

2.

consolidated

with

court

respondent

found

the

trial

guilty

basis of all the evidence.
however,

that

the

guarantee

agreement

on

the
as

charged

on

court

therefore

the

the

discovered

exploiting

a

flagrantly

illegal search that occurred on January 1 5,
The

The

The court also found,

government
by

merits.

suppressed

"all

197 3.

evidence

introduced in the case by the Government with the
exception of Jack Payner' s

1972 tax return

and the related testimony."

1434

F.Supp.

· l~v~,J

11 3,

136

As the tax return alone was insufficient
to demonstrate knowing falsification,
Court set aside respondent's

the District

conviction.~/

The events leading up to the 1973 search
are

largely

Revenue

t

Y'O

.J

undisputed.

Service

launched

In

1965,

an

the

Internal

investigation

of

-btu.

~.

t-

foteign tax havens under the code name "Operation
Trade Winds."
in

1972,

Suspicion focused on the Castle Bank

when

investigators

suspected narcotics
had an account there.
who

supervised

learned

that

a

trafficker named Allan Pal-meff
Special Agent Richard Jaffe,

Operation

Trade

Winds

Service's Florida offices, knew that a

from

~1

the

banker

3.

med F. Euqene Po-e served on the Castle Bank board

9

.s;U. di1:.ec.t.or.s.

( a

private

Jaffe also knew -thatj Norman Casper ,

investigator

-friendly wi t-h--Pcr •

and

occasional

informant,

The

a g en 1;-. asked [ Cas.per t

}

a§fo:v., •""""' ""-'~
,1.])})_ !,( nc :J 1;

~arn

.--

•

what

Through

he

Poe,

"" Michael

could

about
met

Casper

Wolstencroft

Palmer's

ae-eetmt •

vice-president

of

the

i;

krrJ,jll~ ~.(YtRw

{J)'fiit 1;t..£ (JUJ~

Herbert

Castle

re1.{ cflt4

!ct,.J,

Ba+l-k.

Wolstencroft told Casper that the balance in Allan
(')

Palmer's account was $25,000.
rCasper passed this intelligence along to
Jaffe,

agent

who

computerized
observed

~'

depositor

list

Casper

~etermined

relationship with

VY1

f te

Wolstencroft

~ /, ~~t

_3-amor:tg

_Q

Casper

had

U

f

ft.

the-m /_a

Kennedy.

f

l

1

ltt-J

(;J.J sf-eM

H'f

1 "

rj wL" ()._

/G

to se-veral
1J..

cultivat~

t-o

bank-of"fi:-c'er-.

S'..'j ~

un

that

a

in Wolstencroft' s office.

\.J

\

in

interest

expressed

I

wo en

J

4..

u,~- ~1"''-'J

introduced

--

J~£l2 tetAitt «~~
-

(Ct'Or)
\.-

"1(7/

t-he- ~

·

I

p rivate

ff

his

t •j
investigator)

name-d

When Casper discovered that Wolstencroft

intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973,

he

appreved
access

J

r

wf_nt

to

the

basic
bf4./.,, 'rut.f..J .1

to

Jaffe

with

outline
.· /
' f

j Wolstencroft' s

a

of

plan.
a

scheme

briefcase

turned to Kennedy for assistance.

The
to

agent
gain

J; 1 r c
"'PfJ_
Casper
an

if~

f

~~

)

4.

' arrived in Miami on January
Wolstencroft
15

and

went

directly

to Kennedy's

apartment.

At
Key

Casper entered
apartment

using

removed

the

Jaffe.

While

a

key

briefcase
Jaffe

approximately
briefcase,
Wolstencroft

and

Casper~the
was

dinner.
left

pair

swiftly

in~as h

it

the

to

Th~
the

Kennedy

and

QCasper
.,;.J

for these services.

of
the

notified

restaurant,

u

Agent

from

observer

replaced.

He

copying

taken

observed

,. t1 ,
,~

Kennedy.

delivered

documents

"lookout"
at

by

supervised

400

a

supplied

the

~r-p.

and

t

rn~

the

rece~

-tt.. ,

Tlu.•

ct.

Cftl<

--

{

The District Court found that the United
States,

acting

will fully

through

participated

Jaffe,

"knowingly

in the unlawful

Supp.,

at

120 .l/

briefcase

According

to

Government affirmatively counsels
the
them

Fourth
to

search

Amendment

purposefully
and

standing
conduct

seizure of one

()_ ,jJ ~r:

." j 434 F.

that

court,

"the

its

agents

that

1 imitation

an

and

permits

unconstitutional

individual

in order to

obtain evidence against third parties • • •

" Id.,

"'(;

t/

J!A D~W~ fj;j-jJe j
~ CA-(1-

l I

t

fir

rl')(il 'l("{ltf!.tL

..#
J

{$"

k

(IA.At>Vf

/tL<•frL l~u~' -ff~.~~

/~u

fC

1i/ f~

dtc+·~~~

/(,_Jl fitJ
6.- hllP--t-¢( ~

seizure of

\
Michael Wolstencroft' s

IJL

r ~j.
-,

'10-

c)

~_J

5.

) tlSc(\}{..141/
at

13 2-133.

):'he loan guarantee agreement was,

in

A.
the

District

Court's

intentional

view,

violation

~ constitutional

rights.

a

product

of

this

Wolstencroft's

of

Id., at 123.

The District

Court believed that t~~"o/:;;a;..:r:::J

I><!

<tdeterred -- even where, as here, the search did not
impinge

upon

rights.

The court concluded that the Due Process

Clause

of

the

the

defendant's

Fifth

Fourth

Amendment

and

Amendment

the

inherent

supervisory power of the federal courts require the
exclusion
motivated

of
by

hostility

"'v

evidence
a

obtained

"knowing

to

and

any

from

purposeful

Id.,

at

search

bad

faith

fundamental

person's

constitutional rights."

a

129

(emphasis

in

original); see id., at 133, 134-135.
The
Circuit

Court

affirmed

in

a

of

Appeals

brief

order

for

the

Sixth

endorsing

the
),

\, District Court's use of its supervisory power. L590
(pno ,, .)J
206
decide

( 1979

the

)

t

Due
l \

The

Court

Process
-

(

of

Appeals

question.

We

did

not

granted

;q

certiorari, j and we now reverse.
r

II
This

Court

discussed

the

doctrine

of

6.

\ D( ~
"standing to invoke the exclusionary rule"f
detail last term.
We

138
that

Rakas v. Illinois, 439

a

reaffirmed

court may

not

the

exclude

Fourth Amendment unless it finds
search

or

seizure

constitutional

violated

rights.

(1973);

"-

Alderman v.

under

defendant's

at

'v

u.s.

133-140.

389

u.s.

United States,

Amendment

And

(1968).
rights

are

the

rule
the

223, 229-230

394

u.s.

defendant's

violated

own
See,

171-172 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390
377,

128,

that an unlawful

the

e.g., Brown v. United States, 411

n some

established

evidence

(-0\V-ttl AIM9-«~~

only

165,

u.s.

Fourth

when

the

challenged search or seizure invaded his legitimate
expectation of privacy rather than that of a third
party.

States,

\

~

Rakas v.

Illinois, supra,

at 143;

(POWELL,

J.,

Combs v.

408

u.s.

concurring);

224,

227

(197

\r"< .

id., at
United

Jj

Mancusi

v.

DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-370 (1968).
These principles were applied to bank

"\,

records

in United States v.

Miller,

425 U.S.

435

(1976).

Miller rejected a depositor's challenge to

the use at trial of information that his bank had
surrendered under an allegedly defective subpoena.

t

I

7.

We

held

that

the

Fourth Amendment

depositor

interest,"

had

no

"protectable

because he lacked the

requisite expectation of privacy in the copies of
his checks and deposit slips retained by the bank.

~Id.,

at 437; see id., at 442.

simply

"does

not

The Fourth Amendment
of

obtaining

the

prohibit

information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by

him

to

Government

in format ion
will

be

confidence placed

0

for

a

1 imi ted

in the

foregoing
Court

standing ~ to

illegally seized
did

authorities

seized

and

the

recognized,

..

in

from

Nor do we • .!/

establish,

that

as

respondent

4~:.:!J

~the

suppress

from Wolstencroft.

not

conclusion that
interest

purpose

third party will not be

u~D.t tt.. r~

Appeals

the

Id. at 435.

District

lacked

if

---

The
the

even

is revealed on the assumption that it

used only

7 betrayed."

authorities,

disturb

the

documents

The Court of

District

Court's

"Jack Payner possessed no privacy

the

Castle

Bank

Wolstencroft."

documents

434

that

were

at

126.

F.Supp.,

Both courts believed, however, that a

federal court's inherent supervisory power permits
it

to

suppress

evidence

tainted

by

gross

8.

illegalities
interests

that

of

do

any

not

party

government

argues

improperly

expands

infringe
to

this

that
the

the

reach

the

rights

litigation.
novel

of

the

or
The

doctrine

supervisory

power in a manner calculated to upset the careful
balancing

of

interests

embodied

in

Amendment decisions of this Court.

the

Fourth

We agree.

A

fdAM~/
-{kttiiDA M
J.t/J~

~~~~

The District Court held that its decision

to suppress the disputed evidence was dictated by
the

need

privacy

to deter deliberate
persons

of

defendants
S u pp. , at

65,

in

to

'---

We

deter

are

criminal

1 3 5 ; see i d .

131-133.

desire

a

who

unlikely

into

the

75,

court's

deliberate

the

become

to

prosecution.

at 1 3 4-1 3 5 n .

share
the

intrusions

F.

'v

1 29 & n •

commendable

use

of

illegal

conduct as a means of obtaining evidence.

No court

should

possibly

condone

the

unconstitutional

and

criminal behavior of those who planned and executed
this "briefcase caper."~/
this

Court

are

replete

Indeed, the decisions of
with

denunciations

of

willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of
j

law

enforcement.

E.g.,

Jackson

v.

Denno,

378

9.

'V u.s.

368,

see

(1964);

386

Olmstead

v.

United

\._(tqa~)j
States,

u.s.

277

dissenting).
principle
for

issue

is

decide

this

question

not

of

presented

in dispute.

respondent,

Amendment rights were not

J.,

pronouncements

the

the principle is
whether

J (Brandeis,

485

sweeping

But

cannot

today,

438,

whose

infringed,

Tlu-r

ttt~ v~,Jt ~-t;~ i c(

-!#_ ~Cll~ u4 -{to JJjJwl~~

Fourth

-1ub .u tiff~~ d"'of> ~

f"'Utlk w(u~ O\A71.\.

~

11/'rRJJ,

The suppression of probative but tainted
evidence exacts a costly toll upon the ability of
to

ascertain

the

convict the defendant

"v

truth

and

to

acquit

in a criminal case.

or

E .g. '

v

Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States
v.

Ceccolini,

u.s.

435

268,

275-279

~

n -unbending

Our

(1978).

{<I

cases recognize that

l

1; U5lM ~ tt-tu0.

ins1s tt_nce -upon

ethe ideal of governmental rectitude would impede to
<A

an

unacceptable

~+ ~I 11M d.V.. J ~ ~~ ~L
necessary

the

1

degree

t, Hi J

fmret--3:-orw

Court has

of

refused

the

Jt - i

1.

-

r(r

[>"

cerformarrc-e

;-hes~

a: ::a~::~ cf:~eT.~Thus,
to extend

the

exclusionary

rule to "anything which deters illegal searches • •
"

~

Alderman

v.

Our abhorrence of

United

Wu16

1J¥~-t;t~ ¥, f'IU!Wfr U44

to invoke the exclusionary rule.

courts

~ttrf

L ~~"'t .;~lr

The

has standing

{/)<Ju,9. ClliM

States,

supra,

at

174. )

illegality neither requires nor

permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in

-

~1

1 0.

all

proceedings

States

v.

or

against

\;

Calandra,

414

all

persons."

u.s.

338,

348

United
(1974).

Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that
weighs

the

benefits

of

applying

the

exclusionary

rule in a given situation against its high societal
costs.

'vIb1d.
. ;

see

\.-

United

States

v.

Ceccolini,

\,
supra, at 275-279; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
454-J. 457-460 (1976);V Stone v. Powell,
428

u.s.

~
46ft_,

\_ ~~oj
485-489

( 1976); [ united

States

v.

Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, 535-539 (1975).
The

rule

that

bars

a

defendant

from

asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers
rests explicitly on just such a balance.
"The

deterrent

values of

the

incrimination

of

preventing

those

whose

rights the police have violated have
been considered sufficient to justify
the suppression of probative evidence
even

though

defendant

the

is

case

against

the

weakened or destroyed.

We adhere to that

But we

judgment.

are not convinced that the additional
benefits

of

extending

the

exclusionary rule to other defendants
would

justify

upon

the

prosecuting
and

having

further
public

those
them

encroachment
interest

accused

of

acquitted

in
crime
or

11.

convicted

on

the

basis

of

all

the

evidence which exposes the truth."
'\; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.
Court

\I~Jll
.1\

\Y~

1>- t\\J

/

',_-~,

~~

~~
~~~
.

~. .\\

E •g•
v

.

has

\Rakas

,

Powell

v.

~

Illinois, supra, at 137; see Stone

supra

'

consistently.

principle

at

'

488-489 ;\,.United

States v.
--------------

~ l M~ ,L-16\\ ~•:J;

Calandra, supra at 348.

,,

\

P ... · \,.~

tt;.J-

.)J.~
.J\V

\\,

B

~tr.ftV ~"'""
'-;I)<~';Y·

tt.c

(:

';((;

~ l(lr•Lfl(~~

{/l011Qt av'f(

f'tPt'(A -t; ~ ( j ;.~

The

balance

._,5J.
<

this

applied

The

is

exclusion

does

by

sought

'

the

invoking

power of the federal courts.

when

change

not

To be sure, a court

UlJ.om , r

4{~
1ILO..
)!J ld; t.L~ ~
I) I a.•
{J)~ l.iJ kf:<+
1,(."1/

~-

t
may

employ

tnat

power

exclude

evidence

"willful

disobedience

States,

318

u.s.

in

taken
of

332,

some

from

the

law."

345

circumstances
defendant

"vMcNabb

(1943);

see

United

States,

364

u.s.

206,

223

United

States,

350

u.s.

214,

216-217

'v

Hampton

v.

United

425

States,

to

v.

by

United

'\,

Elkins

(1960);

Rea

(1956);

u.s.

v.
v.
cf.

l:L

495

484,

f
(POWELL, J., concurring in the

judgment).~/

h161!'1IO...>!J

I~M

f.JJ..Afl·~

But the

6ottM/.LL<f..Q.

Court

has

never

suggested

that

the

supervisory

I

power authorizes

I

court to suppress ~ evidence

obtaine~~~ ~olatio~J

of Constitution,

rule. ; (rn United States v. · Caceres,

440

statute

u.s.

IM~-t;

754-757 (1979), we refused to apply a uniform rule

tt

c~c/){tf)r

'-J~~o
Q..tv.<

l. ue .c.

~

tfl~

I~ ~ld;;,

:J

741,

O'U..')

I

t6 l ~

1 2.

hj

~ .

exclu~

executive

as

remedy

a

department's

of

an

Elkins

v.

fol lviolation

rules.

And

in

United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for
a restrained application of the supervisory power #.
in terms that foreshadowed the language that would
later appear in Alderman v. United States, supra:
"[A]ny

apparent

process

of

federal

trial

limitation

discovering
ought

to

upon

truth
be

the
in

a

imposed

only upon the basis of considerations
which outweigh the general
untrammeled

disclosure

of

need

for

competent

and relevant evidence in a court of
justice."

364

u.s.,

at 216.

)

Thus,

the

District

- ~~ I

Court's

decision

tB

"\

proceed under its [ s upervisory power did not permit

11.

Wn,. O(.buJTL

~ t o suppre ss evidence without carefully balancing

f I{

)

the

interests

implicated

.. r

exclusionary rul •

the.

alance.

~ =dt<d

tn=e

change

'

The need to deter the underlying

conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are
the same under the supervisory power as they are
under

the

Amendment
doubt

Fourth . Amendment.
decisions

that

the

have

societal

And

our

established
interest

Fourth

beyond
in

any

deterring

1 3.

illegal searches is not sufficient to justify the
exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a
party

who

was

practices.
United

not

victimized

Rakas v.

States,

by

Illinois,

supra.

the

challenged

supra; Alderman v.

The

District

Court

disregarded these principles when it concluded that
"society's

interest

in

[bad

deterring

faith]

conduct by exclusion outweigh[s] society's interest
in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant
)

~evidence."

(A, 1i.S 1J.t. v 1"--4

434 F. Supp., at 135.
The District Court's reasoning, which the

Court

of

substitution
controlling

of

its

own

decisions of

this

to

amounts

affirmed,

Appeals

judgment

for
The

Court.

a
the

courts

below -- understandably shocked by the conduct of a
federal officer -- sought to fashion a remedy that
the

Constitution

itself withholds:

an

independent

right "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of
the Fourth Amendment."

\

suera,

at

societal

174.

In

interests

so
that

Alderman v. ·United States,
doing,
have

they
led

slighted

this

and

the

other

courts to limit the class of persons who may invoke

14.

the exclusionary rule.
of

the

Were we to accept this use

supervisory power,

judiciary

to

circumvent

limitations of the

~-

l

we would
at

will

authorize
the

the

considered

rfiU4it IJuAJ,.l~tU-:f zydt.t,r{lqs ;~
~tantive

1 aw

it is

I

gRar~ed

We hold that the supervisory power

does not extend so far.l/
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

FOOTNOTES

\

..}/

~

18 U.S.C.

1001 provides in relevant

part:
"Whoever,

in

any matter

jurisdiction

of

any

within

the

department

or

agency of the United States knowingly
and willfully •
fictitious
or

. makes any false,

or

fraudulent

statements
shall

representations,

fined

not

more

than

be

$10,000

or

imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."

\__

'}_/

The unusual sequence of rulings was

necessitated by the consolidated hearing conducted
by the District Court.

The court initially refused

to enter a decision on the merits.

At the close of

the evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion
to suppress.

After the Court of Appeals

for

the

Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for
want of
the

jurisdiction,

order

entered

granting

a

verdict

the

the
of

District
motion

guilty.

Court

to
The

vacated

suppress

and

court

then

reinstated its suppression order and set aside the
verdict.

Respondent

does

not

challenge

States

argued

these

procedures.

ll

The

United

District Court and the Court of Appeals

in

the

that

the

6.

fact

remains

that

Process Clause
Government
protected
United

(1952 ~ ,

165, 169

1 imitations

of

the

the

Due

• come into play only when the

activity
right

in

of

States,

opinion).

"ft] he

•

JJ-4

u.s.

Rochin v. California, 342

question

the

defendant,"

some

Hampton

v.

\ __f!t'~

u.s.

425

violates

484,

490 L (plurality

One may disagree with

the

view of

the

plurality in Hampton v. United States, supra, that
no

constitutionally

criminal

defendant

is

of

interest

protected
involved

when

the

a

police

encourage and participate in his crime. See id., at
491-495
But

(POWELL,

there

Michael

can

J.,

be

no

doubt

Wolstencroft's

outrageous

did

respondent's
Process

concurring

rights

Clause

adds

that

judgment).

the

search

any

little

intrude
way.
to

\

of

however

briefcase
not

in

in the

upon

Thus,

0~
~
ti!._e tl

the

this
Due

analysis.

The question for decision is still whether a person
not victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to

) aJ-f
suppress
<::..

its

fruits.

remains the same,

Th

balance

of

interests

and the outcome of that balance

is determined by the prior decisions of this Court.

u.~,

L!ol;

4-t?

( 1qlfsJ( or'wOl' "t

r,IL(( bfurtf/1 ;J.)

5.

er may
ta;integ h¥ unlaw.f

e

used to exclude eviaerrce
oes not

con'duct t

· ants present

upon -the

in

Indeed,

CQU

supervise
alleged

law
to

when

attempts

a

enforcement

that
rights

have

defendant before the bar
its

intrude

assigned

litigants.

the

through

exclusiona

rule

not

of

the

rights

efforts

unlawful

is

it · arguably departs from

adjudicating

role

to

the

to

application

of

deter
of

an

strain this concept even in the

The extra step taken by the Court
in this case threatenes to divorce the
supe

power

-theoretical

its

from

'cat..ion ~

Afl-u"('}~

(V1
7/

~ent

JL~.'!!! :J:i;!:
the

....__.

Amendmen;{

Due

The

on tend
ll(t

c.?

of

Clause

of

the

the

o.£0,..,

Fifth

expressly

Appeals

tf

declined to

exerci.s-e

.a.L.id

~ -

Process

Court

(

that

I

But even if we

assume that the unlawful briefcase search
±-tt

tlt i

3

c 2ffl

fundamental

was
"canons

so
of

outrageous
decency

as
and

to

offend

fairnes s,"

f~l

2.

guarantee

agreement

was

by

discovered

an

investigation independent of the briefcase search.
The

government

also

denied

that

its

agents

instigated or willfully encouraged Casper's illegal
behavior.
the

For purposes of our decision, we accept

District

Court's

contrary

findings

on

both

points.

!/

We are not persuaded by respondent's

suggestion that
creates
United

the Bahamian law of bank

secrecy

an expectation of privacy not present
States

v.

Miller,

u.s.

425

435

in

(1976).

Respondent relies upon a proviso to Ch. 96.9 of the
Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909).
the

proviso

~ Amendment

was

repealed

by

~

of

5

the

Bahamian law does provide Banks and Trust
Act

of

confidentiality to

1~n-ts

banking

Banks

1965,~

Act of 1965, Bahamas Acts

Regul-ation

Although

a

Compani~s

measure

transactions.

281,

of

Section

10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act
1?~~-~· ·1· Ad,
t,~~ b I£·; 7 ~_,

no,

--

of 196 s;provides in relevant part:
"Except

for

performance

the
of

purpose

his

duties

of

the

or

the

exercise of his functions under this
Act or when lawfully required to do
so

by

any

court

of

competent

3.

jurisdiction
under

the

within

the

provisions

the Colony,

Colony

of

any

or

law of

no person shall disclose

any information relating to .

. • the

affairs of • • • of any customer of a
[bank] licensee which he has acquired
in the

performance of his duties or

the exercise of

his

functions

ets

t h i s Act. " Bah am as

G

%

under

5-=-,--,~~+--';c.::t.5-

276.
The

statute

hardly

a

blanket

guarantee

Its application is limited:

privacy.
with

is

except ions:

and

we

of

it is hedged

have been directed to no
Moreover, the ease

authority construing its terms.
Pu...

with

which

learned

the

balance

notion of
American

strictly enforced
depositors

know

I belies

any

confidentiality.

that

their

own

in

And

country

requires them to report relationships with foreign
financial

institutions.

§

Shultz

416

u.s.

considerations
respondent

U.S.C.

1 1 21 :

31

ornia Bankers Assn.

v.

§

~ 5<AU .£1

1 03. 24.

C.F.R.

~31

See
21,

59-63,

reinforce

lacked

a

71-76
our

(1974).

These

conclusion

reasonable

expectation

that
of

privacy in his Castle Bank account.
~/

"The security of persons and property

4.

remains a fundamental value which law enforcement
officers must respect.
the

rules

States,
action

unscathed." \

escape

u.s.

394
is,

Executive

Nor should those who flout

165,

however,
Branch.

175
the

We

Alderman v.

Disciplinary

(1969).

responsibility

note

United

that

the

of

the

Internal

Revenue Service has adopted guidelines that require
agents to instruct informants on the requirements
of

the

law,

and

to

report known

illegalities to

appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual Supp. 9G-

·o 4 o,

§§

3. o3,

4

(Feb.

3,

1 9 7 7) •

Although

these

measures are less severe than one might expect from
an agency charged with upholding the 1 aw, they do
indicate disapproval of the callous policy found to
have

been

implemented

in

this

case.

Nor

can we

assume that similar lawless conduct, if brought to
the attention of responsible officials, would not
be dealt with severely.

To require in addition the

suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial
against

a

third

party

would

penalize

society

unnecessarily •
.§_/ - Norte
su~e

of

District

the

c i t:..e;;.;
: d;;.......c.;;;..;;;a~s-=e;.;s;;.._. ..,;d;;;;,;;;.;
i~
tnat

ffle

lf.p/ss

4/1/80

Riner A, p. 6 (Payner)

And whether a defendant's Fourth AMendment riqhts have been
violated depends upon whethP.r the
seizure invaded

~

h~llenqed

search or

leqitimate expectation of privacv rather

than that of a third party.

lfp/ss

4/1/80

Rider A,

p. 7 (Payner)

The foregoing authorities establish, as the
District Court recognized 1that respondent lacked standing to
urge suppression of the documents illegally seized fr.om
Wolstencroft.

Ellen:
I have suqqested a revision of this sentence to
emphasize that Alderman and like cases have sooken in terms
of "standing".
opinion.

We should not lose sight of this in our

This is one place we can refer back to "standing".

You may find other places.

lfP/ss

4/1/80

Rider~,

p; · 8 (Pavner)

We share the Court's commendable desire to deter the
deliberate use of. illegal methods bv qovernment aqents or
officers.

lfp/ss 4/1/79
Ellen:

Rid~r ~,

fn

(Pavn~r)

What do you think of addinq a note alonq the

followinq lines, perhaps at or near the end of the opinion:

I

The "security of

per~ons

and Property

remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers
must respect.
unscathed".

~or

should those who flout the r.ules escane

Alderman, supra, at 175.

Disciplinary or other

appropriate action is, however, the resPOnsibility of the
Executive Branch itself - in this case the Justice Department
or the Internal Revenue Service.

Nor can we assume that the

lawless conduct practiced in this case, if hrouqht to the
attention of responsible officials, would not be dealt with
severely.

~he

suPpression, in a trial aqainst a third partv,

of hiqhlv probative evidence only

p~nalizes

society7 as a

sanction aqainst the offendinq federal official, it is both
irrational and ineffective.

fcll'\eJ to~~ .
lo K-e~s ?

er 4/3/80
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner
MR.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion

of the Court.
The

question

is

whether

the

District

Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful
search that did not invade the respondent's Fourth
Amendment rights.
I

Respondent

Jack

Payner

was

indicted

in

September, 1976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972
federal income tax return in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§

1 001 •.,!/

The

indictment alleged that respondent

denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time
when he knew that he had
Castle

Bank

Islands.

and

Trust

such an

Company of

account at the
Nassau,

The government's case rested heavily on a

loan guarantee agreement dated April 28,
which

Bahama

respondent pledged

the

funds

1972,

in his

in

Castle

Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan.
Respondent waived his right to iury trial
and

moved

to

suppress

the

guarantee

agreement.

With the consent of the parties, the United States
District Court
took

evidence

for
on

the Northern District of
the

motion

at

a

Ohio

hearing

2.

consolidated

with

court

respondent

found

the

trial

guilty

basis of all the evidence.
however,

that

guarantee

agreement

the

on

the
as

charged

on

court

therefore

the

the

discovered

exploiting

a

flagrantly

illegal search that occurred on January 1 5,
The

The

The court also found,

government
by

merits.

"all

suppressed

197 3.

evidence

introduced in the case by the Government with the
exception of Jack Payner• s
and

the

related

1972 tax return

testimony."

Payner,

434 F.Supp.

113,

return

alone

insufficient

was

136

United

States

v.

(1977). · As the tax
to

demonstrate

knowing falsification, the District Court set aside
respondent's conviction.!/
The events leading up to the 1973 search
In 1965, the Internal Revenue

are not in dispute.

Service launched an investigation of the financial
activities

of

American

citizens

in

the

Bahamas.

The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," was
Suspicion

headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida.
focused

on

the

investigators
trafficker

had

Castle

learned
an

that

account

Bank
a

in

1972,

suspected

there.

when

narcotics

Special

Agent

3.

Richard

Jaffe

of

Norman

Casper,

the

Jacksonville
private

a

office

asked

investigator

and

occasional informant, to learn what he could about
To that end,

the Castle Bank and its depositors.
Casper cultivated
vice-president

his friendship with Castle Bank
Wolstencroft.

Michael

Casper

7

• L

introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private
investigator

and

former

employee.

When

Casper

discovered that the banker intended to spend a few
days

in

Miami

in

January

of

197 3,

he

devised

a

scheme to gain access to the bank records he knew
Wolstencroft

would

be

carrying

in

his

briefcase.

Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January
15

and went directly to Kennedy's

apartment.

At

about 7:30p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key
Biscayne
entered

restaurant.
the

Kennedy.
to Jaffe.
of

apartment

Shortly
using

thereafter,
a

key

Casper

supplied

by

He removed the briefcase and delivered it
While the agent supervised the copying

approximately

briefcase,
Wolstencroft

400

documents

"lookout"

a
at

dinner.

taken

observed
The

from

Kennedy

observer

the
and

notified

4.

Casper when the pair left the restaurant,
briefcase

s.wi-Jt l¥- replaced.

was

photographed

that

evening

and the

documents

The

papers

included

evidencing a close working relationship between the
Castle

Bank

and

the

Bank

of

Perrine,

Florida.

Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately
uncovered the loan guarantee agreement at issue in
this case.
The District Court found that the United
States,

acting

willfully participated

in the

unlawful

seizure of
II

Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase

s u pp • ,

1 2 0 • 3I

at

Government
the
them

affirmatively

Fourth
to

search

According

Amendment

purposefully
and

to

conduct

seizure of one

"the

its

agents

that

documents

permits

unconstitutional

individual

in order to

obtain evidence against third parties . . •
at 132-133.

F.

court,

1 imitation

an

434

that

counsels

standing

and

"knowingly

Jaffe,

through

" Id.,

The District Court also found that the
seized

from

Wolstencroft

provided

the

leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the
critical

loan

Although

the

guarantee
search

agreement.

did

not

~

Id.,

impinge

at

123.

upon

the

5.

defendant's

Fourth Amendment rights,

the District

Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the inherent supervisory power
of

the

federal

courts

required

it

to

exclude

evidence tainted by the government's "knowing and
purposeful

bad

fundamental

faith

hostility

constitutional

to

any

person's

Id. ,

rights."

at

1 29

(emphasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135.
The
Circuit

affirmed

District

Court of
in

Court's

United States v.
curiam).

a

use

brief
of

Payner,

for

order

its

the

Sixth

endorsing

supervisory

590 F.2d 206

the

power.

(1979)

(per

The Court of Appeals did not decide the

Due Process quest ion.

u.s.

Appeals

We granted certiorari,

(1979), and we now reverse.
II
This

"standing

to

Court

discussed

invoke

the

the

doctrine

Amendment]

[Fourth

exclusionary rule" in some detail last term.

v.

Illinois,

reaffirmed
not

exclude

439

the

u.s.

1 28'

established rule

evidence

under

the

of

Rakas

1 38

(1978).

that

a court may

Fourth

We

Amendment

unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure

6.

violated the defendant's own constitutional rights.
Id.,

at

133-140.

u.s.

States,

411

United

States,

See,
223,

e.g.,

229-230

u.s.

394

Brown

165,

171-172

u.s.

And

Amendment

defendant's

Fourth

United

(1973); Alderman v.

Simmons v. United States, 390
the

v.

(1969);

377, 389 (1968).
rights

are

violated only when the challenged search or seizure
invaded

his

rather

than

Illinois,

legitimate
that

supra,

of
at

expectation

a

third

143;

of

party.

privacy
Rakas

id., at 149-152

v.

(POWELL,

J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 408

u.s.

u.s.

364,

224,

227

(1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392

368 (1968).
The

rule

that

bars

a

defendant

from

asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers
;;. l

rests

in

Amendment

part

on

rights

the
are

asserted vicariously.
133,
174.

personal

It

also

exclusionary
of

rule

persons

the

the

societal

counsel
who

and

Fourth

cannot

United States, supra,

represents

that

that

be

Rakas · v. Illinois, supra, at

quoting Alderman v.

judgment

class

perception

may

Court's
costs

against
invoke

considered
of

expanding
it.

at

the
the

Although

..

7.

exclusion
conduct

is
in

a

necessary

deterrent

unlawful

Court

the

cases,

appropriate

to

has

acknowledged that the suppression of probative but
tainted

evidence

ability

of

exacts

courts

to

a

costly

ascertain

toll

the

upon

truth

and

the
to

acquit or convict the defendant in a criminal case.
E.g., Rakas v.

Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United

u.s.

States v. Ceccolini, 435
see

Michigan
Our

(1974).

v.

417

u.s.

433,

recognize

that

an

Tucker,

cases

268, 275-279 (1978);
450-451
unbending

application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce
ideals of governmental rectitude would impede to an
unacceptable degree
judge and

the

truthfinding

After all,

jury.

it

is

functions of

the defendant,

and not the constable, who stands trial.
For

these

interpreted

the

suppression

of

reasons,

the

exclusionary

rule

Court
to

has

not

command

the

'L~-/

"anything

which

deters

illegal

A

searches
supra,
neither

Alderman

"
at

174.

requires

"illegally seized

Our
nor

v.

United

abhorrence
permits

evidence

in

all

of
us

States,

illegality
to

exclude

proceedings or

against all persons." United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).

Instead, we have adopted

?.

8.

a

balancing

approach

that weighs

the

benefits of

applying the exclusionary rule in a given situation
against
United

its

high

States

societal

v.

Ceccolini,

Stone

v.

Powell,

supra,

u.s.

United States v. Janis, 428
(1976);

Ibid. ;

costs.

at

275-279;

433, 454, 457-460

u.s.

428

see

464,

485-489

(1976); see also United States v. Peltier, 422

u.s.

531, 535-539 ( 1975).
When a criminal defendant asks a court to
suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third
party's Fourth Amendment rights,

the balance tips

against application of the exclusionary rule.
"The

deterrent

values

the

incrimination

of

of

preventing

those

whose

rights the police have violated have
been considered sufficient to justify
the suppression of probative evidence
even

though

defendant
We

the

is

case

against

weakened or

adhere to that

the

destroyed.

judgment.

But we

are not convinced that the additional
of

benefits

the

extending

exclusionary rule to other defendants
would

justify

upon

the

public

prosecuting
and

having

convicted

further

on

those

interest

accused

them
the

encroachment

of

in
crime

acquitted

basis

of

all

evidence which exposes the truth."

or
the

9.

Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.
Court

has

applied

E.g., Rakas v.

v.

Powell,

this

principle

The

consistently.

Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone

supra,

at

488-489;

States

v.

establish,

as

United

Calandra, supra, at 348.
III
The
the

foregoing

District

lacks

Court

standing

suppress

the

Wolstencroft.

authorities

recognized,

under

the

Fourth

respondent

Amendment

illegally

documents
434 F.

that

to
from

seized

Supp., at 126; see 590 F.2d,

at 20 7.

The Court of Appeals did not disturb the

District

Court's

conclusion

possessed no privacy

interest

that
in

"Jack

Payner

the Castle

Bank

documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434
F • S u pp . ,

Miller,

at

126 •

425

u.s.

Nor
435

do

we.

(1976),

United

States

established

v.

that

a

depositor has no expectation of privacy and thus no
"protectable

Fourth Amendment

interest"

in copies

of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank.
Id.,

at

record
case.!/

437;

see

supports

id.,
a

at

contrary

442.

Nothing

conclusion

in
in

the
this

10

The

District

Appeals

believed,

should

use

its

Court

however,

and

that

supervisory

the

a

Court

federal

power

to

0

of

court

suppress

evidence tainted by qross illegalities that do not
infringe

the

defendant's

constitutional

rights.

The United States contends that this novel approach
psets the careful balance of interests embodied in
th e Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court.
the government' s view,

In

rvisory power does
~uilty

court to free a
}-k..:_

person

/

(..;jl""".....~~_,.....~loCWI~nrd ~t: ~ ~~

~~-et:!'Q...-a-aeJ'"I9~
__,..........shaJ::.J

desire

to

privacy

deter

of

th

District Cou

deliberate

persons

ilt

who

intrusions

are

at

135 •

No

court

We

's commeooable

unlikely

defendants in a criminal prosecution.
S u pp • ,

l t i<>L

should

into
to

the

become

See 434 F.
condone

the

unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior of
those

who

caper. "_5!

replete

planned

executed

this

"briefcase

I d
n eed, the decisions of this Court are

with

activities

and

denunciations
undertaken

in

of
the

willfully
name

lawless
of

law

J

10

The

District

Appeals

believed,

should

use

its

Court

however,

and

that

supervisory

the

a

Court

federal

power

to

0

of

court

suppress

evidence tainted by gross illegalities that do not

lfp/ss

4/4/80

In the qovernment's view, such a substantive extension of the
supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a
standardless discretion as to whether and when to apply the
d:.~

Fourth Amendment as this Court has construed .\

We aqree with

the government.
We

~~greement

also with the District

Court's commendable

District e~·s commendable
desire

to

privacy

deter

of

del1'berate

persons

who

· t rus1ons
·
1n

are

unl'k
1 e1y

defendants in a criminal prosecution.
Supp.,

at

1 35

0

No

court

should

·
1nto
to

the

become

See 434 F.
condone

the

unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior of
those

who

caper. "_5!

replete

planned

d

executed

this

"briefcase

Indeed, the decisions of this Court are

with

activities

an

denunciations
undertaken

in

of
the

willfully
name

lawless
of

law

11.

enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,

485

-

Sweeping

(1928)

(Brandeis,

pronouncements

however,

decide

the

J. ,

of

dissenting).

principle

question

cannot,

presented

today.

wdb~~

Wolstencroft .i. s
for

the

rights.

aoubH~s

government's

entitled to some remedy

willful

invasion

of

his

But the only issue in this case is whether

this respondent, whose Fourth Amendment rights were
not

infringed,

has

standing

to

invoke

the

exclusionary rule.
Federal

courts

have

their

used

supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude
evidence

taken

from

the

defendant

by

"willful
lll.

disobedience of law."

u.s.

U.S.

206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350

214,

216-217

u.s.

(1956);

States,

425

in

judgment).

the

however,

that

484,

the

cf.

Hampton

v.

United

495 (POWELL, J., concurring

This

Court

supervisory

has
power

never

held,

authorizes

suppression of evidence obtained from third parties
in

!/ ~

"l4

)

trv--e.._

1/lc....., 1-o M;:;t;;
332, 345 (1943); see Elkins v. United States,

u.s.

364

McNabb v. United States, 318

violation of

Constitution,

statute or

rule.6/

11.

u.s.

368,

386 (1964): see Olmstead v. United States, 277

u.s.

enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378

438,

485

-

Sweep'ng

(1928)

(Brandeis,

pronouncements

dissenting).

J. ,

of

principle

Rider · A, · p; - 11 - (Payner)

lfp/ss 4/4/80

~
.
1 pronouncements of principle do not,
These unexcept1ona
however, support in

this case the reliance by the courts

below upon the supervisory power.

,
exclusionary rule.
Federal

courts

their

used

have

supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude
evidence

taken

from

the

disobedience of law."
U.S.

332,

u.s.

364
U.S.

"willful

McNabb v. United States, 318

206, 223 (1960): Rea v. United States, 350
216-217

u.s.

(1956):

States,

425

in

judgment).

however,

by

345 (1943): see Elkins v. United States,

214,

the

defendant

that

484,

the

495

This

cf.

Hampton

(POWELL,
Court

supervisory

J.,

has
power

v.

United

concurring

never

held,

authorizes

suppression of evidence obtained from third parties
in

violation

of

Constitution,

statute

or

rule. 6/

( / We

have

invoked

caution even when

the
a

supervisory

440

u.s.

power

criminal defendant

violation of his own rights.
Caceres,

741,

754-757

with

1 2.

some

asserts

a

In United States v.
(1979), we refused

to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an
executive

department's

rules.

And

in

Elkins

v.

United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for
. ·'

a restrained application of the supervisory power:
" [A] ny

apparent

trial

federal

of

process

1 imitation

discovering
ought

upon

truth

to

be

the

in

a

imposed

only upon the basis of considerations
which outweigh
untrammeled

the general

disclosure

and relevant evidence
justice."
See

364

also Nardone v.

u.s.,

of

need for
competent

in a court of

at 216.

United States,

u.s.

308

338,

340 (1939).
We
does

not

evidence

conclude

permit

that

a

without

interests

the

federal

rule.

by
Nor

supervisory
court

carefully

implicated

exclusionary

to

the

Fourth
a

power

suppress

balancing

the
does

same

Amendment

change

in

legal

theory alter the weight to be assigned the elements
of the balance.

The need to deter the underlying

conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are

the

same

under

under

the

Amendment
doubt

the

Fourth
decisions

that

the

1 3.

supervisory power as they are
Amendment.
have

societal

And

established
interest

our

Fourth

beyond

in

any

deterring

illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was
not victimized by the challenged practices.
v.

Illinois,

supra;

Alderman

v.

United

Rakas
States,

supra.
The
principles

District

when

interest

in

it

Court

outweigh[s]

exclusion

trier

43 4 F •

reasoning,

[bad

to

the

a

fact

all

13 5 •

by
in

relevant

The

Court

District

of

substitution

controlling

these

conduct
interest

with

at
the

"society's

that

faith]

society's
of

S u pp • ,
which

amounts
for

disregarded

concluded

deterring

the

furnishing
evidence."
Court's
affirmed,
judgment

Appeals

of

its

decisions

own

of

this

Court.7j
IV
Understandably shocked by the conduct of
a federal off.leer, the ~l~S~t~~~~~~~~bo~~~~~~~._r~
~
~ ~4>-"""'iind
/'} - .
~
"' o ·
.tb.e-- .Court
a£-

lm'O~

sought

to

fashion

a

remedy

that

~

/.o

I\

14.

~~~~~~ ;
Cor::u;.t~

~l&ID..:

-an.. i.nde,pepd.en.t

J;,j,~fit

"to

exclude relevant and probative evidence because it
was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment."
In
interests
class of

so

Alderman v.

United States,

doing-;- they

that

have

led

we

to

slighted

this

persons who may
Were

Court

invoke

accept

the

this

the
to

supra,

at

societal
1 imi t

th

exclusionary,
use

of

the

supervisory power,
~
ClM
a-t lelil-i the cons ide red 1 imitations of

.

to

J..~R.t.

the substantive law it is charged with enforcing.
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend
so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

FNl
FOOTNOTES

~/

18

u.s.c.

§

1001 provides in relevant

part:

of

jurisdiction

any matter

"Whoever,

in

any

within

department

the
or

agency of the United States knowingly
and willfully . . . makes any false,
fictitious
or

or

fraudulent

representations,

fined

not

statements
shall

than

more

$10,000

be
or

imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
~/

The unusual sequence of rulings was a

byproduct of the consolidated hearing conducted by
the District Court.

The court initially failed to

enter judgment on the merits.

At the close of the

evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion to
suppress.

After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want
of

jurisdiction,

the

District

Court

vacated

the

order granting the motion to suppress and entered a
verdict of guilty.
suppression

The court then reinstated

order

and

set

aside

the

its

verdict.

Respondent does not challenge these procedures.

ll

The

United

States

argued

District Court and the Court of Appeals
guarantee

agreement

was

discovered

in
that

through

the
the
an

independent

investigation

briefcase search.
its

agents

behavior.

~
the

c..i P"

untainted

rfl

by

2.

the

The government also denied that

will fully

encouraged

Casper's

illegal

For purposes of this opinion,

-t. .. /~

District

Court's

contrary

findings

on

both

points.

!/

We are not persuaded by respondent's

suggestion that
creates
United

the Bahamian

law of bank

secrecy

an expectation of privacy not present
States

Respondent

v.

cites

Miller,
a

vwfr.::

425

proviso

to

96.9

Ch.

435

u.s.

Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909).
that

proviso

was

Amendment Act,
Bahamian

repealed

by

Bahamas Acts

law

does

confidentiality

to

5

§

of

1965 No.

grant

banking

in

( 1976). f)""

of

?
I

the

Although
the

65,

Banks

at 281,
of

measure

a

transactions.

Section

10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act,

Bahamas Acts 1965 No.

64,

at 275-276, provides in

relevant part:
"Except

for

the

performance

of

purpose

his

duties

of

the

or

the

exercise of his functions under this
Act or when lawfully required to do
so

by

any

jurisdiction

court

of

within

competent

the

Colony

or

The

under

the

provisions of

any

F tJ

3.

law of

the Colony, no person shall disclose
any information relating to . • • the
affairs of

•

•

•

any customer of

a

[bank] licensee which he has acquired
in the performance of his duties or
the

exercise of his

functions

under

this Act."
statute

privacy.

is

hardly

a

blanket

guarantee

of

Its application is limited; it is hedged

with except ions;

and we

have been directed to no

authority construing its terms.
depositors

know

that

their

Moreover, American

own

country

requires

them to report relationships with foreign financial
institutions.
1 03. 24.
Shultz

31

U.S.C.

1121;

~

31

C.F.R.

See generally California Bankers Assn.
416

U.S.

21,

59-63,

71-76

(1974).

§

v.

This

respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an
American bank,
with

the

loan

his undoing.
reasonable

the Bank of Perrine,

in connection

transaction that eventually led

to

We conclude that respondent lacked a

expectation

of

privacy

in

the

Castle

Bank records that documented his account.

2/
remains a

"The security of persons and property

fundamental

value which law enforcement

officers must respect.
the

rules

escape

Nor should those who flout

unscathed."

Alderman

v.

United

States,

394

U.S.

165,

175

FN

4

•

(1969). {jisciplinary

action is not, however, the responsibility of the

~-:.J,

W-~ t-AJ'~

Y(~
11

in

revealed

Branch. ( We

Judicial

investigation

this
of

note

record

that
led

Operation

to

the
a

Trade

&)

improprieties
congressional
Winds.

See
I

Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS
before

a

Subcommittee

Government
(1976).

of

Operations,

the

House

94th

Cong • '

Committee
1st

on

Sess.

As a result, the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue "called off" the operation.
35.

The

require

Service
agents

requirements

also

to

of

adopted

instruct

the

law,

Tr. Oral Arg.

guidelines

informants

and

to

that

on

report

the
known

illegalities to appropriate state authorities.
Manual Supp. 9G-40,

IRS

3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977).

~§

~vv-~~k~

Although these measures -\

~r~

•~w~.re

lees

~~

than one might expect from an agency charged with

c 1.......0
upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of
~

~~

the Ga:Howli! .Po-l i.e¥ found to have been implemented
"\

in

this

case.

lawless

Nor

conduct,

responsible

can

if

we

assume

brought

officials,

to

would

~· require

that

the

not

similar

attention of

be

with

dealt

in addition the suppression

(- N 5.

of highly probative evidence in a trial against a
third party would penalize society unnecessarily.
~/

courts

a

practices

The cited cases do not confer upon the

generalized
of

law

responsibility is
law,

to

the

license

enforcement

confided,

Executive

permits

federal

to

oversee

United

the
That

agencies.

subject to

Branch.

Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
power merely

applicable
States

v.

The supervisory

courts

to

supervise

"the administration of criminal justice" among the
parties before the bar.
318

u.s.

ontrol

McNabb v. United States,

332, 340 ~ en a court attempts to

-

\

arguably

Process

departs

from

its

WL

~

~

law enforcement behavior that has had no

/A.u._

~

ffect on the rights of persons present in court,
it

~ the

assigned

rights of litigants.

The

'}_/
respondent's
Due

same

difficulty

attends

claim to the protections of the ..,...
Clause

of

the

Fifth

Amendment.

The

Court of Appeals expressly declined to consider the
Due Process Clause.

But even if we assume that the

unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to
offend

fundamental

"canons

of

decency

and

r:f\J

6.

fairness , " Roc h in v • Ca 1 i for n i a , 3 4 2 U• S • 1 6 5 , 1 6 9

fact

the

J.) ,

401,

u.s.

(1952), quoting Malinski v. New York 324
40 7

( 194 5)

(opinion of Frankfurter,

remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process
Clause
Government
protected

come
activity
right

of

into
in
the

United States, 425 U.S.
opinion).

play

only

question

when

violates

defendant,"

484,

the
some

Hampton

v.

(plurality

490 (1976)

Even if one disaqrees with the view of

implicated

was

Hampton

the

plurality

that

in that

no

case,

protected
see

id. ,

interest

at 4 91-49 5

(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment), there can
be

no

doubt

that

the

search

of

Michael

Wolstencroft's briefcase did not intrude upon this
respondent's
Process

rights

Clause

adds

in

any

little

way.

Thus,

the

Due

to our analysis.

The

question for decision is still whether a person not
victimized

by

an

unlawful

suppress its fruits.

search

is

entitled

to

That balance of interests is

determined by the prior decisions of this Court.

LFP 4/'/;80
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner
MR.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion

of the Court.
The

question

is

whether

the

District

Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful
search that did not invade the respondent's Fourth
Amendment rights.
I

Respondent
September ~ 976,

Jack

Payner

was

indicted

in

on a charge of falsifying his 1972

federal income tax return in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§

1 00 1 . .l/

The

indictment alleged that respondent

denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time
when he knew that he had
Castle

Bank

Islands.

and

Trust

such an account at the

Company of

Nassau,

Bahama

The government's case rested heavily on a
~

"

loan guarantee agreement dated April
which

respondent pledged

the

funds

28,

1972,

in

in his Castle

Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial
and

moved

to

suppress

the

guarantee

agreement.

With the consent of the parties, the United States
District Court
took

evidence

for
on

the Northern District of
the

motion

at

a

Ohio

hearing

2.

consolidated

with

court

r espondent

found

basis of al l
however,

the

trial

guilty

the evidence.

that

the

on

the
as

merits.

charged

The

on

the

The court also found,

government

the

discovered

-:;..
guarantee

agreement

by

exploiting

a

flagrantly

illegal search that occur red on January 1 5,
The

court

therefore

suppressed

"all

197 3.

evidence

introduced in the case by the Government with the
exception of Jack Payner' s
and

the

related

Payner,

434

return

alone

testimony."

F.Supp.
was

1972 tax return

113,

136

United

States

(1977).

insufficient

v.

As the tax

to

demonstrate

knowing falsification, the District Court set aside
respondent's conviction.2/
The events leading up to the 1973 search
are not in dispute.

In 1965, the Internal Revenue

Service launched an investigation of the financial
activities

of

American

citizens

in

the

Bahamas.

The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," was
headquartered in Jacksonville,
focused

on

the

investigators
trafficker

had

Castle

learned
an

that

account

Fl~a.

Bank
a

in

Suspicion
1972,

suspected

there.

when

narcotics

Special

Agent

~~------------~--~~
Jo

Richard

Jaffe

of

Norman

Casper,

the

Jacksonville

asked
and

investigator

private

a

office

occasional informant, to learn what he could about
To that end,

the Castle Bank and its depositors.
Casper cultivated
vice-president

his friendship with Castle Bank
Casper

Wolstencroft.

Michael

introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private
investigator

and

former

When

employee.

Casper

discovered that the banker intended to spend a few
days

in

Miami

in

January

of

197 3,

he

devised

a

scheme to gain access to the bank records he knew
Wolstencroft

would

be

carrying

in his

briefcase.

Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January

1\.

15

and went directly to Kennedy • s

apartment.

At

about 7:30p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key
Biscayne
entered

restaurant.
the

Kennedy.
to Jaffe.
of

apartment

Shortly
using

thereafter,
a

key

Casper

supplied

by

He removed the briefcase and delivered it
While the agent supervised the copying

approximately

briefcase,
Wolstencroft

400

documents

"lookout"

a
at

dinner.

taken

observed
The

from

Kennedy

observer

the
and

notified

4.

Casper when the pair left the restaurant,
briefcase was replaced.
that

evening

working

The documents photographed

included

relationship

the Bank of Perrine,

and the

papers

between

evidencing
the

Fl~a.

a

Castle

close

Bank

and

Subpoenas issued to

the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered the

loan

guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United
States,

acting

through

Jaffe,

"knowingly

willfully participated

in the unlawful

Michael

briefca~.

and

seizure of

.....-S u pp . ,

Wolstencroft 1 s
1 2 0 • 3I

at

Government
the
them

search

to

Amendment

purposefully
and

standing
conduct

court,

"the

its

agents

that

seizure of one

1 imitation

an

4 34 F.

that

affirmatively counsels

Fourth
to

According

II

permits

unconstitutional

individual

in order to

"""-..

obtain evidence against third parties • • . • " Id.,
~

at 132-133.
documents

The District Court also found that the
seized

from

Wolstencroft

provided

the

leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the
critical

loan

Although

the

defendant 1 s

guarantee
search

agreement.

did

not

Fourth Amendment

Id.,

impinge

rights,

at

123.

upon

the

the District

5.

Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the inherent supervisory power
of

the

federal

courts

required

it

to

exclude

evidence tainted by the government's "knowing and
purposeful

bad

fundamental

faith

hostility

constitutional

to

any

rights."

person's

Id.,

at

129

(emphasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135.
The
Circuit

affirmed

District

in

Court's

United States v.
curiam) .

a

use

Appeals

brief
of

Payner,

for

order

its

the

Sixth

endorsing

supervisory

590 F.2d 206

the

power.

(1979)

(per

The Court of Appeals did not decide the

,,ru: ~cess
u.s.

Court of

question.

We granted certiorari, __

(1979), and we now reverse.
II
This

"standing

to

Court

discussed

invoke

the

the

doctrine

Amendment]

[Fourth

exclusionary rule" in some detail last term.
~

v.

Illinois,

reaffirmed
not

439

the

exclude

u.s.

1 28,

established rule

evidence

under

the

of

Rakas
We

1 38

(1978).

that

a court may

Fourth

Amendment

unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure
violated the defendant's own constitutional

rights.~

6.

Id.,

at

133-140.

See,

e.g.,

Brown

v.

United

~

u.s.

States,

411

United

States,

223,

229-230

u.s.

394

(1973); Alderman v.
171-172

1 65,

Simmons v. United States, 390

u.s.

And

Amendment

the

defendant's

Fourth

(1969);

377, 389 (1968).
rights

are

violated only when the challenged search or seizure
invaded
rather

his
than

Illinois,
J.,

legitimate
that

supra,

concurring);

of

expectation

a

third

at 143;

of

party.

privacy
Rakas

v.

id., at 149-152 (POWELL,

Combs v. United States,

224, 227 ( 1972); Mancusi v. · neForte, 392

408

u.s.

u.s.

364,

368 (1968).
The

rule

that

bars

a

defendant

from

asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers
rests

on

rights

the

are

perception
personal

vicariously.

Rakas

quoting Alderman v.

v.

and

that

Fourth

cannot

Illinois,

be

supra,

Amendment
asserted
at

133,

United States, supra, at 174.

It also represents the Court's considered judgment
that

the

societal costs of the

exclusionary rule

counsel against expanding the class of persons who
may invoke . it.

Although exclusion is a necessary

deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases,

7.

the Court has acknowledged that the suppression of
probative but

ainted evidence exacts a costly toll

upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
and

to

acquit

or

criminal case.

convict

the

defendant

(1978);

433, 450-451

a

E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at

137-138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435
275-279

in

see Michigan v.

(1974).

u.s.

268,

417

u.s.

Tucker,

Our cases recognize that an

unbending application of the exclusionary sanction
to enforce

ideals of governmental rectitude would

impede to an unacceptable degree the truthfinding
functions of judge and jury.

After all, it is the

defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial.
For
interpreted

these

the

suppression of

reasons,

the

exclusionary rule

Court
to

has

not

command

the

"[every] thing which deters

illegal

,...-..,.
searches •
\_/
supra,
neither

at

Alderman

II

174.

requires

"illegally seized

Our
nor

v.

United

abhorrence
permits

evidence

in

all

of
us

States,

illegality
to

exclude

proceedings or

against all persons." Uniterl States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
a

balancing

Instead, we have adopted

approach that weighs

the benefits of

8.

applying the exclusionary rule in a given situation
against

its

United

States

high

societal

v.

costs.

Ceccolini,

u.s.

United States v. Janis, 428
(1976);

Stone

v.

Powell,

supra,

at

433, 454, 457-460

u.s.

428

275-279;

464,

485-489

(1976); see also United States v. Peltier, 422

u.s.

531, 535-539 (1975).
When a criminal defendant asks a court to
suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third
party's Fourth Amendment rights,

the balance tips

against application of the exclusionary rule.

/I "The
the

deterrent

values

incrimination

of

of

preventing

those

whose

rights the police have violated have
been considered sufficient to justify
~

the suppression of probative evidence
even

though

de fend ant

the

is

case

weakened

against

the

or destroyed.

We adhere to that i udgment.

But we

are not convinced that the additional
benefits

of

the

extendi n g

exclusionary rule to other d efendants
would

justify

upon

the

and

further
public

P.rosecuting

those

e ncroachment
interest

accused

of

in
crime

'

having

convicted

on

them
the

acquitted

basis

of

all

evidence which exposes the truth."

y.lderman

or
the

t)

v. United States, supra, at 174-175.

The

9.

Court

---

has

applied

E.g., Rakas v.

v.

Powell,

this

principle

consistently.

Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone

supra,

at

488-489;

United

States

v.

establish,

as

Calandra, supra, at 348.
III
The
the

foregoing

District

lacks

Court

standing

suppress

the

Wolstencroft.

authorities

recognized,

under

the

Fourth

respondent

Amendment

illegally

documents
434 F.

that

to
from

seized

Supp., at 126; see 590 F.2d,

at 20 7.

The Court of Appeals did not disturb the

District

Court's

conclusion

possessed no privacy

interest

that

"Jack

Payner

in the Castle

Bank

documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 4 34
F • S u pp. ,

Miller,

at

1 26 .

425

u.s.

Nor
435

do

we.

( 1976),

United

States

established

v~

that

a

depositor has no expectation of privacy and thus no
"protectable Fourth Amendment

interest"

in copies

of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank.
Id.,

at

record

437;

see

supports

id.,
a

at

442.

contrary

Nothing

conclusion

in
in

the
this

case.if
The

District

Court

and

the

Court

of

1 0.

Appeals

believed,

should

use

its

however,

that

supervisory

a

federal

power

to

court

suppress

evidence tainted by gross illegalities that do not
infringe

the

defendant's

constitutional

rights.

The United States contends that this novel approach
upsets the careful balance of interests embodied in
the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court.

In

-

the government's view, such a substantive extension
"/
of

the

supervisory

power

would

enable

federal

courts to exercise a standardless discretion as to
whether and when to apply the Fourth Amendment as
this

Court

-

has

construed

We

it.

agree

with

the

government.

7

We

Court's

commendable

intrusions
unlikely

into
to

prosecution.
should

nevertheless

the

become

agree with the District

desire
privacy

to
of

deliberate

persons

are

criminal

See 434 F. Supp., at 135.

No court

the

in

who

a

condone

defendants

deter

unconstitutional

and

possibly

criminal behavior of those who planned and executed
this "briefcase
this

Court

caper."~/

are

replete

I ndeed, the decisions of
with

denunciations

of

willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name

11 •

of

u.s.

law enforcement.
368,

States,

386

277

(1964);

U.S.

485

But

pronouncements

of

Jackson

see

438,

dissenting).

District

E.g.,

(1928)

v.

378

United

(Brandeis,

J.,

unexceptional

these

reliance

Denno,

Olmstead

principle

Court's

v.

do

not

upon

support

the

the

supervisory

power to free a defendant whose own constitutional
rights were not infringed.~/
The

supervisory

power

is

applied

with

some caution even when a criminal defendant asserts
a violation of his own rights.
Caceres,

440

u.s.

741,

In United States v.

754-757

(1979), we refused

to exclude all evidence tainted by viol a tions of an
executive

department's

And

rules.

in

Elkins

v.

United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for
a restrained application of the supervisory power:
(/ .. [A] ny
process

apparent
of

~ federal

1 imitation

discovering

trial

ought

upon

truth

to

be

the

in

a

imposed

only upon the basis of considerations
which outweigh the general
untrammeled

disclosure

of

need for
competent

and relevant evidence in a court of
justice."
See

also Nardone v.

340 (1939).

364

u.s.,

at 216.

United States,

308

u.s.

338,

1 2.

We
does

not

conclude

permit

evidence

a

without

interests

that

federal

carefully

implicated

exclusionary

the

by

rule.

Nor

supervisory
court

to

suppress

balancing

the

Fourth

the
does

a

power

same

Amendment

change

in

legal

theory alter the weight to be assigned the elements
of the balance.

The need to deter the underlying

conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are
the

same

under

under the

the

Fourth

Amendment
doubt

supervisory power as they are
Amendment.

decisions

that

the

have

And

our

established

societal

interest

Fourth

beyond

in

any

deterring

illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was
not victimized by the challenged practices.
v.

Illinois,

supra;

Alderman

v.

United

Rakas
States,

supra.
The
principles
interest

District

when
in

it

deterring

outweigh[s]

furnishing

the

trier

434 F •

disregarded

concluded

exclusion

evidence."

Court

[bad

that

faith]

society's
of

S u pp. ,

fact
at

these

"society's
conduct

interest

by
in

with

all

relevant

13 5 .

The

District

1 3.

Court's

reasoning,

affirmed,

amounts

judgment

for

which
to

the

a

the

Court

substitution

controlling

of
of

decisions

Appeals
its
of

own
this

Court.l/
IV
Understandably shocked by the conduct of
a

federal

fashion

the

remedy

that

a

authorize:
evidence

officer,

"to

exclude

because

violation of

the

United States,

it

was

courts
our

below

decisions

relevant
seized

and
from

Fourth Amendment."

supra,

at

1 7 4.

sought
do

to
not

probative
another

in

Alderman

v.

Were we to accept

this use of the supervisory power, we would confer
on the

judiciary discretionary power to disregard

the considered limitations of the law it is charged

...

with enforcing.

We hold that the supervisory power

does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

FOOTNOTES

~/

18 U.S.C.

1001 provides in relevant

§

part:
{/"whoever,

in

any matter

jurisdiction

of

any

agency of the United
and willfully .
fictitious
or

or

within

department
Stat~s

not

or

knowingly

. makes any false,
fraudulent

statements
shall

representations,

fined

the

more

than

$10,000

be
or

imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
~/

The unusual sequence of rulings was a

byproduct of the consolidated hearing conducted by
the District Court.

The court initially failed to

enter judgment on the merits.

At the close of the

evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion to
suppress.

After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want
of

jurisdiction,

the

District

Court

vacated

the

order granting the motion to suppress and entered a
verdict of guilty.

The court then reinstated its

suppression

and

order

set

aside

the

verdict.

Respondent does not challenge these procedures.

ll

The

United

States

argued

in

the

that

the

through

an

District Court and the Court of Appeals
guarantee

agreement

was

discovered

FN2.

independent

investigation

by

untainted

the

The government also denied that

briefcase search.

~
/

its

agents

willfully

encouraged

Casper's

For purposes of this opinion,

behavior.

illegal
we

need

not question the District Court's contrary findings
on either point.

!/

We are not persuaded by respondent's

suggestion that
creates
United

the Bahamian law of bank

an expectation of privacy not present
States

Respondent

v.

Miller,

cites

a

425

proviso

to

u.s.

435

Ch.

96.9

Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909).
that

secrecy

proviso

was

Amendment Act,

by

Bahamas Acts

law

Bahamian

repealed

confidentiality

to

banking

of

1965 No.

grant

does

5

§

( 1976).

of

the

Although
the

65,

transact ions.

Banks

at 281,

measure

a

in

of

Section

10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act,

Bahamas Acts 1965 No.

at 275-276, provides in

64,

relevant part:
(/"Except

for

performance

the
of

purpose

his

duties

of

the

or

the

exercise of his functions under this
Act or when lawfully required to do
so

by

any

jurisdiction

court
within

of
the

competent
Colony

or

FN3.

under

the

provisions of

any

law of

the Colony, no person shall disclose
any information relating to • • • the
affairs of

any customer of a

.•

[bank] licensee which he has acquired'
in the performance of his duties or
the

exercise of his

functions under

this Act."
(/The

statute

privacy.

is

hardly

a

blanket

guarantee

of

Its application is limited; it is hedged

with exceptions;

and we

have been directed to no

authority construing its terms.
depositors

know

that

their

Moreover, American

own

country

requires

them to report relationships with foreign financial
institutions.·

103.24.
Shultz

31

u.s.c.

§

1 121 ;

~'

31

c~

See generally California Bankers Assn.

416

U.S.

21,

59-63,

71-76

(1974).

§

v~

This

respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an
American bank,
with

the

in connection

loan transaction that eventually led

his undoing.
reasonable

the Bank of Perrine,

to

We conclude that respondent lacked a

expectation

of

privacy

in

the

Castle

Bank records that documented his account.

5/
remains a

"The security of persons and property

fundamental value which law enforcement

officers must respect.
the

rules

escape

Nor should those who flout

unscathed."

Alderman v.

United

FN4.

u.s.

States, 394
briefcase
course

affair was

of

Service's
Hearings

165, 175 (1969).

an

We note that the

revealed to Congress
investigation

extensive

intelligence

operations.

in

the

of

See

the

Oversight

into the Operations of the IRS before a

Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations,
result,

94th Cong.,

t he

Commissioner

a

Revenue

Internal

of

"called off" Operation Trade Winds.
35.

As

(1976).

1st Sess.

t

Tr. ~ Oral

Arg.

The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that

require

agents

requirements

to

instruct

of · the

law,

informants

and

to

on

report

the
known

illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS
Manual

Supp.

9G-40,

3.03,

§§

4

(Feb.

3,

1977).

Although these measures appear on their face to be
less positive than one might expect from an agency
charged

with

disapproval

upholding
of

the

the

practices

implemented in this case.
similar

lawless

attention of

law,

dealt with appropriately.

found

to

indicate

have

been

Nor can we assume that

conduct,

responsible

they do

if

brought

officials,

would

to
not

the
be

To require in addition

the suppression of highly probative evidence in a
trial against a third party would penalize society

FN5.

unnecessarily .

.§./

Federal

have

courts

used

their

supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude
evidence

taken

from

the

disobedience of law."
u.s.

defendant

by

"willful
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Executive
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subject to
United
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Russell, 411 u.s. 423, 435 (1973).
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to
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"the administration of criminal justice" among the
parties before the bar.
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318 u.s. 332, 340 (1943).
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difficulty
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protections of

the Due

The Court

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

of Appeals expressly declined to consider the Due
Process

Clause.

But

even
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assume

that

the

unlawful

briefcase search was so outrageous as to
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fundamental

"canons
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(1952), quoting Malinski v.
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in
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not

any way.
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of

intrude
Thus,

the Due Process Clause adds little to our analysis.
' .

The question for decision is still whether a person

FN7.

not victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to
suppress its fruits.

That balance of interests is

determined by the prior decisions of this Court.
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Although the Court of Appeals relied
solely upon the supervisory power, the Fourth
Amendment is the constitutional provision most
directly in point when a defendant seeks
suppression of evidence obtained in an unlawful
search.

Consequently, the policies that have

informed established doctrines of "standing to
invoke the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule,"
Rakas v. Illinois, 439

u.s.

instructive in this case.

128, 138 (1978), are
The Fourth Amendment

does not require the exclusion of evidence from a
criminal trial unless the challenged search or
seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional
rights.

~
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.'
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

~
I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September,p976,
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1. The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castie
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within tho jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully .. . makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

-
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov·
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2
The events leading up to the 1973 search arc not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation
the financial activities of American citizens in the
'Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conduct ed by the District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to Ruppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent docs not challenge these procedures.
2

' '
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi- .
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe , "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ."
434 F. Supp., at 120 ...----;tCCording to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti~
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan uarantee
agreement. !d., at 123.
lthough the search did not impinge
\ upon thl)lgf®mls t'e Fourth Amendment rights, the District
COurt believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern8 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
inves tigation untainted by the briefcase sea rch . The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." Id., at 129 ~
nlaesili iw oti~i•~; see id., at 133, 134-135.
-The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's usc of its super·
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per cur·iam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
'-process question. We granted certiorari,-- U. 8 . - (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
Thls Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 430 U. S. 128, 138 (1078). \Ve
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
1
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con·
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. Sec, e. g., Brown v.
Un·iled States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). A11d the defei~d
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when
ohaJ4wl~li'R Fraroh 81' PPiiKU'€ invaded his legitimate expecta ion
ofj)rivacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De·
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
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~t~lil:il

'Alute l'llR3r

i~

it..'\1 Although

I

I

78-1729-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. PAYNER

5

has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but
tainted evidence exacts a fSTIY 'toll upon the ability of courts ~
to ascertain the truth aRel tie t:tet1ttit or eon: ciet the elsfsRElattt in
a c:iminal case. E. g., f!~kas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;~}-o -r\.Q. " · f~)
Umted States v. Ceccoltnt, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978);
U S lfi.A
4 2.~
see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-451 (1974). Our
L\ ~ -~q\ 1q "£:,) •
1
cases recognize thajf • unbending application of the exclu~
sionary sanction to enforce ideals of overnmental rectitude
-'1
would impede ~ unacceptabl ~ the truthfinding
1
functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, and
not the constable, who stands trial.
or these reasons, the Court has not interpreted the exclusionary rule to command t;Ju 1 1 1
· Iii 8f " [every l thing
which deters illegal searches.... " Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174. Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires
nor permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a
balancing approach that weighs the benefits of applying the
exclusionary rule in a given situation against its high societal
costs. Ibid.; see United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275279; United States v. ~anis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460
i (1976); Stone v. Powell,J;WG H: OJ 101, 485-489
; see
· al o United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-539 (1975).
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary
rule.
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of
those whose rights the police have violated have been
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case aga.i nst the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
~# ----jut we are not convinced that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants

C

J

,

...
r

)
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would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi..flence which ex oses the truth." Alderman v. United
tates, supra, at 17 -175.

E. g.,
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at
488-489; United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.

...

--- ------------

The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court·
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally sei~ed from
.Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; Gie 590 F. 2d, at 207.'
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court's
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest
in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstenc.:roft." 434 F. Supp., at 126_; Nor do we. United States .
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976) , established that a depositor
has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4

I

4 We are not persuaded by respond ent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creates an experta1ion of privacy not present in
United States v. Mille!', 425 U. S. 435 (1976). Respondent ci1 es a proviso
to Ch. 96 .9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama. Islands (1909). Although
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian law does grant a measure of confidentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276,
provides in relevant part:
"Except for the purpose of the perfo1mance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do
y.
court of competent juri diction within the Colo y or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person shall isclose any inf01mation

L.

I
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities ~ do not
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The United
States contends that this novel approach upsets the careful
balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such ~
stsu
B extension of the supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a standardless discretionp;Eilitr\ffie~
a:ml when be !tp}Jly tfte l'-eurtl1: Am:e11eh~l81lt as~~COUl:.tshai.
~ued ~ We agree with the Government.
e JHWP ihJ~I'!~S ·
t e District Court's commen able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos<.:J who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5

I

II

1

•

A.

I

I
I
'

I

I
I

- cc.,-

relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bankl licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act."
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is
limited; it is hedged with exception. ; and we have been dir~e
e ed to no
authority construing its terms. Moreover, Ameriran depo. i ll'::l know
tha,t their own country requires them to report relationl'hipR 'llh foreign
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. Sec generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 , 59-63,71-76 {1974).
This respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank,
the Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan transact ion thaL eventually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked it reagonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented
L - - --,;-;-us;-;;"alll. ount.
,'
" " he security of persons and property remains a fundamental value [
which I:tw enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who floutr ' , .._ ... t
tho ruins escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S . 165,
II\ "·~~
175 (1969). We note( that tllil ~1·ie~88fll! niliir WQQ J;Qnocdeel t~t•CongreRs
itt th8 oilnrP8 8t !tii orh s· w m l·g t'
I tliC
. ' . * lliSBI~og
.raf;O'f\
oporoltilll
Sec Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS be-r
J
fore a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operation~
\t~ I V\0 S _,

lidOJ

(D

r ..

~ rv~~c+ ~ICUieM J
~ ~~rc~~s

Tr~f~cX-'t~

~ PfDj fJ.M))

I
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Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
.
. 1
'(Jt"ttt ~
( of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 ( 1964); sec Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485j ~ ~ /a.QI.A\(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional 14\0~~ 11:>
pronouncements of principle do not support the District ,
tl{t btL~ ~
Court's reliance upon the supervisory power to free a defendMl - ~-:.S
I"
ant w!1ose own constitutional rights were not infringed~A
, .... (/ ~ c:rr
----~.-..1"'/he supervisory power i <> !lplli(·tl with some caution even
t.ovSI~a:Jrt1V\AJ J
' en a criminal defendant asserts a violation of his own 1 ~~ ""fo
t;J ~ In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741,. 754-757 1 +Cu 'Mk..a:h~
(1970), we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by viola_/' ri..fr -·
or 4.AA ~tl.M -

Y

94th Cong., 1::tt Se~s. ~ As :1 result, thE' Commi~sionrr of Internal
R evenue "called off" Operntion Trnde Winds. Tr. of Ornl Arg. 35. The
Commis.<:ioner also adopted guidelines that require agents to · inst ruct
informnnts on t.he requirement ~'< of the Jav.g:pmtl to report Tmown Jil~ahtics to appropriate ~ fate authorific~'<. IRS Mnnunl Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03,
4 (Feb. 3, 1977) . Although the~r mensures appear on thrir face to be
less positive than one might expect from nn agency cha,rgcd with upholcling
the lrLw, they do indicate di Ha.pprovnl of tho prnctices found to have been
implemented in this ear;o. ]:T
"'1Mjnssm11ct1i'ii't"""siiffi11ir l1iW1C'R§ conduct, if brought. to iho attention of re.-ponsible officials, would not ·be
dealt with appropriately. To require in addition tho suppreHsion of
highly probative evidence in a trial against a third 11arty would penalize
Lsociety unnecessarily.
6 F ederal courts leom ~11 ±heir supervisory power in Rome circumstances to exclude eviclrnre taken from the defendant by "willful diRob edience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 3:32, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; R ea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (195G); cf. Jlampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, hO\Y~vcr , that the supervisory power authorizrR suppression of evidence obt.ained from ihird parties in violation of Constitution, statute or

I'

sa fi!

:llrr •

*i•e ~tlftlsh. b'ni~etl 8tutea '· ~a&beii, 411 8. 8. 118, til
Tho supervisory powrr merely permits federal coutis to supervise
"tho administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar.
McNabb v. United~ 340 ~.
ltM; h

'

.$t~ j

~

'

<:r

1
j
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tions of an executive department's rules. And in Elkins v.
nited States, 8" 2 ; t 2H~{111eCourt ca:Ired Tor a restramea .
application of he supervisory power:
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power docs not ermit a
federal court to suppress evidence w1thout carefully balancing
the same interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment exclusionaryrule. Nordoes a c 1ange in legal theoryl alter the
weight to be assigned the elements of t e balance. The need
to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the
evidence are the same under the supervisory power as they are
under the Fourth Amendment.
our Fourth Amendment
::::
decisions have established beyond an:f"":doubt that the societal
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was
the challenged ·practices. Rakas v. Illinois,
no v1c 1m
f.
\ ·Q.J&\
supra; A lder.man v. United States, supra.
. The District Court db sg 1 J~ theseprinciples wh_e_n....,.,it-_..,"\.M \~ ~f
concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith]
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F.
Supp., at 135. The District Court's reasoning, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, amoqnts to a substitution of its
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 7

.-r

\

\5/---

7 Tho same difficulty attends respondent's c]ajm to the protections of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to cousider the Due Procer:;s Clause. But even if we
ass.u
o unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous .as. to
e
fundamental " anon!> of decency and fairnes!>," Rochin v. Califomia, ~\
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, ~7

l

"'
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llf$.
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer,
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Alderman ·. v. United States, supra, at 174.
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

c ~·

..,.er

1

,'11/0i-

II
This Court discussed the doctrine of
"standing to invoke the [Fourth Amendment]
exclusionary rule" in some detail last term.
v. Illinois, 439

u.s.

128, 138 (1978).

Rakas

We

reaffirmed the established rule that a court may
not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment
unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure
violated the defendant's own constitutional rights.
Id., at 133-140.
States, 411

u.s.

See, e.g., Brown v. United
223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.

United States, 394

u.s.

165, 171-172 (1969);

Simmons v. United States, 390

u.s.

377, 389 (1968).

And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are
violated only when the challenged search or seizure
invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy
rather than that of a third ·party.

Rakas v.

Illinois, supra, at 143; id., at · 149-152 (POWELL,

J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 408
224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392

u.s.

u.s.

364,

368 (1968).

(

The foregoing authorities establish, as

) the District Court recognized, that respondent

2.

lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to
I
I

I

I

I

suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F.2d,
at 20 7.

\

The Court of Ap?eals did not disturb the

District Court's conclusion that "Jack Payner
possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank
documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434
F.Supp., at 126.
Miller, 425

u.s.

Nor do we.

United States v.

435 (1976), established that a

depositor has no expectation of privacy and thus no
"protectable Fourth Amendment interest" in copies
of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank.
Id., at 437; see id., at 442.

Nothing in the

record sup?orts a contrary conclusion in this
case.!/
The District Court and the Court of

( Appeals believed, however, that a federal court
should use its supervisory power to suppress

J

evidence tainted by gross illegalities, even when
they do not infringe the defendant's constitutional
rights.

The United States contends that this novel

ap?roach upsets the careful balance of interests
embodied in the Fourth Amendment decisions of this

3.

Court.

In the Government's view, such an extension

of the supervisory power would enable federal
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in
their application of the exclusionary rule to
enforce the Fourth Amendment.

We agree with the

Government.
A

We certainly can understand the District
Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate
intrusions into the privacy of persons who are
unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution.

See 434 F. Supp., at 135.

No court

should condone the unconstitutional and possibly
criminal behavior of those who planned and executed
this "briefcase caper."2/

Indeed, the decisions of

this Court are replete with denunciations of
willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement.

u.s.

E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378

368, 386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States

277 *U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
dissenting).

(Brandeis, J.,

But these unexceptional

pronouncements of principle do not in themselves
justify the District Court's reliance upon the

4.

! supervisory power to free a defendant whose own
constitutional rights were not infringed.

Indeed,

the . . principles never have been thought to

-

encompass the full range of considerations relevant
to the application of an exclusionary rule.
\

Although exclusion ·is a necessary
deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases,
the Court has acknowledged that the suppression of
probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll
upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
I

in a criminal case.

E.g~,

Rakas v. Illinois,

supra, at 137-138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435

u.s.

268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428

464, 489-491

u.s.
I

I

I

(1976); see Michigan

433, 450-451

(1974).

v~

u.s.

Tucker, 417

Our cases recognize that ·

unbending application of the exclusionary sanction
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truthfinding functions of
judge and jury.

After all, it is the defendant,

and not the constable, .who stands trial.
For these reasons, the Court has not
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to command
"[every]thing which deters illegal searches . • •

5.

"

Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174.

Our

abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor
permits us to exclude "illeqally seized evidence in
all proceedings or against all persons." United
States v. Calandra, 414

u.s.

338, 348 (1974).

Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that
weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule in a given situation against its high societal
costs.

Ibid.; see United States v. Ceccolini,

supra, at 275-279; United States v. Janis, 428

u.s.

433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v. Powell, supra,
at 485-489 (1976); see also United States v.
Peltier, 422

I

u.s.

531, 535-539 (1975).

When a criminal defendant asks a court to

suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third
party's Fourth Amendment rights, the balance tips
against application of the exclusionary rule.

I

"The deterrent values of preventing

I

the incrimination of those whose

\

rights the police have violated have
been considered sufficient to justify
the suppression of probative evidence
even though the case against the
defendant is weakened or destroyed.
We adhere to that judgment.

But we

are not convinced that the additional

6.

benefits of extending the
exclusionary rule to other defendants
would justify further encroachment
upon the public interest in
prosecuting those accused of crime
and having them acquitted or
convicted on the basis of all the
evidence which exposes the truth."
Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.

The

Court has repeatedly affirmed its considered
judgment that the costs of the exclusionary rule do
not permit expansion of the class of persons who
may invoke it.

E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at

137; see Stone v. Powell, supra, at 488-489; United
States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.
B

The societal interests threatened by
indiscriminate application of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule are equally at risk when a
criminal defendant invokes the supervisory power to
suppress evidence seized in violation of a third
party's constitutional rights.~

Indeed, this
J

Court has exercised the supervisory power with some
caution even when the defendant asserts a violation
of his own rights.

In United States v. Caceres,

440 U.S. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused to exclude

7.

) all evidence tainted by violations of an executive
department's rules.

And in Elkins v. United

States, supra, at 216, the Court called for a
restrained application of the supervisory power:
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the
process of discovering truth in a
federal trial ought to be imposed
only upon the basis of considerations
which outweigh the general need for

\

l

untrammeled disclosure of competent
and relevant evidence in a court of
justice."

364

u.s.,

at 216.

See also Nardone v. United States, 308
340 (1939).
[PICK UP at page 9.]

u.s.

338,

er 6/18/80

INSERT No. 78-1729 Payner; p. 8, n. 8.
The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the balance of
interests under the supervisory power differs from that
considered in Alderman and like cases, because the supervisory
power focuses upon the "need to protect the integrity of the
federal courts."

Although the District Court in this case
j

relied upon a deterrent rationale,

the~e

ca

no doubt that

the supervisory power serves the "two-fold" purpose of deterring
illegality and protecting judicial integrity.

See post, at 7.

As the dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule serves precisely the same purposes.

Ibid.,

citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218
(1979), and Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961).

Thus,

the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, like the supervisory
power, is applied in part "to protect the integrity of the court
rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the
defendant .
428

u.s.

.

.

" Post, at 10; see generally Stone v. Powell,

465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414

33 8, 486 ( 197 4)

u.s.

0

See supra; see also, e.g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-486.
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citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218
(1979), and Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961).

Thus,

the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, like the supervisory
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rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the
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428

u.s.

" Post, at 10; see generally Stone v. Powell,

465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414

u.s.

33 8' 486 ( 197 4) •
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'h.

As our Fourth Amendment decisions show, the
( exclusion , in this ca3e. j

balanc~

A

ll.

~

tips against

None of the decisions cited by the

0dissent, post, at 7-9, supports

~

contrary view, since none of

1\
those cases involved criminal defendants who were not themselves
the victims of the challenged practices.

Thus, our decision

today does not limit the traditional scope of the supervisory
power in any way: nor does it render that power "superfluous."

tf,__
Post, at 12.

We merely reject the\ use

~-J.. ~

........

~

~ '~ ~

as a substitute for ~\Fourth Amendmen~
cases where the lower courts qisagree with the balance struok by
the decisions of this Court.

.
'•

,•

T.bs Chief Justto~

S...etL- )' ; J

Ju.atz:?c

/

·n~
a.

lr. Just
R?f·
·
J1:r.
~
~~~
.tlr. Just
1
lr. Justice .tlla(·h. i 1
.7 Mr. Justioe P til
/
. Nr. Justioe R·~hnqd at
Mr.

Juatioe St~V~tis

~~)

Mr. Justice Marshall
C11"0Ulated:
'1 'l JUN lSSO
Recirculated:------

No. 78-1729

United States, Petitioner, v. Jack Payner
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The Court today holds that a federal court is unable to
exercise its supervisory powers to prevent the use of evidence
in a criminal prosecution in that court, even though that
evidence was obtained through intentional illegal and
unconstitutional conduct by agents of the United States,
because the defendant does not satisfy the standing
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

That holding effectively

turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions
of Fourth Amendment violations into a sword to be used by the
Government to permit it deliberately 'to invade one person's
Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against
another person.

Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the

federal courts are unable to protect the integrity of the
judicial system from such gross government misconduct.
I

. The facts as found by the District Court need to be more
fully stated in order to establish the level of purposeful
misconduct to which agents of the United States have sunk in
this case.

Operation Trade Winds was initiated by the Internal

Revenue Service (IRS) in 1965 to gather information about the
financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas.

The

investigation was supervised by Special Agent Richard Jaffe in
the Jacksonville, Fla., office ..

It was not until June 1972

that the investigation focused on the Castle Bank and Trust
Company of the Bahamas.

In late October 1972 Jaffe asked one

of his informants, Norman Casper, to obtain the names and
addresses of the individuals holding accounts with the Castle
Bank.

Casper set to work soon thereafter.

He was already an

acquaintance of Michael Wolstencroft, Vice-President and Trust
Officer of the Castle Bank.

Casper knew that Wolstencroft

frequently visited the United States carrying a briefcase with
documents from the Castle Bank.

Casper therefore introduced

Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private detective who worked
_for Casper.

In early January 1973, Casper learned that

Wolstencroft planned a business trip to the United States on
January 15, 1973, and that he would have Castle Bank records
with him on that trip.

Plans for the "briefcase caper," as

Casper called it, began in earnest.
As found by the District Court, Casper discussed the
details of the plan with Jaffe on several occasions during the
week before Wolstencroft's trip.!/

Casper told . Jaffe that he

could get the needed documents from Wolstencroft, but that
Jaffe would have to supply photographic services.

On January

11, Casper specifically informed Jaffe that he planned to enter
an apartment and take Wolstencroft's briefcase.

Jaffe then

stated that he would have to clear the operation with his
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superior, Troy Register, Jr., Chief of the IRS Int~lligence
Division in Jacksonville.

Clearance was obtained, and Jaffe

told Casper to proceed with the plan.

~/

Casper called Jaffe

the following day and asked if the IRS could refer him to a
locksmith who could be "trusted."
referral.

Jaffe gave him such a

~/

The plans were finalized by the time of Wolstencroft's
arrival on January 15.
Kennedy's apartment.
restaurant for dinner.

Wolstencroft went directly to Sybol
The couple eventually went to a

!/

Using a key provided by Kennedy,

~/

. Casper entered the apartment and stole Wolstencroft's
briefcase.

Casper then rendezvoused with the IRS-recommended

locksmith in a parking lot five blocks from the apartment; the
locksmith made a key to fit the lock on the case.

Casper took

the briefcase and newly made key to the home of an IRS agent.
Jaff~

had selected that location for the photographing because

it was only eight blocks from the parking lot where Casper met
the locksmith and Jaffe knew there was a need to act with
haste.

~/

The briefcase was opened in

Jaffe,

then photographed
had arranged for Kennedy and
watched on their date, and this lookout

called Casper at the IRS agent's home when the couple finished
their dinner.

After all the documents had been copied, Casper

relocked the briefcase and returned it to Kennedy's apartment.
The entire "caper" lasted approximately one and one-half hours.
The illegalities of agents of the United States did not
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..

stop even at that point, however.

During the following two

weeksi Jaffe told Casper that the IRS needed additional
information.

Casper therefore sent Kennedy to visit

Wolstencroft in the Bahamas.

While there, acting pursuant to

Casper's instructions, Kennedy stole a rolodex file from
Wolstencroft's office.

This file was turned over to Jaffe, who

testified in the District Court that he had not cared how the
rolodex file had been obtained.

~/

The IRS paid Casper $8,000 in cash for the services he
rendered in obtaining the information

abo~t

Castle Bank.

Casper in turn paid approximately $1,000 of this money to
Kennedy for her role in the "briefcase caper" and the theft of
the rolodex file.
The "briefcase caper" revealed papers which showed a close
relationship between the Castle Bank and a Florida bank.
Subpoenas issued to that Florida bank resulted in the
uncovering of the loan guarantee agreement which was the
principal piece of evidence against respondent at trial.

It is

that loan agreement and the evidence discovered as a result of
it that the District Court reluctantly

2/

suppressed under the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under its
supervisory powers.
The District Court made several key findings concerning the
level of misconduct of agents of the United States in these
activities.

The District Court found that "the United States,

through its agents, Richard .Jaffe, and others,

~nowingly

willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of Michael
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and

Wolstencroft's briefcase, and encouraged its informant, Norman
Casper, to arrange the theft of a rolodex from the offices of
Castle Bank." 434 F. Supp. 113, 120-121 (N.D. Ohio
1977) (footnotes omitted).

The District Court concluded that

"the United States was an active participant in the admittedly
criminal conduct in which Casper engaged .. ... " Id., at 121.

The

District Court found that "the illegal conduct of the
government officials involved in this case compels the
conclusion that they knowingly and purposefully obtained the
briefcase materials with bad faith hostility toward the
strictures imposed on their activities by the Constitution."
Id., at 130 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

The

District Court considered the actions of Jaffe and Casper
"outrageous," ibid., because .they "plotted, schemed and
ultimately acted in contravention of the United States
Constitution and laws of Florida, knowing that their conduct
was illegal." Ibid.
The most disturbing finding by the District Court, however,
related to the intentional manipulation of the standing
w,.....

requirements of the Fourth Amendment by agents of the United
States, who are, of course, supposed to uphold and enforce the
Constitution and laws of this country.

The District Court

found:
"It is evident that the Government and its agents,
including Richard Jaffe, were, and are, well aware that
under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
evidence obtained from a party pursuant to an
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unconstitutional search is admissible against third parties
who's [sic] own privacy expectations are not subjected to
the search, even though the cause for the unconstitutional
search was to obtain evidence incriminating those third
parties.

This Court finds that, in its desire to apprehend

tax evaders, a desire the Court fully shares, the
Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the
'
~--------Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to

-

purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure
of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third
parties, who are the real targets of the governmental
intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and
~

will act in the future, according to that counsel.

Such

governmental conduct compels the conclusion that Jaffe and
Casper transacted the 'briefcase caper' with a purposeful,
bad faith hostility toward the Fourth Amendment rights of
.

'

Wolstencroft in order to obtain evidence against persons
like Payner." Id., at 131-133 (footnotes omitted).
The Court of Appeals did not disturb any of these findings.
590 F.2d 206 (CA6 1979)

(~

purport to set them aside.
at 6, n.S.

curiam).

Nor does the Court today

See ante at 3, n.3. But cf. ante,

It is in the context of these

findin~~

--

intentional illegal actions by Government agents taken in bad
faith hostility toward the constitutional rights of
Wolstencroft for the purpose of obtaining evidence against
persons such as the respondent through

manipula~ion

of the

standing requirements of the Fourth Amendment -- that the
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suppression issue must be considered.
II
This Court has on several occasions exercised its
supervisory powers over the federal judicial system in order to
suppress evidence that the government obtained through
misconduct.

See,

~'

McNabb v. United States, 318

u.s.

332

(1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Mesarosh
v. United States, 352

u.s.

1 (1956); Mallory v. United States,

354 U.S. 449 (1957); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).

Cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214

(1956) (supervisory powers used to enjoin federal agent from
testifying in state criminal prosecution concerning illegal
search and from turning over to the State evid'e nce illegally
seized).

The rationale for such suppression of evidence is

two-fold: to deter illegal conduct by government officials, and
to protect the integrity of the federal courts.

McNabb v .

.United States, supra, at 342, 345, 347; Mesarosh v. United
States, supra, at 14; Elkins v. United States, supra, at 217,
222-223.

Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367

u.s.

643, 659-660 (1961) (Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments); Brown v. Illinois, 422

u.s.

590,

599-600 (1975) (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments).

The Court has particularly stressed the need to

use supervisory powers to prevent the federal courts from

bec~ming

accomplices to such misconduct.

See,

~,~abb

v.

United States, supra, at 345 ("Plainly, a conviction resting on
evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the
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procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to
stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in
willful disobedience of law"); Mesarosh v. United States,
supra, at 14 (the Court should use its supervisory powers in
federal criminal cases "to see that the waters of justice are
not polluted"); Elkins v. United States, supra, at 223 (federal
courts should not be "accomplices in the willful disobedience
of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold").
The need to use the Court's supervisory powers to suppress
evidence obtained through

governm~ntal

misconduct was perhaps

best expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his famous dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-485
(1928):
"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct
·that are commands to the citizen.

In a government of laws,

existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously.

Our Government is the

potent, the omnipresent teacher.

For good or for ill, it

teaches the whole people by its example.
contagious.

Crime is

If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it

breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

To declare that in

the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means -- to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal -- would bring terrible retribution.

-8-

Against that

pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face." Id., at 485.
Mr. Justice Brandeis noted that "a court will not redress a
wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands," id., at
483, and that in keeping with that principle the court should
not lend its aid in the enforcement of the criminal law when
the government itself was guilty of misconduct.
denied despite the defendant's wrong.

"Then aid is

It is denied in order to

maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the
administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial
process from contamination." Id., at 484.

See also id., at

469-471 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id., at 488 (Stone, J.,
dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 453, n. 3
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 10/
The reason for this emphasis on the need to protect the
integrity of the federal courts through the use of supervisory
powers can be derived from the factual contexts in which
supervisory powers have been·exercised.

In large part when

supervisory powers have been invoked the Court has been faced
with intentional illegal conduct.

It has not been the case

that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered," People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, lSO N.E. 585,
587 (1926).

In these cases there has been no "blunder" by the

government agent at all; rather, the agent has intentionally
violated the law for the explicit purpose of obtaining the
evidence in question. Cf. Lopez v. United States, supra, at 440
(supervisory powers should be exercised only if there has been
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"manifestly improper conduct by federal officials'').

If the

federal court permits such evidence, the intended product of
deliberately illegal ~" government action, to be used to obtain a
conviction, it places its imprimatur upon such lawlessness and
thereby taints its own integrity.
The present case falls within that category.

The District

Court found, and the record establishes, a deliberate decision
by government agents to violate the constitutional rights of
Wolstencroft for the explicit purpose of obtaining evidence
against persons such as Payner.

The actipns of the government

agents -- stealing the briefcase, opening it, and photographing
all the documents inside -- were both patently in violation of
the Fourth Amendment rights of Wolstencroft 11/ and plainly in
violation of the criminal law. 12/

The Government knew exactly

what information it wanted, and it was that information which
was ·stolen from Wolstencroft.

Similarly, the Government knew

that it wanted to prosecute persons such as Payner, and it made
a conscious decision to forego any opportunity to prosecute
Wolstencroft in order to obtain illegally the evidence against
Payner and others. 13/
Since the supervisory powers are exercised to protect the
integrity of the court, rather than to vindicate the
constitutional rights of the defendant, it is hard to see why
the Court today bases its analysis entirely on Fourth Amendment
standing rules.

The point is that the federal judiciary should

not be made accomplices to the crimes of
others.

Casper~

Jaffe and

The only way the IRS can benefit from the evidence it
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chose to obtain illegally is if that evidence .is admitted at
trial against persons such as Payner; that was the very point
of the criminal exercise in the first place.

If the IRS is

permitted to obtain a conviction in federal court based almost
entirely on that illegally obtained evidence and its fruits,
then the judiciary has given full effect to the deliberate
wrongdoings of the government.

The federal court does indeed
\~

}I

become the accom lice of the government lawbreaker, an

_____,

/£ accessory after the faci; for without judicial use of the
evidence the "caper" would have been for nought.

Such a

pollution of the federal courts should not be permitted. 14/
It 1s particularly disturbing that the Court today chooses
I

I

--

\\

to allow the IRS deliberately to manipulate the standing rules
_...--of the Fourth Amendment to achieve its ends. As previously

-

noted, the District Court found that "the Government
affi·rmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment
standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an
unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order
to obtain evidence against third parties, who are the real
targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents
in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to
'

that counsel."

434 F. Supp., at 132-133 (emphasis supplied}.

Whatever role those standing limitations may play, it is clear
that they were never intended to be a sword to be used by the
Government in its deliberate choice to sacrifice the
constitutional rights of one person in order to .Prosecute
another.
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The Court's decision to engraft the standing limitations of
the Fourth Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory powers is
puzzling not only because it runs contrary to the major purpose
behind the exercise of the supervisory powers -- to protect the
integrity of the court -- but also because it appears to render
~he

supervisory powers superfluous.

In

o~der

to establish that

suppression of evidence under the supervisory powers would be
proper, the Court would also require Payner to establish a
violation of his Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights, 15/ in which
case suppression would flow directly from . the Constitution.
This approach is totally unfaithful to our prior supervisory
power cases, which, contrary to the Court's suggestion, are not
constitutional cases in disguise.
I also do not understand the basis for the Court's
assertion that this is not a case in which the District Court
was ·supervising the administration of justice "among the
parties before the bar," ante, at 8, n.7, and therefore
supervisory powers are inapplicable.
before the bar.

Clearly the Government is

Equally clearly, the Government embarked on

this deliberate pattern of lawless behavior for the express
purpose of gaining evidence against persons such as Payner, so
there can be no legitimate claim that the illegai actions are
only tangentially related to the present prosecution.

Instead,

the Government misconduct is at the very heart of this case;
without the evidence produced by the illegal conduct, there
would have been no case at all, and Payner would never have
been brought before the bar.

This is simply not a case in
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which a federal court has attempted to exercise "g~neral
supervisory authority over operations of the Executive Branch,"
ante, at 1 (BURGER, C.J., concurring).

Rather, this is a case

where the District Court refused to be made an accomplice to
illegal conduct by the IRS by permitting the agency to use the
proceeds of its crimes for the very purpose for which they were
committed -- to convict persons such as Payner.
Contrary to the Court's characterizations, this is also not
a case in which there has been "indiscriminate" or "unbending"
application of the exclusionary rule.

The District Court noted

that "exclusion on the basis of supervisory power is only done
as a last resort," 434 F. Supp., at 134, n.74.

That court

concluded that suppression was proper only where there had been
"purposefully illegal" conduct by the Government to obtain the
evidence or where the Goverrnnent's conduct was "motivated by an
intentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right."
Id., at 134-135 (footnotes omitted).

In this case, both those

threshold requirements were met, and the District Court in
addition concluded that absent suppression there was no
deterrent to continued lawless conduct undertaken by the IRS to
facilitate these types of prosecutions. 16/

This is not "a

'chancellor's foot' veto [by the District Court] ·over law
enforcement practices of which it did not approve," United
States v. Russell, 411
States, 425

u.s.

u.s.

423, 435 (1973); Hampton v. United

484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion ) •

Brother POWELL noted on a prior occasion,

"[t]h~

As my

fact that

there is sometimes no sharply defined standard against which to
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make these judgments [of fundamental fairness] is not itself a
sufficient reason to deny . the federal judiciary's power to make
them when warranted by the circurnstances •.•. Nor do I despair of
our ability in an appropriate case to identify appropriate
standards for police practices without relying on the
'chancellor's' 'fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism.' ..

Hampton v. United States, supra, at 495, ·n.6

(POWELL, J., concurring).

That appropriate case has arrived,

and the Court should prevent the Government from profiting by
use in the federal courts of evidence deliberately obtained by
illegal actions taken in bad faith hostility to constitutional
rights.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
suppress the fruits of the Government's illegal action under
the Court's supervisory powers. 17/

Accordingly, I dissent.
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FOOTNOTES

!/

The Court rather blandly states that "Agent Jaffe approved

the basic outline of the plan," ante, at 2.

Such a

characterization is misleading in light of the findings of the
District Court.

As is noted in the text infra, Jaffe knew

explicit details of the operation in advance and helped to make
the arrangements by recommending a locksmith who could be
"trusted," by providing a safe and convenient location for the
photographing of the documents, and by providing a photographer
from the IRS.

~/

Jaffe testified in the District Court that "[w]hatever I

knew, he [Register] knew."

See 434 F. Supp. 113, 121, n.40;

Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), p. 513.

11

It was clear why Casper needed a locksmith who could be

"trusted."

Casper testified as follows in the District Court:

"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Casper, you knew you were

committing an illegal act, and you wanted somebody who
could be trusted to keep his mouth shut about it?
"A. There is that possibility, yes.
"Q. Isn't that the fact.

....
"A. Yes."

434 F. Supp., at 119, n.20; Tr. in CR 76-305

(N.D. Ohio), pp. 452-453.
It is interesting to note that even the locksmith who could be
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...

"trusted" refused to enter Kennedy's apartment . with Casper.
Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), p.451.
The Government contends that when Agent Jaffe made the
referral he did not know what use Casper intended to make of
such a .locksmith.

Brief for United States 6, n.4.

The

District Court found, however, that Jaffe already knew at the
time of the referral that Casper intended to enter Kennedy's
apartment and to take and open Wolstencroft's briefcase.
were, then, only two logical

alternative~

There

why Casper would want

such a locksmith: to make a key to enter the briefcase, or to
make a key to enter the apartment.

Either way, Jaffe must have

known that Casper's conduct was improper, and yet Jaffe made
the referral anyway.

5./

It·. was not established at trial what occurred in Kennedy's

apartment prior to the couple's

depart~re _for

dinner.

Since it

was peculiarly within the power of the United States to produce
Kennedy as a witness and since the Government did not explain
her absence from the trial, the District Court inferred that
Kennedy's testimony "would be unfavorable to the Government by
further delineating the improprieties" of the "briefcase
caper."

5/

434 F. Supp., at 119, n.22.

The District Court, after -hearing the testimony of both

Casper and Jaffe, disbelieved Jaffe's assertion that Casper had
informed him beforehand that Kennedy had given Casper a key
with which to enter the apartment.

-16-

See 434 F. Supp., at 119,

n.l5; id., at 121, n.40.

~/

See also n. 3, supra .•

434 F. Supp., at 120, n.25; Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio),

pp. 494-496.

ll

As noted previously, Casper had told Jaffe to provide the

photographic equipment.

Jaffe testified that one of the

cameras used was a "microfilmer" which was "much quicker" than
a regular camera.

This camera had been brought by the IRS

because "Casper had to get the documents and the briefcase back
to the apartment prior to the return of the owner."
76-305 (N.D. Ohio), pp. 493-495.

Tr. in CR

This testimony again shows

that Jaffe was fully aware in advance that the activities of
the evening were improper.

~/

See 434 F. Supp., at 120 & n.34; Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D.

Ohio), p. 501.

~/

See 434 F. Supp., at 124, 129, 134, n.74.

10/ The Court's opinion inexplicably ignores this basic thrust
of our prior supervisory powers cases, and instead implies that
the only value served by suppression . is deterrence of future
misconduct.

See ante, at 9. · Deterrence is one purpose behind

the suppression of evidence in such situations, but it is by no
means the only one.
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11/ The Government conceded below that Wolstencroft's Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated.
Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), p. 502.

434 F. Supp., at 126.
See also Brief for

United States in No. 78-5278 (CA6), p.20.
14; Brief for United States 39.

See

Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg.

The Court agrees that the

conduct was unconstitutional. Ante, at 6.

12/ The Court characterizes the actions of Jaffe and Casper in
the briefcase incident as "possibly criminal behavior," ante,
at 6.

The District Court concluded that the actions of the IRS

appeared to constitute a prima facie case of criminal larceny
under Florida law, and possibly violated other criminal laws of
that State as well.

434 F. Supp., at 130, n.66.

Casper

admitted in the District Court that he knew he was committing
an illegal act.

Tr. in CR 76-305 {N.D. Ohio), pp. 452-453.

The stealing of the rolodex file from Wolstencroft's office was
also both unconstitutional and criminal.

That theft, however,

produced no additional evidence against Payner.

See 434 F.

Supp., at 123, n.56.

13/ See 434 F. Supp., at 129, n.65; id., at 131-133 & n. 69.
See also Tr. in CR 76-305 {N.D. Ohio), p. 505.
Wolstencroft in fact was indicted for aiding and abetting
Payner.

Brief for United States 3, n. 2. · However, Wolstencroft

is a Bahamian resident, and did not return to the United States
to answer the indictment. Id.

The mere fact that the

Government went through the steps of indicting Wolstencroft

does not in any way undermine the District

Cou~t's

finding,

based on substantial evidence in the record, th a t Wolstencroft
was never the target of the IRS investigation.

In light of the

Government's concession that Wolstencroft's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated, it is hard to see how the banker could be
successfully prosecuted on the aiding and .abetting charge.

14/ It is simply not a sufficient cure for the Court to
denounce the actions of the IRS, ante, at 6, while at the same
time rewarding the Government for this conduct by permitting
the IRS to use the evidence in the very manner which was the
purpose of the illegal and unconstitutional activities.

15/ The Court appears to ·s uggest that there can be no
suppression of evidence based on a violation of the Due Process
Clatlse in this case because it was not Payner who was the
immediate victim of the Government's outrageous conduct.
at 9, n.9.

Ante,

Although the District Court concluded that the

evidence should be suppressed under the Due Process Clause as
well as under its supervisory powers, the Court of Appeals
specifically did not reach that issue, 590 F.2d 206 (CA6
1979)

(~

curiam), and the Government purposely did not raise

the issue in this Court. See Pet. for Cert. 21, n. 13.
Accordingly, the Court's suggestion is pure dicta.
In addition, the only authority cited by the Court for its
suggestion is Hampton v. United States, 425
(1976) (plurality opinion).

484, 490

Hampton was only a plurality

-19-
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u.s.

.·

opinion, and the issue for which the Court purports to cite it
was not raised by the facts of that case.

Similarly, in the

Court of Appeals below the United States was able to cite only
Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, .407 {1967), a case plainly not
on point, and the sentence from the Hampton plurality opinion
quoted by the Court, ante, at 9, n. 9, for . the proposition that
Payner lacked standing to raise a due process argument.

See

Brief for United States in No. 78-5278 {CA6), pp. 21-22; Reply
Bri~f

6.

~he

issue whether the standing limitations this Court

has imposed for challenging Fourth Amendment violations also
apply for violations of the Due Process Clause based on
outrageous government conduct has not yet been settled by this
Court.

Cf. 434 F. Supp., at 129, n. 65, and authorities

discussed therein.

The due process issue is properly left for

consideration in the first instance by the Court of Appeals on
rema-nd.

16/ There is no suggestion by the Government that any action
has been taken against Casper, Jaffe or others for the conduct
·exposed in this case.

The Court admits that the corrective

measures taken by the IRS "appear on their face to be less
positive than one might expect from an agency charged with
upholding the law,"

~'

at 6, n. 5.

The District Court

specifically found that the Government agents knew they were
violating the Constitution at the time, 434 F. Supp., at 135,
n. 79, and that continued

m~nipulation

of the

s~anding

limitations of the Fourth Amendment by the IRS could be

...

deterred only by suppression of the evidence, id., at 133.

17/ The Government argues that Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence stripped the federal judiciary of its supervisory
powers to exclude evidence obtained through gross misconduct by
agents of the United States.

In the Court of Appeals this

argument was relegated to one footnote, see Brief for United
States in No. 78-5278, p. 41, n. 27.
address the issue.

The Court does not

I would merely note that the Government's

discussion of the legislative history behind Rule 402 fails to
convince me that it was Congress' intent to attempt such a
radical curtailment of the long-established supervisory powers
of the federal judiciary.

See United States v. Jacobs, 547

F.2d 772, 777 (CA2 1976), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 436

u.s.

31 (1978).

-21-
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The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976,
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. 1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
1 18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
fictitiou s or fraudulent statements or repi'esentations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

78-1729-0PINION
2

UNITED STATES v. PAYNER

respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court sot aside respondent's conviction.2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation of the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bftfi.Yrecords
he know Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
2 The unusual sequence of mlings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismi sed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, tho District Court vncated the order granting the motion to
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not challenge these procedures.

•'
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe}, "knowingly and wmfully participated in the
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase . . . ."
434 F. Supp., at 120. 3 According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
a reement. I d., at 123. Although the search did not impinge
upon the ~clangs Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern3

The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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mcnt's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." Id., at 129 (emphasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its supervisory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per cur,iam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con:.
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. Sec, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v..
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged search or seizure invaded his legitimate expectation
~
of privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972 ·
· ,Ljllw.e-- - - f) ~.
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
e en an from asser · g the FourthThe rule thaitrars
Amendment rights
strangers rests on e perception that
Fourth Amendm t rights are persona nd cannot be asscr
vicariously. Ra)cas v. Illinois, sun , at 133, quoting
erman v. Umted States, supra, a 74. It also repr nts the
Court' considered judgmer that the societal osts of the
exclllSionary rule counsel~ cxp~:ud.iug e class of per01 s who may invoke itJ Although e
wn is a necessary
deterrent to unlawful conduct ~aJ5propriate cases, the Court

P b

l
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has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but
tainted evidence exacts a clostly toll upon the ability of courts
to ascertain the truth and to acquit or convic the defendant in
a criminal case. E. g. , Rakas v. Illinois, pra, at 137-138;
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 2 , 275- 279 ( 1978);
see Michigan v. Tuck er, 417 U.S. 433, 0-451 (1974). Our
cases recognize than an unbending ap ication of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of ·overnmental rectitude
would impede to an unacceptable egree the truthfinding
functions of judge and jury. After 1, it is the defendant, and
not the constable, who stands trial
For these reasons, the Court h not interpreted the exclusionary rule to command the
ppression of " [every] thing
which deters illegal searches. . . ' Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174. Our abhorren e of illegality neither requires
nor permits us to exclude ' illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all 1 rsons." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1 74). Instead, we have adopted a
balancing approach that eighs the benefits of applying the
exclusionary rule in a g' en situation against its high societal
costs. Ibid.; see Uni d States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275279; United States . Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460
(1976); Stone v. P eU, 428 U. S. 464, 485-489 (1976); see
also United States . Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-539 (1975).
When a crimin defendant asks a court to suppress evidence
obtained in vio tion of a third party's Fourth Amendment
rights, the bal ce tips against application of the exclusionary
rule.
terrent values of preventing the incrimination of
hose rights the police have violated have been
con · lered sufficient to justify the suppression of probati~ evidence even though the case against the defendant
· weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
ut we are not convinced that the additional benefits
m- defendants
of extending the ~x.clusiG-nal'y-rnle- to
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would justify further encroachment upon tho p
c interest in prosecuting those accused of cr.in.'l~ and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderrnan v. United
States, supra, at 175-175.
The Court has applied this principle consistently. E. g.,
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at
488- 89; United States v. CalaryJ[,[J!,.~r.t,;J ~ 348.

The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
W:olstoncroft. 431: F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207.
Tho Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court's
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest
in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 126. Nor do we. United States v.
M.iller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor
has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; sec id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not pre8ent in
United States v. Mille1·, 425 U. S. 435 ( 1976). Respondent cites a proviso
to Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian law does grant a measure of confidentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276,
provides in relevant part:
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully requir!i!cd,!_.W.I-UJ...-.--u:l'-<l.u.lC._____
court of competent jurisdiction within the Color
or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person shall isclose any information
4
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities that do not
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The United
States co~s t~ this novel approach upsets the careful
balance of interests embodif'd in the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such a substantive extension of the supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a standardlcss discretion as to whether
~nd when to apply the Fourth Am~ndment as this Court has
construed it. We agree with the ~G.io.ovv.c:cronJ.Jm:Jl.E!eJJn.tt__________,
e 48: etlilu~lMr~ tt~Ji!Wi :: i1JR.. the f>istrict Court's \commendable de ire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. Sec 434 F.. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5

v

- c...c.....J

relating to ... the affairs of ... any customrr of a [bankl licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions undrr this Act."
The statuto is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been .dir~c ~ed to no
authority construing its terms. Moreover, AmNican drpo111iJ!rs know
that their own country rrquirrs thrm to report relationship~ with foreign
.
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. Sec generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59--63,71-76 (1974). ~;;
-Th~ respondent ~evealed his Bahamian account to an Arnrrican bank,
tho Bank of Perrino, in connection with the loan transaction that eventually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented

~+----..h""'
Js-a'""'lttount.

i

5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officrrs must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscatjl£.d." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969). We notejl t1wt the brirfcase affair was revealed to Congress
in the course of an extensive investigation of the Service's intelligence
operations. Sec Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS beforo a Subcommittee of the · House Committee on Government Operations,
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Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g. , Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

iual 1 s 1 r usm to a eiolal!'tbli of his s u
~
~ In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757
(1979) , we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by viola~:h'll'CiC?!Ii111

1

94th Cong., 1st, Se~s. (1976) . As a res111t., tho Commi ~~ioner of Internal
Revenue "rnll cd off" Opera tion Trade Winds: Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The
Commi ~sioner also adopt ed p;uidelinrs that require agents to instruct
informants on t.he requirrmrnts of the lfl.wqn:n-d to rrport known illrgalities to appro]11'iat,o st air authoritio~ . IRS Manual S11pp. 90-40, §§ 3.03,
4 (Feb. 3, 1077). Althon!);h thrsr mrn..,ures apprar on thrir face io be
less positive than one might expect from an agrncy charged with upholding
tho bw, thry do indicat e disaJ)proval of the pmcti crs found to hnve been
implemrnt ed in thi ~ case. Nor can we ass11mc thnt similar lawlrss conduct ; if brought to the attention of responf'iblc offirinls, would not be
dealt with appropriately . To rrquire in addition the ~11J1pres::; ion of
higlily probative evidence in a trial against a third party would penalize
society unnccecsarily.
6 Federal courts have ~d their supervisory power in some circumst anceR to exclude evidrnre taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States. 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); sec
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) ; R ea v. Unit ed States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Ilampton v. Unit ed States, 425 U.S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J ., concurring in the judgment). This Court ha s never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evidence obt.ained from third p artie~ in violation of Constitution, siaiute or
rule. The courts have no generalized license to over~ee the 11ractices of law
enforcement agencies. That responsibility is confided , subject to applicable
law, to ihe Executivo Branch. Unit ed States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435
(1973). The supervisory power merely permits federal coutis to supervise
"the aclmin· a.tion of criminal justice" among the pa.rtics before the bar.
cNabb v. United Sta , ~ 340 ~

c:r-
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tions of an executive department's rules. And in Elkins v.
United States~S!UprfJJ, at;. 216} the Court called for a restrained-:-application of the supervisory power:
"[A] ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a
federal court to suppress evidenc~vithout carefully balancing
the same interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment exGlusionary rule. Nor does a change in legal theory alter the
weight to be assigned the elements of the balance. The need
to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the
evidence are the same under the supervisory power as they are
under the Fourth Amendment. And our Fourth Amendment
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the societal
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was
not victimized by the challenged practices. Ralws v. Illinois,
supra; Alderman v. United States, supra.
The District Court disregarded these principles when it
concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith]
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F.
Supp., at 135. The District Court's reasoning, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 7
Tho samo difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the
Due Proces · Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend
fundamental "canon · of decency and fairness," Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407
7

t
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:wJIC·
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer,
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174.
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged' with enforcing.
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of tJ1e defendanq) Hampton v. UnitwSfafi80 425 U. S. 48'!).-490 ~(plurality
o]J'ifiionlj' One may disagree with the Hampton plurality's view that no
protected interest was involved in that case. See id., at 491-495 (PowELL,
J., concurring in the judgment). There ran be no doubt, however, that
the search of Mic.lmcl Wolstencroft's briefcase did not intrude upon this
respondent's rights in any wtty. Thus, the Due Process Clause adds little
to our analysis. The question for decision is still whether a person not
victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to suppress its fruits. That
balance of interests is determined by tho prior decisions of this Court.
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I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976,
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001,1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands,
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U.S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within tho jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States kno\\'ingly and willfully ... makes any false,
fictiLious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
1
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found , however, that the Government discovered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner. 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation of the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depo8itors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devi8ed a scheme to (.!;ain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a b~rproduct of the consolidated
hearing conduct ed by ihe District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted rrRpondent's motion to Ruppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Si>.ih Circuit dismissed ihe government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then rein sUtted its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not challenge these procedures.
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffee, 11 knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ."
434 F. Supp., at 120. 3 According to that court, 11 the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. I d., at 123. Although the search did not impinge
upon the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Governs The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." /d., at 129 (emphasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's usc of its supervisory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per cur'iam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment l exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 ( 1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. !d., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 ( 1973) ; Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged search or seizure invaded his legitimate expectation
of privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149- 152 (PowELL, J .. concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The rule that bars a defendant from asserting the Fourth
Amendment rights of strangers rests on the perception that
Fourth Amendment rights arc personal and cannot be asserted
vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 133, quoting Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. It also represents the
Court's considered judgment that the societal costs of the
exclusionary rule counsel against expanding the class of persons who may invoke it. Although exclusion is a necessary
deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases, the Court
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has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but
tainted evidence exacts a <fostly toll upon the ability of courts
to ascertain the truth and to acquit or convict the defendant in
a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275- 279 ( 1978);
sec Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450- 451 ( 1974). Our
cases recognize tha an un en mg app icat10n o t1c exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude
would impede to an unacceptable degree the truthfinding
functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, and '
not tho constable, who stands trial.
For these reasons, the Court has not interpreted the exclusionary rule to command the suppression of " [every lthing
which deters illegal searches.... " Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174. Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires
nor permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a
balancing approach that weighs the benefits of applying the
exclusionary rule in a given situation against its high societal
costs. Ibid.; sec United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275279; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 485-489 (1976); see
also United Stales v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-539 (1975).
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary
rule.
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of
those whose rights the police have violated have been
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
but we are not convinced that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
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would justify further encroachment upon the public inter•
est in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United
States, supra, at 175-175.
The Court has applied this principle consistently. E. g.,
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at
488-489; United States v. Cala·ndra, supra, at 348.

III
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207.
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court's
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest
in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 126. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor
has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy crcate>s an expectation of privacy not present in
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). Respondent cit es a proviso
to Ch . 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian law docs grant a measnre of confi~
denliality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276,
provides in relevant part:
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colonly or under the provi~
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose any information
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities UHtt ~. not
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The Umted
States contends that this novel approach upsets the careful
balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such a substa.ntive extension of the supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a standardless discretion as to whether
and when to apply the Fourth Amendment as this Court has
construed it. We agree with the Government.
We nevertheless a.greo..:u•itkl t 1e is nc ourt's commen able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who arc unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos'3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." "
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [ba.nkl licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act."
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is
limited; it is hedged with excor1tiom;; and we have been directed to no
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depost.iors know
that their own country requires them to report relationships with fo·reign
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103 .24. Sec generally California Bankers Assn. v. Sh-ultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-03,71-76 (1974).
This respondent alRo revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank,
tho Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan transaction that eventually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented
his amount.
5 "Tho Recurity of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officer~ must 11espect. Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscathed." Alder-man v. United States, 394 U. S. 165
175 (1969). We noted that the briefcase affair was t~~"liQlocli!e ongress
in the course of an extensive investigation of the Service's intelligence
opemtions. See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,

.t.· -t~A- '-c
~ ~'h.;f;.
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Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunCiations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. D enno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (-Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional
pronouncements of principle do not support the District
Court's reliance upon the supervisory po·wer to free a defendant whose own constitutional rights were not infringed.6
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
when a criminal d0fendant asserts a violation of his own
rights. In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757
(1979) , we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by viola94th Cong., 1st Sr~s. (1976). AR n rrsnlt., tho Commissionrr of Internal
Revrpue "cnlled off" Oprrntion Trnd e Winds. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The
Commissioner also adoptrcl gnidclinrs that require agents to instruct
informantR on the reqnir<'mrnt r< of the law, :mel to rrport known ill<'a;alities. to approprinte f<tat<' nuthoriti0s: IRS Mnnnnl Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03,
4 (Feb . 3, 1977). Although thrf<r mrmmreR apprar on thrir face to be
less positive than one might <'Xprct from nn ag0ncy charged with upholding
the law, thry do indirntc clif<n pprovnl of tho prnrtirrs found to have been
implemented in thi'R rase. Nor rnn W(' [lSSl!ffi(' thnt Rimilnr lawlc~R conduct, if brought, to the nttrntion of f<'f<ponr<iblr offirials, would not b e
dealt with appropriatrly. To rrqnirc in addition the snpprrsRion of
highly prohat.ivc rviclence in a trial against a third party would penalize
society unnecef<sn rily.
/
/ ~
1
6 Federal conr1R have fll!d
their suprrvisory powN' in ,·orne circumV
stanceR to excludr rvidrnce tnkrn from the defendant bv "willful di ~obedience of law." McNabb v. UnilNl States. 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see
Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 210-217 (1!156); rf. !Iampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 405 (PowELL, J ., concurring in the jurlgmrnt) . This Court ha s never
held, howrver , thn.t. the supcrvi1<ory powrr nuthorizrs supprrssion of evidence obtain0d from third pnrticR in violntion of Comtitution, sta.t ute or
rule. The rQJIJ:ts ll.:u~d li~o ~.iho fll'~til!e s 8£ ltni" ~
Wlf9+'Seu:.J91'1t..a~~~ It'R!~Oli:'Iibil~~~ . il'ttBjPllt t9 applieeble
r
law, t8 -tH8 El<~trive flrMl ~ l;fonit ~ d StatPB " • RussllU, 411 IT ~. 426, 466 ~
L--f,H~+r-4~~~~·~
· 11ower merely prrmitR frcleral rourts to supervi. ·c
"the admini. tra.tion of criminal just icr" among the parties before the bar.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,340 (1943).
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tions of an executive department's rules. And in Elkins v.
Unit ed States, s'upra, at 216, the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power:
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a
federal court to suppress evidence without carefully balancing
the same interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Nor does a change in legal theory alter the
weight to be assigned the elements of the balance. The need
to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the
evidence are the same under the supervisory power as they are
under the Fourth Amendment. And our Fourth Amendment
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the societal
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was
not victimized by the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra; Alderman v. United States, supra.
The District Court diiiiFQ~!H'aeEl ,stflese principles when it
concluded that "society's interest in deterring rbad faith]
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F.
Supp., at 135. The District Court's reasoning, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 7
7 The same difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of t.he
Due Proc e~s Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful briefca se search was Ro outrageous as to offend
fundamental "canons of decency and fairneRS," Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York , 324 U.S. 401, 407

)~

L
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IV
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer,
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174.
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
'fhe judgmen,t of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita·
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Government uctivity in question violates some protected rigM of tJ1e defendant," Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality
ne may ~a"' e
1 1
mp on p ura 1 y s v1ew
o inion .
protected intere t was involved in t.hat case. See id., at 491-495 (PowELL,
J., concurring in the judgment). There can be no doubt,' however, that
the search of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase did not intrude upon this
respondent's rights in any way. Thus, the Due Process Clause adds little
to our analysis. The queiition for decision is still whether a per,;on not
victimized by an unlawful sea,rch is entitled to Ruppress its fruits. That
balance of interests is determined by the prior decisions of this Court.

j
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 197~
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. 1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. '\Vith the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court f o u n d / .
18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or repvesentations, ... shall be fined
1

not mom thon $10,000 " imp<llioood not m"' thon five

Y'""' "

both."/

, r

.--s

78-1729-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. PAYNER

2

respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated
·hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
suppress arid entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal. lenge these procedures.
2

'

I
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase . . . ."
434 F. Supp., at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties ...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. !d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. Tho Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super·
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
·Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con·
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend.
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J. , concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion tha.t "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities oven when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the
~
careful balance of interests embodied in the Foutfh Amend-/"
/
ment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal

~

4

We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of
· .~--- ~
United States v. Mille1', 425 U.S. 435 (1976) .
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"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person f:hall disclo::;e any information
relating to .. . the affairs of . . . any customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
's ftmctions under this Act."
The st atute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no
authorit.y construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know
that their own country requires them to report relation.-hips with foreign
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. See generally California Banlce1's Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 , 59-63,71-76 (1974).
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[No paragraph] At the outset, it is not clear that
secret information regarding this respondent•s
account played any role in the investigation that
led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement.

See p. 3, supra.

Even if the causal

link were established, however, respondent•s claim
lacks merit.

He cites a provision, Ch. 96.9 of the

Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909), that is
no longer in effect.
safeguarded by
Stat.

~, 96

§

Bank secrecy is now

19 of the Banks Act, I Bah. Rev.

(1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No.

65, which provides in relevant part:

'·•'·
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courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their applicatiom
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Governm:

JIC

We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos•.3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 18.5
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).[Bw.ts the'i'e 'WlO~HiiptieRel
p~u;g.g~Jtst!M-"''f

pfinctrne-

· ·

"Tho security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rules esc, p l.lnacathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
1 5 (196_9). Wo not~ono- ~ invest igated,(improprieties revealed
in this record.at MIL
m 197() Sec Overs1ght Hearings into the
Operations of the IRS before a u committee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Trndewinds, Project Haven, and
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Con g., 1st Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Ccmmi~sioner also adopted guidelines that re~
quire agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report known illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual
Supp. 9G-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977) . Although these mpasures appear
on their face to be less positive than one might expect. from an agency
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the prac~
ticcs found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible
officials, would not be dealt. with appropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party
would penalize society unnecessarily.
5

'

I

.

'.
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But our cases also show that these unexceptional
principles do not command the exclusion of evidence
in every case of illegality.

Instead, they must be

weighed against the considerable harm¢ that would
flow from Wilt indiscriminate application of an
exclusionary rule.

..
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those whose rights the police have violated have been
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
But we arc not convinced that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
would justify further encroachment upon the public inter.est in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the e ·donee which exposes the truth." Alderman
~ited
States, supra, at 174-175. ~ ~

.

('M~~il@..

.

'

~~

--!122 fA~, %4)

","~488-4St[L'

_ ~4k.s. ~ (/tt)_;
.,.;;5 in1~r~sts.::::•:;:,:;:;;•:::::::i~ <lgt't<t )'/),

t-----------~~.--

at risk when a ('ri mi11 Al <l<•f ndant invokes the supervisory
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third
party's constitutional rights. M18se~ 1he supervisor ower
is applied with some caution even when a 8Fiminttl defendant

('

1

6 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 2.06, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. IIarnpton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court. has never
held, howover, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evidence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or
rule. The upervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise
"the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar.
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340.

.
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A though exclusion is a necessary deterrent to unla.wful
conduct in appropriate cases, the Court has acknowledged
!(ruA (~ " .
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts
s~ ; tftf
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth ( Uf\'
?>,-z3Bb~'\ft
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;} !i~~z cl'1~
1 'J
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978);
•
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489- 491 (1976); see Michigan
~
v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974)..{t)ur cases recog~(!).Je.,.J~
1
L--+--n-:i-ze-.. that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction
J
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede
una:cceptably the truthfinding f.unctions of judge and jury.~~\)s~ · v ,
A~ter all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands
, ~ p m,
tnal.
, 1 t~ ~ {)
ese-reasons the-€uart has not mterpreted t e exc uM- '-\~ 5 ... ., ~
sionary rule to
mand " [every] thing hich deters illegal
searches. . . . Alderman v. Uni})it States, supra, at 174.
Our ab renee of illegality nei~er requires nor permits us
to
ude "illegally seized
·clence in ..all 12roceedii · or
ainst all ~ " United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.
~8, 348 (1974)./Inst~ad, we have aclopted a balancmg approach that weigh§,rtf1e benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule in a given ·t'llation against its high societal cost. Ibid.;
see United
ates v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; United
States v. nis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v.
Powell supra, at 485-489; see also United States v. Peltier,
422 . s. 531, 535- 539 (1975).
hen a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth A~dment
rights, the balance tips against application of th~~dusionary

.r:;

/·1.d

_J

'->7

r.

~- To

"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of

1

PN

'f
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asserts a violation of his own rights.() In United States v.
Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused to exclude
all evidence tainted by violations of an executive department's
rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 216
( 1960), the Court called for a restrained application of the
supervisory powe~
11:1
"[A] ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.

See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
-non :nde that "the~m:50lj"":power ·de
·
edcral co rt to suppress evidence in ted by an unla' ul searc
- -+--L.. ithou carefully balancing the rune interests i
licated b
he F rth Amendment exclus· nary rule. Nor oes a chan e
nth legal theory for exclus· n alter the weig to be assign d
he elements of the balan . The need to eter the uncle - _a_. 1g conduct and the co of excluding t e evidence a~r/ t eame under the super sory power as hey are mljer t e
ourth Amendment.
ur Fourth Am dment deci~ns ha
stablished beyond ny doubt that
e societal terest i
eterring illegal s rches does not justify the exclusion o
the instance
a party w. o was not th
ainted evidence
victim of the c llenged practi s. Rakas . Illinois, supr ,
derman v. United States, supra.
- -+--..;the District Court
·
when it
c ncluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith]
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F.
Supp., at 135. 'l'he ~-Qn:tr~/..g Xreasonmg, which the
l~ivtc:W.d Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of
~
~ judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court ... ----:::;

1

]}
e
\
\
-1
(
w~

\ -huw- If7-'t'

*

8 The wma dHlioulty attenru. '"pnndant'a ebim to the pmtaationa nf the
Due P""""' Clause nf the Fifth Amandmont. Tha Cnmt of Appeal.

)

{jJo

fl]

No. 78-1729 Payner; INSERT No. 2 p. 9:
We conclude that the supervisory power
does not permit a federal court to suppress
evidence tainted by an unlawful search without
carefully balancing the benefits of exclusion
against its high societal costs.

And our Fourth

Amendment decisions have established beyond any
doubt that the interest in deterring illegal
searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted
evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices.

Rakas v.

Illinois, supra, at 137; Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 174-175.2/

The values assigned to the

competing interests do not change because a court
has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment.
In either case, the need to deter the underlying
conduct and the detrimental impact of excluding the
evidence remain precisely the same.
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m
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer,
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Alderman v. f.l..pitecl .State.s, supra.
17.
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.
e hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

~

expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend
fundamental "'canons of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant," Hampton v. United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion).

-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals
Jack Payner.
for the Sixth Circuit.
[April -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1. The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
Hme when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loa11 guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
118 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
''Whoever, in any matter within the juri:;diction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
.fictitious or fraudulent statement:; or representations, ... shall be fined
Ilot mora th!t.n $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discovered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence 'introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew W olstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
2 The unusual sequence of n1lings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the Di:strict Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment 011 the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
grant-ed re:spo ndent'~:> motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismi:ssecl the government'~; appeal for want of juri~:>
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
·uppre:ss and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated it-;
suppre~:;.~ion order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not challenge· these procedures.
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and W olstencroft a.t dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation·
shin betv,reen the Castle Bank and the Bauk of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlll wful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ."
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. !d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Cla.use of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appea,h; that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
iuve~;tigution untainted by the briefcase ~Search. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouruged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's ''knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." !d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super~
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
!_Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffinned the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds tha.t an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
Un-ited States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171- 172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149- 152 (PoWELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolsteucroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Mil7er, 425 U. B. ,435 (1~76) , estab1i'$bed that a depositor.-
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
Ullited States contends that this novel approach upsets the
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creatP~ an expectation of privacy not present in
U11ited States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the out><rt, it. is not
clmr that, srrrPt information regarding this respondent's account played
any rol<> in the invP:.:tigation that, led to thr discovery of the critical loan
gunrantee agreement. SeP p. 3, supra. Even if the rau~allin.k werp cstabli:;ht>d, howrwr, re~pondent's claim lacks merit. He citPfi a provi;;ion,
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909) , that is no
longer in rffPrt.. Bank sPcrrcy is now safegua.rded by § 19 of the Banks
Ar.t, I Bah . Rev. Stat. ch . 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65,
which providr,.; in relPvant part:
" Ex<·ept, for the purpose of tlie performance of his duties or the exercise
of hi:; function,; under this Art or when lawfullr required to do so by any
court, of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of uuy law of the Colony, no pel'l:ion :.:hall disclo~e :my information
rPlating to . . . the affairs of . . . any customer of a [bank] licensee
whirh he has acquired in the performance of hi:s duties or the exercise of
his funcLion:; under this Act."
Sn nlll6 tht , Dilnks 11t1d 'Pr uilt G6HlflHHi@l• ~or111l~~ieN A6r, 1Q8 ;l,ial~, Acts
Seo al:;o the Bunks and Trust Compani<:'s Regulation Act, 1965 Bah . Act
1071 Bah. Arts No. 15. The :.:tatutr i:; hardly a blanket guarantee of
prinlry . Its application is limited; it il:! hedged with exceptions: and we
have b<·<.'n dirpcted t.o no authority construing itR terms. ~forcover,
Am<:'rican dPpositors know that their own country require:; them to report
r<'lation~hipR with foreign financial inRtitutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31
CFTt § 10:3.24. Sf'e gPnerally California Bankers Assn. v Shultz, 416
F . S. 21, 59--fl.1, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent lacked a
rpa::;onablf' <:'Xj)<.'Ctation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented hi:; account.

No, &'-1-)

78-1729-0PINION

c

UNITED STATES v. PAYNER

men t decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such
' an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

III
We certainly can vnderstand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become 'defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutionaJ an·d possibly criminal behavior
of thos•.:J who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of ~illfully lawless activitieB underta:ken in the name
of law enforcement. E. (J., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
"The t*'Curity of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcemE-nt officer~ must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rulE>.-; escape unscathE-d." Alderrnan v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the improprietiPS revealed in this rPcord. See Ovpr~ight Hearings into the Operatiou;; of tlw IHS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Nnrcotics Traffickers TaxProgram), 94th Cong., lst -Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopbed guidelines that require agent~> to instruct infonmmts on the requirements of the law and to
r<,port known illegalities to [appropriate state authorities. IRS Mmnwl
Snp1~ 9Q m, §§ 3 Ol 4. (Ji'e'B. a, 19'?71. Although these memmres appear·
on their face to be le~s positive than one might expect from an agency
charged with upholding t11e law, they do indicate disapprovaJ of the practices found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot a.!Ssume
that similar lawle:;s conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible
officials, would not be deaJt with appropriately. To require in addition the
suppressioq of highly probative evidence in a trial against a -third pa:rty.·
would penalize ::;ociety unuece:ssarily.
5

q. .21 )~ q373.3{3))
~373. f
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that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that wou1d
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
Although exclusion ..i8.('a11ecessary deterrent to unlawful
couuuct in appropriate cases, the Court has acknowledged
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;
United States v. Ceccolin.i, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978);
StoneY. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433. 450-451 ( 1974); Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) ]
Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction .to enforce ideals of
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truthfinding functions of judge and jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 485-489; United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
348 (1974). After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights. 0
8 .Federal courts may use their supervi~ory power in ~ome circum:,;Lances to exclude evidence t<lken from the defendant by "willful disobedience' of law." McNabb v. United States, ;ns U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power Huthorizes supprrl'tlion of evideme obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, shLtute or
rule. The supervi<>ory power merely permits federal courts to supervise
" the admini:;tra.tion of criminal ju~tice" among the parties before the 'bar.
McNabb v. United States, supra, ~t 340.
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In Unite,d States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-75·7 (1979),
we refused to exclude a.ll evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power.
" [A] ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evide11ce in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216~!Jf
Sec also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939) .
'\Vc conclude that the supervisory power do<'R not ]Wrn:it a
f<'d<'ral court to suppress evidence fainkd h.r l:tili l!l:Hlawfwl

I'

liii'MI'iolh · 1tlhett~ elnBhilly 8al&FIIIiF~!!j tR.e 8ettefit.a ef -exci"trsiun
high societal eest~ i\n~.gur Fourth Amendment

~tits

decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,
at 137; Aldennan v. United States, supra, at 174-175. 7 Tl.,..h...,
e _ _/~
values assigned to the( competing interests do not change
{._;
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case. the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain precisely the same.
1 "The deterrent. vainer: of preventing the incrimination of tlwRe whose
rights 1he pol ire havr violntf'd have been ronsiderrcl Rnffirient to ju ~tify
ihe supprrs~ion of proba.tivr f'Yidencr rwn though the ea~r agaim;t t.hc
(]pfrndant. i:; weakrnrd or de~troyrd. We adhrrr to that judgment. Hut
wr arr noi. convincrd that. the additional benefits of extending thr PxeluR ionar·~ · rulP 1.o other clrfendan1s would ju;;tify further rner·oarhmrnL upon
thf' public interest, in pro;:rcuting those accused of crimP a.ncl having thrm
acquitted or convicted on thr basis of all the rviderrcf' which cxpo~r:; the

truth.'' Alrlernum v. United States, supm, at 174-175. Src

al~o

Stone
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Thus, the District Court erred when it concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion
out-weigh'[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reasoning, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 8 Were we to accept this use of the
supervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

v. l'utrell, 428 U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U S. 3BS, 348 (1974).
8 The ;;a me difficul1 y attends re-spondent's cbim to the protections of the
Duo Proce!'s Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful brief~1-~e sen.rch was o;o outrageous as to offend
f11nchun<•ntnl "'canons of decency and fairness,' " Rochin v. Califomia, 342
l l S l65, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that " [t]he limitations of the Du~ Process Clause ... come into play only when the Govl'nun<'nt. activity in question viohttes some protected right of t.he defendnut/' Hampton v, United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion) .
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The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.
I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976,
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001,1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
1

,.
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found , however, that the Government discovered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 ( 1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investi~~:a
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The proj ect, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devi:::ed a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing condu cted by the District Court. The court initially fruled to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, tho District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not challenge these procedures.
2
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase , a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationshin between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The Dil'trict Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlAwful sei:wre of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase . . . . "
434 F. Supp., at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties ...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. !d. , at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134--135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super"
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con"
stitutional rights. /d., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Ralcas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De"
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor

,,
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has no expectation of privacy a.nd thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should me its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the
careful balance of interests embodied in the Foutrh Amendment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). Respondent cites a proviso
to Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian hw does grant a measure of confidentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276,
provides in relevant part:
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose any information
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act."
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know
that their own country requires them to report relationships with foreign
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,59-63,71-76 (HY74).
This respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank,
the Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan transaction that eventually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented
his account.
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courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their applicatiol'l
of the exclusior\ary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

A
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the ·unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional
pronouncements of principle do not support the District
Court's reliance upon the supervisory power to free a defend5

"The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officers rp.ust re~'<pect. Nor should those who flout
the niles escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969). We note that Congress investigated improprieties revealed
in this record at some length in 1976. See Oversight Hearings into the
Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that require agPnts to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report known illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual
Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977). Although these measures appear
on their face to be less positive than one might expect from an agency
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the practices found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible
officials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party
would penalize society unnecessarily.
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ant whose own constitutional rights were not infringed. nthe princ'p
ne er have b~n t~~"Cl'5Tn~

f!jci,
l~~~u:~c~1~~i~~a~~' ~~~:.idor~t

to

th~~tion

Although exclusion is . a necessary deterrent to unlawful
conduct in appropriate cases, the Court has acknowledged
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan
1\
v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 ( 1974)1) 0ur cases~-~ J-~n"!":Ize:}that unbending application of the ex~lusionary sanctiOn
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede
unacceptably the truthfinding functions of judge and jury.
After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands
trial.
Eor tl)P'a@ r9&s9na,...the Court h&.a.llOt.int.eJ:preted the IP¥CJusionaqr rwle ~ eaffirnand "[e~~:yj4ihittg ~deters lllegttlS4tarches ... .).) Alderman ~~W States, S'U'pro, -1t lU. .
Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor permits us
to exclude "illegally seized evidence in aU proceedings or
against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S.
338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule in a given situation against its high societal cost. Ibid.;
see United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v.
Powell, supra, at 485-489t'> SQ@ alsB bll%itB8! ~tfl!t88 V: }&BUiBf",
~22

u.s. 5Bl, 586

e611 (1Q'>i81.

When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary
rule.
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of

J

I
I
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those whose rights the police have violated have been
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United
States, supra, at 174-175.
The Court has repeatedly affirmed its considered judgment
that the eosts of the exclusionary rule do not permit expansion
of the class of persons who may invoke it. E. g., Rakas v.
Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 488- 489;
· United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.

III
t~

B

-.
appllmr-

'b 0c indi ~c:;r;iminrte
are 8CfUal
at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the supervisory
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third
party's constitutional rights. Indeed, the supervisory power
is applied with some caution even when a criminal defendant
Th!- societal interests

MeB OX

tll,~Qt9~9a

.

tb~ ~m:.~lR@.:R.dJ;oegt.ewhu;i.QR<aP"""'~

°Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); R ea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in tho judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evidence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or
rule. The supervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise
"the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar.
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340.
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asserts a violation of his own rights. 0 In United States v.
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754-;-757 (1979), we refused to exclude
all evidence tainted by violations of an executive department's'
rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 216
( 1960), the. Court called for a restrained application of the
supervisory power:
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
/

(193~9:J·~(?ht., ,J.

See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a
federal court to suppress evidence tainted hY an unlawful search
without carefully balancing th~ne iniiete~t~ implicated by
t:.}:}e FottPtH: h);l.iAQm8At QX9lw.si9~ rnle ;wor QQ8S a eH:ttHge
it? iRe legal t:heeFy £or exclm:io~t !MteF'the weight to be assigned
the elements of the balance. The need to deter .the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are the
same under the supervisory power as they are un.der the
Fourth Amendment. /'Jur Fourth Amendment decisions have
established beyond any doubt that the ~Miettri interest in
deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,·
Alderman v. United States, supra.
iW.t-. ¥'he District Court ·
concluded that "society's interest in
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of {act with all relevant evidence." 434 F.
Supp., at 135. J'hbS 4:listPiet; €8wr~asoning, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of._
~judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 7
The srune difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
7

cJ.MA j

.t!JI. . ,... 1~
~5 ~-aJ_
~k ~
·
a,as.f-S. ~ e;f
_ _./)~

~

l

.IJ •.
~ ~")
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III
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer,
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174.
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

'

expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend
fundamental "'cnnons of decency and fairness,' " Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protecLed right of the defendant,'' Hampton v. United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion).
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.
I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976,
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001,1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or repl'esentations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
1

''
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discovered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner. 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 ( 1977). As the tax return
alone was in sufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The proj ect, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focu:-ed on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its dPpoRitors.
To that end , Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discowred that the
b:mker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devi.:oed a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a bypro<inct of the consolidated
hearing condu cted by the Distri ct Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent 's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court vaca ted the order granting th e motion to
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent docs not challenge these procedures.
2
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents tflken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was reD]aced. The documents photographed that
evening includPd papers evidencing a close working relationshiD between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine nltimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The Di~trict Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlAwful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ."
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties ...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. I d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the GovernThe United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investiga,tion untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point .
8
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ment's ''knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super~
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
'[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
·Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. /d., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 140- 152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contra.ry conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the
careful balance of interests embodied in the Foutrh Amendment decisions of this Courf In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
. 4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of baJJk secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Respondent cites a proviso
to Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909'). Although
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of t.he Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, BahamiaJJ. law does grant a measure of confidentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Tmst
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276,
provides in relevant part:
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by aJJY
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose aJJY information
relating to ... the affairs of ... aJJY customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his ftmctions under this Act."
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know
that their own country requires them to report relationships with foreign
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Slntltz, 416 U.S. 21, 59'-63, 71-76 (1974).
This respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank,
the Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan tran&'Lction that eventually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented
his account.
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courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

A
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos•.3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional
pronouncements of principle do not support the District
Court's reliance upon the supervisory power to free a defend5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officers must t'espect. Nor should tho ·e who flout
the rules esca e unscathed." Alderman v. United States 394 U. S. 165,
1 9). We note t 1a Con,.ress investigated improprieties revealed
in 1s recor ,
· ~ Sec Overs1ght Hearinp;s into the
Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project H::wen, and
Narcotics Traffi ckers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt•ed guidelines that require agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report known illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual
Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb . 3, 1977). Although these measures appear
on their face to be less po~itive than one might expect from an agency
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the practices found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible
officials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party
would penalize society unnecessarily.

~U .
fv...t;
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ant whose own constitutional rights were not infringed./fudeed, the principles never have been thought to encompass
~ · the full range of considerations relevant to the application
of an exclusionary rule)
Although exclusion is a necessary deterrent to unlawful
conduct in appropriate -cases, the Court has acknowledged
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978);
1tone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan
~ t4<~~
. 'l'ucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974). Our cases)'ecogize that unbending application of the exclusionary sa1ction
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede
-~
unacceptably the truthfinding functions of judge a n
jury.
Etd
After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands
trial.
(DIIJ).
'--)
r
For these reasons, the Court has not interpreted the
~~
siouarr plf:>. to command "[every]thing which deters illegal
searches. . . . " Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174.
Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor permits us
to exclude "illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 u. s.
338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary
rule in a given situation against its high societal cost. Ibid.;
see United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v.
Powell, supra, at 485-489; see also United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 535- 539 (1975).
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary
rule.

1

r

tk

-r)l

"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of
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those whose rights the police have violated have been
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment.
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and ha.ving
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United
States, supra, at 174-175.

)

~ {;EHoJ:Ft h88 PQp todliF offirmod i+s- considered judgment
that t)1e costs of the exclusionary rule 99 JU* ponnit Pxpansion
of the class of persons who may invoke it. /!!. (}71(akas v.
Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, sftpra, at 488-489;
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.
"
·
02

'

c: ~

----6

B
The societal interests threatened by indiscriminate application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule are equally
at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the supervisory
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third
party's constitutional rights. Indeed, the supervisory power
is applied with some caution even when a criminal defendant

I

6 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the drfendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States. 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); R ea v. United Stat es,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; rf. Hampton v. Unit ed States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, tha,t, the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evidence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or
rule. The supervisory power merdy permits federal courts to supervise
"the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar.
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340.
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asserts a violation of his own rights. 6 In United . States v.
Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused to exclude
all evidence tainted by violations of an executive department's
·rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 216
(1960), the Court called for a restrained application of the
supervisory power&)
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a
federal court to suppress evidence tainted by an unlawful search
without carefully balancing the same interests implieated by
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. · Nor does a change
' in .the legal theory for exclusion alter the weight to be assigned
the elements of the balance. The need to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are the
same under the supervisory power as they are under the
Fourth Amendment. ~~ndmeni5 decisions have
established beyond any doubt that the sociJ al interest in
deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challei•ged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra;
Alderman v. United States, supra.
The District Court m-isappli,ed-t.h~ pdnmples when it
concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith]
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] soci~ty's interest in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F.
Supp., at 135. The· Dis~Gourtls reasoning, which the
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 7
7 The same difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals

~

~

~
,

_
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III

____

Understandably ~·t of a federal officer,
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174.
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.
~~old that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment ;tihe onrt or Appeals IS
Reversed.

expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend
fundamental" 'canoll s of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952) , quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of t.he defendant," Hampton v. United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion).

'i
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United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals
Jack Payner.
for the Sixth Circuit.
[April -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § lOOP The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found---------1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the juri~diction of any department or
agency of the United States .knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
.fictitious or fraudulent statoments or representations, .. . shall be fined
not mora than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both;"

~

~
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respondent guilty as cha.rged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov.ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence 'introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised· a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
2 The unusual sequence of mlings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the Di~tri ct Court. The court init ially failed to
enter judgme11t on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismi::;sed the govrrnment's appeal for want of jurisdiction , the Di::;trict Court vacated the order granting the motion to
uppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppreiii>ion order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not clwlenge· these procedure ,
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation·
shio between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unl11wful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase . . . ."
434 F. Supp, at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties ...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. /d., at 123 8 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Governs The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appe!lls that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con~rary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." !d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super~
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
I Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con~
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. Un·ited States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 ( 1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F . Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolsteucroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 425 U. B. 435 (lll76) , establi>hed that a depooi~
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l1as no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
Uuited States contends that this novel approach upsets the
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend~
4 We are not. persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creatP::J an expectation of privacy not. present in
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976) . At. the outsPt, it is not
cll'ar that. o:rcrPt information regarding thi~ respondent's account played
any role in the inve:;tigation that. led to the discovery of the critical loan
gunrantee agreement. Seep. 3, supra. Even if the causal link were establi:::lwd, howrvrr, respondent's claim lacks merit.. He cites a provi~ion,
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909) , that is no
longer in effect.. Bank secrpcy is now snfeguarded by § 19 of the Banks
Art, I Bah. Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65,
which provid~ in relevant. part:
" Ex<·ept for the purpose of t.l\c performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when la.wfull~· required to do so by any
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of uny law of the Colony, no person ;;hall disclose any information
relating to . . . the affairs of . . . any customer of a [b;mk] licensee
whirh he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functionH under this Act."

Bce nlde tltc Q::PJlcs and TttiSI

5GIII]Jttnie~ "'Ro~ulttthan 4 et;
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Sen also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah . Acts
1971 Bah. Acts No. 15. The ~tatute i;; hardly a blanket guarantee of
privacy . Its application is limited ; it is hedged with exce ption~ ; n.nd we
luwe been directed t.o no authority construing its term». Moreover,
American depositors know that their own country requires them lo report
rrlation:ships with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121 ; 31
CFH. § 108.2-1. See generally California Banke1·s Assn. v. Shultz, 416
U . S . 21, 59-6:3, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent. lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in t.he Castle Bank records that docu~
mentcd his a.ccount.
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men t clecisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

III
We certainly can \}nderstand the District Court's commend~
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become 'defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutionaJ a1id possibly criminal behavior
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of '~illfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
~
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485_....,-(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
s ''The i::i('Curity of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which bw enforcement officers must respect . Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscathed." Alderr/ULn v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969). We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the improprirties rPv(•aled in this record. 'See Ovrrsight Hearings into the Operations of the IHS before a Subcommitter of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Nnrcotic,; Traffickers TaxProgram), 94th Con g., 1st·5ess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called dff' Operation Tra;de Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that reuire agentli to instruct informants on the .!..equirements of the law and to_ lo.._, s.u ~JQ.Av i~
re >ort known illegalitie~ to ~appropl'late state authorities. IRS Manual
f, ,
L.....
)
Snpp. 90 i9, §§ 3.93, 4 (Fee. 3, 1977). Although these measures appear· la.)Wl I\ 1t'\
T~ll(\
on their face to be le:ss positive than one might expect from an agency
~c..te.d
charged with uiJ1JOlding tlle law, they do indicate uisapproval of the prac. J
ticPs found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume
t at similar lawle:ss conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible
official!:!, would not be dealt with nppropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a t:hi:rd party.·
would prnalize :society unuece:ssarily.
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that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of i1legality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
.
)
tt
<#
Although- e~shu;ion is a J~essa~e-tefli'BH1; oo ~fu
~j JUJ
ggutJ"t~e1; tR lilpJ:u:a}lriate. ·caseQ tpe Court has acknowledged
~
~('1(.;
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts
\:hn~ <1J\Jl.AA.. w\1\UU.
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth
·b; ~
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;
1
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 ( 1978); / ( 1/
•
o.IUStone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan/
1\\oS .JJ. .£.£tct01A.Sl"( v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 450-451 ( 1974)
aufrnan v. nt e
b~ · - 1-\\\)~) V
tates, 394 U.S. 217. 237-238 (1969)
ack, J., disseuting)_;
~lV'ft..Q. •
~
Our cases ave consistently recognized that unbending apph5\al~~ \1. (~rA)! cation of the exclusionary sanction .to enforce ideals of
t.\ t.\ 1;\ .S 33 ~
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth\
' ;,
"'- >
finding functions of judge and jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell,
.9+~ (I ttif )·
supra, at 485-489; United States v. Calandra, 414 IT S ~~g, r-..s~r·~.
348. ~ After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a crimiual
defell(laut i11vokcs tlw supervisory power to suppr<>Rs evidence ~·
seized iu violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
\\hen the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.~/
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Federal courts may
their supervi::mry power in some circum:,;tances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedienre' of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see
Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, .f., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
-------held, however, tha,t the sup<>rvi1<ory power authorizel:l :::;upJH'PK1<ion of evi-~
dem·e · obt<tim•d from 1hird Intrlie~ in violation of Con::<tit.utiou, statute or
rule . The supervi:::;ory power merely permits federal courts to l:lUpervise
" lhe admini:::;tration of criminal ju;,;tice" among the partie::; before the bar.
McNabb v. Unit~,;d States, supra, 11-t 3'!0.
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979),
we refused to exclude aU evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power.
" [A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." .364 U. S .. at 216.
Sec also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
'Ve conclude that the supervisory power does not }3eFfl:ut It
:ffideFQl court te sYppress eviElenee t!Wn~l by an unlawful
se~lt

\\tthoni;

~rg--tfie.-heA.efits-of

xelusiOll"

againstrii;s :RigA ~oei~M ee~ ~ _9ur Fourth Amendment
t:cc~ions have established beyond anyc doubt that the interest
1
terring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 110t the
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.•Y The
values assigned to the competing interests do not change
b'ecause a court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain precisely the same.
I

$.The de-terrent v::<lue::: of preventing tho incrimination of those whose
rightR the police have violated hnvc been considered suffi ciC:'nt to jw:illfy
the iiUpJlression of probative evidener even though the ca~c agah1Ht tJ1e
clrfendrmt is wenkPnccl or de:-;troyrd . We aclhC'rC:' to thai judgmE-nt. But
wr fli'P noi. convinrf•d that the additional benefit::< of extending thr rxcluRion m·~· rule t.o othrr defendants would ju,;tjfy fmther encroachment upon
tlw public interest in pro:-;ecuting tho::<r nccused of crimP :mel lmving them
acquitted or convicted on the ba~i s of all tho evidence wh1C'h rxpo~e::< the
truth." Alderman v. United States, sup.ra, at li4-175. Sec ul::;o Stone
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District Court erred when it concluded that "soy's 11Pfurest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion
weigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
WJ t 1 all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reasoning, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a
substitution of individy9-l judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.•.1'were we to accept this use of the
supervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

v. Pwell, 428 U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414

_tJ. s. 3a~. 348 (1974).
:!/ .. The l:mme difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appe~tls
expres:;ly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
·,;ume that the unlawful briefcase search was ~;o outrageous as to offend
fundaml'ntul "'canons of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342
U. S !65, 169 (1952), quoting Malimki v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limitatio!lls of the Due Proces,.; Clause ... come into play only when the
ernment. activity in que~:>·tion violates some protected right of the defendrw t," Hampton v, United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion).
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United States, Petitioner, On ·writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals
Jack Payner.
for the Sixth Circuit.
[April -, 1980]
Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in a11y matter within tho jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . , makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or impri ·oned not more than five years, or both."
1

WLJIJ

-------
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all theevidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds/'
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle·
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the meritl:>. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to ;;uppre::;s. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction , the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
uppre::ls and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppre;;sion order and set aside the verdict Respondent doe;; not chaJlen~e these {lrocedtt,res.
1
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlBwful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase . . . ."
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties ...." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. I d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge·
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern8 The United States argued in the District Court ltnd the Court of Appeals that the bruarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase ~;earch. The Government also
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." !d., at 129; se6
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super..
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 ( 1979)
(per cur-iarn). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari, - U. S . - (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude·
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. ld., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Sirnrnons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra., at 143; id., at 149- 152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Cornbs·
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 ( 1968) .
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
¥ ilier, 425 U. S. 435 ( 1976) , established that a depositor·
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. 'rhe
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend4

We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in
Uui.ted States v. Miller. 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the out.~rt, it is not
clear that secrf't information regarding this respondent's account played
any rolr in thP im·f'stigation that led to the discovery of the critical loan
guarantee agrf'f'ment. Seep. 3, supra. Even if the ca,u~allink werr rstablished, however, respondent's claim lacks merit. He cites a provi::;ion,
Ch. 96.9 of the St atutc Law of the Bahama Islands ( 1909), that is no
longer in effect.. Bank secrecy is now safrguarded by § 19 of thr Bm1ks
Act, I Bah. Hrv. Stat. ch. 96 ( 1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65,
which providr:-: in relevant. part:
"Except for the purpose of the performa11cr of his duties or the exercise
of his functionH under thi:o Art or whrn lnwfull~' required to do so by any
eourt of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of m1y law of the Colony, no person shall di::;close any information
relating to ... the affairs of . . . any customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of hi::; duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act."
~re also the Banks and Trust Companies Rrgulation Act, 1965 Bah. Acts
No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah. Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. ActR No . 20,
1971 Bah . Act;; No. 15. The statute is hardly a bl~tnket guarantee of
privacy. Its a.pplication is limited; it is hedged with excepbon~; and we
have been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover,
Americm1 depo::;itor~ know that their own country requires them to report
relat.ion::;hips with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S . C. § 1121; 31
CFR § 103.24. Sre generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416
U. S . 21, 59-63 , 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent lacked a
rea:;onable expectation of privu,cy in tho Castle Bank records Lhat documrntL-'Cl his account.
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ment decisions of this Court. ' In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

III
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos•3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
6 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the improprieties revealed in this record. See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Narcotics Trafficker:; Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Se:;s. As a. result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt,ed guidelines that require agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report. known illegalities to a supervi:;ory officer, who is in turn directed
lo notify appropriate state authorities. IHS Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373.3
(3), 9373.4- (Dec. 27, 1977) . Although these measures appear on tlwir
!ace to be les::> pos1tivP than one might expect from an agency charged
with upholding the law, thPy do indicate disapproval of the practice:>
found to have beE'n implemented in this cal:ie. We cannot a::;sumt'
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to t.he attention of responsible
t>fficials, would not be dealt with a,ppropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party·
wonld penalize ~:~ocicty unttece::;sarily.

1
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously
l!erved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case.
E . g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974). 6 Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury. E. g. , Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and
not the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.7
See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 2:37-238 (1969) \
(Black, J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 87 F . Chi. L. Rev . 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970).
7 Federal court::; may u:;e their
·upervi::<ory power in ·orne circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant b~r "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 31R U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Bea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELl,, .J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorize:; ::mppre:;sion of evi8
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979),
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power,
"[A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.

I

See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize
a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
taintPd evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Ill-inois, supra,
at 137; A lderrnan v. United States, supra, at 174-175.8 The
values assigned to the competing interests do not change
dence obtaint>d from third parties in violation of Constitution, sta.tute or
rule. The supen~KOry power mer-ely permits fE>deral courts to supervise
"the ndministmtion of criminal .in~tice" among the partie:> before the bar.
JfcNabb v. United States. supra.. nt 340.
8 "The cletcrrrnt. values of preventing t.hr incriminntion of 1ho;;e whose
right~ tlw policr ha.vr violatrcl have been considered ~ufficirnt t.o ju"tify
the suppresHion of probn tivr evidence even though the ca.,e againot llJC
defendant. is WE>akened or dc:-itroyNl. Wf.' nclhcre to that judgment. But
we nro not. convincf.'cl that the addilionnl bt'tJCfib of extending the <'xclusionary rule l.o other defeJldants would jnstif~r l'urther enrroachmf.'nt upon
thP pnblic in terr. ·t in pro,;ecuting those accused ol' crime and having them
acquitted or ronvictf.'d on the basis of nll the eviclenc<' whieh cxpOiSP. " tho
truth ." Alde1·man v. United States. supra. at ]74-175. See al::;o Stone
v. Powell, 42R U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United Sta.tes v. Calandra, 414
u.s. '33 '34 (1974),
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because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
ilUpervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain preeisely the same.
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion
outweigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reasoning, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling de£isions of this Court.l) Were we to acceptt his use of the
supervisory power, we would ·confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

ThP ~-;mne difficulty nttmds respondent's claim to the protect ions of the
:Vue Proces:; Claui'if' of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to consider the Due Proce;,.":! Clause. But ev('ll if we
as:;ume that the unlawful bnrfctt.~e search was ~;o outrageous a:; to offend
inndlunental "'canon:; of decency and fairness,'" Bochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, Hi9 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurtt>r, J .), the fact remains that "[L]he limitation:; of the Due Proce:;:; Clau:se . . . come into play only when the Government a.ctiviLy in quest1on violates some protected right of the defendant," Ilampton . United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion).
9
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I

United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals
Jack Payner.
for the Sixth Circuit.
[April -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funtls in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U . S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant, part:
"Whoever, in ~tny matter within the jnrisdic1ion of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
:fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
1
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,''
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle·
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merit<!. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent'rs motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court. vacated the order grunting the motion to
suppresrs and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinrstated its
"Uppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent doel:l not cl1allenge tbese \)rocedq_res •.
1

'
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase . . . ."
434 F. Supp ., at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties ...." I d.,
at 132- 133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. !d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Governs The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
inve~:>t igation untainted by the briefcase ~:.-earc h . The Govemment also
dPnied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super...
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 ( 1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U. S . - (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Ralcas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude·
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own c stitutional rights. ld., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 ( 1973) ; A' derman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the·
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra., at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 ( 1968) .
'l'he foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
l'ecognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 425 U, S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor·
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth AmendWe are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy create;; an cxJwctn.tion of priva<·y not present in
United States v. Mille1·. 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the outRct, it is not
clear that sec rPt information regarding this respondent's account played
any role in thr invrstigation tlmt led to the diRcovery of the critjcal loan
guarante<> agrP<>m<>nt. Seep. 3, supra. Even if the causal link were establi;;hed, howewr, respondent'i> claim lacks merit.. He cites a provision,
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909), that is no
longer in effect.. Bank secrecy is now safrgnarded by § 19 of the Banks
Act, I Bah. Hov. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Ball. Acts No. 65,
which providPH in relevant. part:
"Except for the purpo::;e of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functiom; under this Art or when lawfully required to do so by any
eourt of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person r:hall di::;close any information
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functjons nnder this Act."
~ro also the Banks and Trust Companie.s Regulat.ion Act, 1965 Bah. Acts
No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah . Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. Act;; No. 20,
1971 Bah . A<'ts No. 15. The stat ute is hardly a blanket. gua.rnntee of
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hed~ed with excepUon;;; ami we
h::tw b<>en din,cted t.o no authority construing its terms. Moreover,
AmericUJJ depo;;itor::; know that their own country rf'quir<>s them to report.
relat.ionship;; with foreign finnncial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121 ; 31
CFR § 103.24. See generally Califumia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416
U. S . 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent. lacked a
reawnable rxprrt::ttion of privacy in the Castle Bank records that docu·
mentcd his <Lecount.
4
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ment decisions of this Court. ' In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

III
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos•3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 ( 1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485
6 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the improprieties revealed in this record. See Oversight. Hearings into the Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven , and
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt,ed guidelines that require agents to in~:~truct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report known illl'glllities to a supervi~:;ory officer, who is in turn directed
to notify appropriate state authoritie~. IH.S Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373.3
(3), 937;U (DN·. 27, 1977) . Although these mea~:;ure~:~ appear on their
face to be less pmntive than one might expect from a11 agency charged
with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the practice:;
found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot a>iSume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of re::;pon::;ible
vfficiahl, would not be dealt. with appropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party·
would penalize ::;ociety mrnece::;sarily.

I
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously
served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a ·costly toll upon
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case.
E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U. S. 464, 489-491 ( 1976); see Michigan V. rrucker, 417
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974). 6 Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury. .E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485--489; United States
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and
uot the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights. 7
n See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 2:37-238 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclu~ionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 TT. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970).
7 Federal courts may u,;e their supervi;;ory power i11 some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U . S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (19(i0) ; Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, .J., concurring in t.he judgment) . This Court ha::; never
held, however, that the :oupervisory power authorizel:i ;,upprel:il:iion of evi-

I
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-7S7 (1979),
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power.
f'[A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only U!)On
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele~
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.

~I

I

See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize
a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest
ln deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
taintPcl evidence at the instance of a part who was not
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,
at 137C)./~X)ifJQfitJ•de? Vi lfi5LJ;fW~'ep•;tt::J ;Mi'n liJN.s The
values assigned to the competing interests do not change

t{M;{ed~

v. WvtA.W.J
No .-7'1-- v--1 ~
(~t1f';uj-

dence obtained from third parties in viohtt.ion of Con. titution, sta.tute or
rule. The superviso ry power mei'rly permits fPderal courts to supervise
l0
"Lhe administration of criminal jn~ticP" among the parties before the bar.
JfrNabb 1' . United States. supm.. at 340.
"The cletPrrrnt values of prevrnting the incrimination of lhoRr whose
rightK tlH1 police have violated have brrn considrred suffici<'ni to justify
the supprc·s:;ion of probative evidence evrn though the case against the
defen(hmt is weakened or de~troyed. We ndhrro to that judgment. But
we :no not. conYincrd that. the additional benefit::; of ext.pnding the exclusionar~' rule t.o othrr dPfendant.s would justif~r further encroachment upon
the public interPr>t in pro,;ecuting those accused of crime and having tlwm
acquitted or convicted on the bn:;is of nil the evidence which expo~~ ....
truth ." Alderman v. United States. supra. aL 174-175. Sec al:;o St'r:flzev \..

v. Powell, 42R U. S. 464, 488- 489 (197()); United States v. Calandra, 414

u.s. '338, 348 (1974),
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because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
2upervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain preeisely the same.
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion
outweigh{s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reasoning, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling de~isions of this Court. 1) Were we to accept{ his use of the
supervisory power, we would confer on the Judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

9

Thr smne diffieul1y atf.pnds rrspondent!s claim to thr protections of the
l)ue Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
expressly declined to consider the Due Proce~:>."> Clause. But even if we
al:ll:iUme that, the unla,wful Qnrfcase search was !:iO outrageous a:; to offend
Itmdaml•ntal "'caJ10llN of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165, 169 {1952) , quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J .), the fact remains that "[t]he limitations of the DuP Proce:;::; Clause ... come into play only when the Gov- ·
ernment act1vity in questiOn violate~ some protected right of the defendant," Hampton . United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion) ,
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United States, Petitioner,] On ·writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals
Jack Payner.
for the Sixth Circuit.
[April -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.

I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 100V The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands.
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern/
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent stat<'ments or representations, ... shall be fined
/
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. " /
1

'
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discovered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court therefore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds/'
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle·
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of mlings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
uppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinsta-ted its
.suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not challenge these :procedttres•.
1

1'
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationship between the Castle Bank ru1d the Bank of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The District Court found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ."
434 F. Supp ., at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties . . . ." I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee
agreement. I d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern8 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement wa.s discovered through an independent
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also
denied that it:; agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 1:29; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super..
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979)
(per cur·iam) . The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari, - U. S . - (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not ·exclude·
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs·
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
'Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126 ; see 590 F . 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v;.
~
Milie~, 425 U. S. 435 (1976) , est,.blished that a ·deposito/
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how, . _J J..{J
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
_ _s_u_p~press evidence tainted by gross illegalities
,r'ffi1GL\..
c not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights.
D(
f~
United States contends that this~ approach ups s
fii/A.O\f h
careful balance of interests embodied in the Four h ~mend~ cde. -

·IJ'J

4

We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian

htw of bank secrecy create~ an expectation of privacy not present in
United States v. Mille1·. 425 U. S. 435 (1976). AL the outset., it is not
clea.r t.hat secret information regarding this respondent.'s account played
any role in the investigation that led to the discovery of the critjcal loan
guarantee agrPement. Seep. 3, supm. Even if the ca.usa.llink were e;,'iabli::;hed, however, respondent's claim lacks merit.. He cites a provision,
Ch. 96.9 of the St a.tute Law of the Bahama Islands ( 1909), that is no
longer in effect.. Bank secrec~' is now safegua.rded by § 19 of the Ba11ks
Act, I Bah . Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65,
which providE'$ in relevant part:
"ExcepL for the purpose of Lhe performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or whPn lawfully required to do so by any
eourt of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person shall di~:;close any information
relating to . . . the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the perfonnance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act."
~ee also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah. Act
No. 64, § 10, ns amended, 1968 Bah. Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. Acts No. 20,
1971 Bah , Act;; No . 15. The statute is hardly a blanket. gua.rantro of
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged with exception;;; and we
Juwe been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover,
American depo::;itor;; know that their own country requires them to report
relatjonship;; with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31
CFR § 103.24. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416
U. S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in tho Castle Rank records that documented his account.
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ment decisions of this Court. · In the Government's view, such
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
We agree with the Government.

L

III

We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F .. Supp., at 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of thos·~ who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name ~
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officer::; must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscathed." Alde1-man v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the improprieties rewaled in this record. See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Narcotics Trafficker::; Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt,ed guidelines that require agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report known illegalities to n supervi:sory officer, who is i11 turn directed
to llOtJfy appropriate state authoritie;:;. IHS Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373 .3
(3), 9373.4 (Dec . 27, 1977) . Although these measures appear on their
!ace to }){' les:; po:s1tive than one might expect from aJ1 agency chargt>d
with upholding the law, they do indicat.e disapproval of the practicp::;
found to havr bren implemented in this case. We cannot a<ii:iume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to lhe attention of respomnble
e>fficials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the
uppression . of hi~hly probative :vidence in a trial against a third party·
wonld penahze ~ocwty mroece~sanly.
/

I

~
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
that these unex-ceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously
llerved." United States v. Calandra, · 414 U. S. 338, 348
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a ·costly toll upon
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case.
E . g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U. S. 464, 489·-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974).6 Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and
uot the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
~
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.7 ~
6

See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969) \
(Black, J., dissenting) ; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 TT. Chi . L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970) .
7 Federal courts may usc their supervi;;;ory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowgLL, ,J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes :;uppression of evi- /

/
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In Unite,d States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-75-7 (1979),
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power.
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize \
a federal court to suppress otherw.ise admissible evidence
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest
in deterring illegal sea.rches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim. of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,
~
at 137 ; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.8 The/
values assigned to the competing interests do not change
dence obt<1.i ned from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or
rule. Thr supervi;.;ory power merdy permjts fE-deral courts to supervise
" the administration of criminal jn;;tiee" nmong the partie8 before the bar.
JfcNabb \'. United States. supra.. at ~40 .
g "Thr deterre-nt. values of preventing the incriminntion of thoRr whose
rightK tho police havr violated ha.vc brrn considrred ~ufficie-nt t.o .iu ~ tify
t he supprE>s;;ion of probative <>vide-nrc even though the case again~t the
defendant. i:; wE>akrtwd or drstroyrd. We adhere to thnt judgmE-nt. Bu t
we are not. convincrcl that the additional benrfit::; of r xtending the rxclusionar~r rule to other clrfe11dants would ju stif~· further enrroachment upon
the public int<>rcl't, in ]wo:,:ecuting tho:;e accused of rrimr and having tlwm
acquittNl or convicted on the basi~ of all the evidc•nc<> which expo:;e~; the
truth." Aldennan v. United States, sup1·a, at 174-175. See also Stone
v. Powell , 42R U. S. 46-1:, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414

u. s. :338, 34
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because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
lilUpervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain preeisely the same.
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion
{)Utweigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reasoning, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court. 0 Were we to accep tfhis use of th
lilUpervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

9 Th11 ~<LIU<.' difficulty att.md:;; rrspondent,'s claim t.o the [)rotections of the
~
Due Proces::; Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeal~
flxpre.ssly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
as~:;ume that, the unhtwful briefcase search W!li:i so outragcou:> a::; to offend
ftmdamC:'ntal "' cmwns of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342
U . S. 165, 169 (1952) , quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opimon of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains thaL "[t]he limitation:,; of the Dut> Proce::;::; Clau:se . . . come into play only when the Government acttvity in que::;twn violates some protected right of the defend-

"'",'' Hampton • l'nU<d '"''"• •upm, at 490 (plummy opinion) .
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights.
I
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. 1 The indictment alleged that
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. ·
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pl~dged
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000
loan.
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found
18 U.S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false,
:fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
1
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.JUN 2 ~
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence.
The court also found, however, that the Government discov·
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there·
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax
return . . . and the related testimony." United States v.
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the
District Court set aside respondent's conviction. 2
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute.
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investigation into the financial activities of American citizens in the
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,"
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors.
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records
he kneYv Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase.
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan.
The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially fai!ed to
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not challenge these procedures .
2

..

.......
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the
t'l\·o left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approximately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout"
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that
evening included papers evidencing a close working relationshin between the Castle Bank and the B~mk of Perrine, Fla.
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered
thP- loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case.
The Di,trict CoPrt found that the United States, acting
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the
un lfl wfu 1 seizure of Michael Wolsteneroft's briefcase. . . ."
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Government affirmativelv counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefullv conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d.,
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ultimatelv led to the discoverv of the critical loan gnanmtee
agreement. /d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern3

The United States argued in the District Ccurt and the Court of Appeals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent
inn-stigation untainted bv the briefcase search. The Government also
deniPd that its ag:ents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For
purprses of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's contrary findings on either point.

..
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see
id., at 133, 134-135.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its supervisory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 ( 1979)
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979),
and we now reverse.
II
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. ld., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v.
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.
Un#ed States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois,
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 ( 1972) ; M.ancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v.
Miller, 4.25 U. S. 435 ( 1976), established that a depositor·
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips
retained by his bank. ld., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case!
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, however, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities that did not l
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The United
States contends that this approach as app 1e m t 1s case._ 1
upsets the careful balance of interes s embodied in the Fourth

_,

• We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the outset, it is not
clear that secret information regarding this respondent's account played
any role in the investigation that led to the discovery of the critical loan
guarantee agreement. See p. 3, supra. Even if the ca.usallink were established, however, respondent's claim lacks merit. He cites a provision,
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909), that is no
longer in effect. Bank secrecy is now safeguarded by § 19 of the Banks
Act, I Bah. Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65,
which provides in relevant part:
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose any information
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of
his functions under this Act."
See also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah. Acts
No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah. Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. Acts No. 20,
1971 Bah. Acts No. 15. The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we
have been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover,
American depositors know that their own country requires them to report
relationships with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31
CFR § 103.24. See generally Califomia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416
U. S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). We conclude that respondent lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented his account.

'.
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Amendment decisions of this Court. In the Government's
view, such an extension of the supervisory power would enable
federal courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their
application of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. We agree with the Government.

III
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., a.t 135. No court should
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
G "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165,
175 (1969). We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the improprieties revealed in this record. See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Ccmmissioner also adopted guidelines that require agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to
report known illegalities to a supervisory officer, who is in turn directed
to notify appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373.3
(3), 9373.4 (Dec. 27, 1977). Although these measures appear on their
face to be less positive than one might expect from an agency charged
with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the pra.ctices
found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible
officials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party
would penalize society unnecessarily.
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show
that these unexceptional principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would
ftow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously
served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case.
E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell,
428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417
V. S. 433, 450-451 (1974).6 Our cases have consistently
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and
not the constable, who stands trial.
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights.
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights. 7
See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970).
7 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943); see
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States,
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S.
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evi0
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979,,
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States,
864 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained
application of the supervisory power.
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general
need for untrammeled disClosure of competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216.
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize
a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175,.8 The
dence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or
rule. The supervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise
''the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar.
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340.
8 "The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose
rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify
the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the
defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But
we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclueionary rule to .other defendants would justify further encroachment upon
the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the
truth." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175. See also Stone
v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
u.s. 338, 348 (1974).
The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the balance of interests under the
supervisory power differs from that considered in Alderman and like cases,

'"'·'
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values assigned to the competing interests do not change
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain preoisely the same.
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion
outweigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reasoning, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a
eubstitution of individual judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.9 Were we to accept this use of the
because the supervisory power focuses upon the "need to protect the
integrity of the federal courts." Although the District Court in this case
relied upon a deterrent rationale, we agree that the supervisory power
serves the "two-Jold" purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judiciai
integrity. See post, at 7. As the dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary n1le serves precisely the same purpo~es. Ibid.,
citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979), and
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961). Thus, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, like the supervisory power, is applied in part "to
protect the integrity of the court rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the defendant. ... " Post, at 10; see generally Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
S.
486 (:~ ).
In this case, where the illegal conduct did not violate the respondent's
rights, the interest in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such
conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact. See supra; see also, e. g., Stone v. Powell,
supra, at 485-486. None of the cases cited by the dissent, post, at 7-9,
supports a contrary view, since none of those cases involved criminal
defendants who were not themselves the victims of the challenged practices. Thus, our decision today does not limit the traditional scope of the
supervisory power in any way; nor does it render that power "superfluous." Post, at 12. We merely reject its use as a substitute for established Fourth Amendment doctrine.
9 The same difficulty attends respondent's cla.im to the protections of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals
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supervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Ret·ersed.

expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend
fundamental "'canons of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defend:qn~," Hampton v. United Statea, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion) ..
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At respondent's nonjury trial for falsifying a federal income tax return
by denying that he maintained a foreign bank account, respondent
moved to suppress a loan guarantee agreement in which he pledged the
funds in the bank account as security. The District Court fotmd
respondent guilty on the basis of all the evidence, but then (1) found
that the Government had discovered the guarantee agreement as the
result of a flagrantly illegal sea rch of a bank officer's briefcase, (2) suppressed all 1he Government's evidence except for respondent's tax return
and Iela1ed testimony, and (3) set aside the conviction for failure to
demonst rate knowing falsification. The court held, inter alia, that,
although the illegal search did not violate respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts
required it to exclude evidence tainted by the illegal search. The Court
of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Respondent lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress thr documents illegally seized from the bank officer. A defendant's Fourth Amendment rights arc violated only when the challenged
conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that
of a third party, and respondent possessed no privacy interest in the
documents seized in this case. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128;
Unit ed States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435. Pp. 4-6.
2. The supervisory power of the federal courts docs not authorize a
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it
was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Under
the Fourth Amendment, the interest in deterring illegal searches does
not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party
who was not the victim of the challenged practices. And the values
assigned to the competing interests of deterring illegal searches and of
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furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence do not change
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. Such power does not
extend so far as to confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.
Pp. 6-9.
590 F. 2d 206, reversed.
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DATE:

PROGRAM:

EYEWITNESS NEWS

TIME:

STATION OR NETWORK:

WTOP TELEVISION

6:0-0 PM, EDT

IRS COMMISSIONER UNDER INVESTIGATION BY HOUSE COMMITTEE
MAX ROBINSON: Eyewitness News has learned that
Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Donald Alexander is under
investigation by the House Ways and Means Committee. Correspondent Clarence Jones has this exclusive report.
(FILM CLIP)
CLARENCE JONES: The House Ways and Means Committee is
investigating allegations that IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander
has deliberately sabotaged a massive tax evasion investigation.
The IRS case involves more than 100 top executives in scores of
major corporations across the country. There is evidence that
those corporations hid hundreds of millions of dollars in banks
in the Bahamas to evade U. S. income taxes.
Alexander, the nation's top tax enforcement official,
was appointed by Richard Nixon in the spring of 1973. The
congressional committee wants to know whether Alexander took the
job with the understanding he would protect the corporations and
the executives who helped elect Republicans in 1972.
Before he took the IRS Commissioner's job, Alexander
moved in the highest levels of corporate business. His Cincinnati
law firm represented some of the nation's largest corporations.
The committee is searching for secret bank or trust accounts in
the Bahamas that Alexander or his associates might have used to
evade taxes or to hide illegal campaig~ contributions.
Extremely reliable sources inside two branches of the
federal government say the committee has notified Treasury Secretary William Simon that the IRS Commissioner is under investigation. The committee has suggested, according to our sources,
that Simon ought to find out why an internal IRS investigation
of Alexander was short-circuited.
Investigators to the House Ways and Means Committee
have talked to IRS agents, who gave them this story. The intelligence.divison received a tip that a meeting was to take place
between Commissioner Alexander and a major security swindler who
has ties to organized crime. According to their information, the
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meeting was set up in Miami shortly after the swindler was
released from the federal prison in Atlanta. Their info r mation
says that the meeting was designed to dispose of a tax lien then
pending against the underworld figure. The amount of that IRS
claim was more than $100,000.
IRS regulations require all allegations of suspected
corruption be reported immediately to the IRS inspection division.
This was done, but instead of putting surveillance on the
Commissioner, the inspection division went to Alexander and told
him about the allegation. The meeting never took place, and the
accuracy of the information could not be confirmed.
In addition to the Bahamian bank accounts and the
Florida meeting allegation, the committee is investigating a
Seattle customs case, and Alexander's role in it. We'll have more
tomorrow on how the IRS discovered corporations hiding money in
the Bahamas.
The investigat~on that turned up tax evasion in the
Bahamas may have also discovered hidden campaign contributions
there. The House Ways and Means Committee is investigating allegations that Commissioner Alexander has used his power to prevent
his agents from telling grand juries all they know. I'm Clarence
Jones, Eyewitness News, at Internal Revenue Service headquarters.
ROBINSON: A spokesman for IRS Commissioner Alexander
would not deny that an investigation of Alexander was in progress.
However, that spokesman said the allegations against Alexander are
untrue and unfounded. He said that Alexander did not move to block
any IRS investigation. He said some of the cases rising out of
Project Haven are presently being considered for prosecution.
Others, however, might be jeopardized by improper procedure used
by IRS agents. The spokesman said Alexander never met improperly,
secretly or otherwise, with any individuals involved in a tax case,
and finally, the spokesman said, Alexander denied that he had any
role in the dismissal of the customs case.
GORDON PETERSON: IRS Commissioner Alexander was in New
Haven, Connecticut, today. There, David Ropik, our Eyewitness
News correspondent in Hartford, asked him about the allegations.
What did he say, David, when you asked him if he believed the
House Ways and Means Committee was investigating him?
J.

DAVID ROPIK: The first time I asked him, Gordon, he
kind of hedged a bit, and didn't really say one way or the other.
The second time, the same thing; but when I asked him a third time,
he did say that he had read in a paper somewhere--and he wouldn't
say where--that he was aware that allegations to that effect are
being made against him, and he said that he knew of two committees 1~
that are interested in the alleged operation--apparently pretty
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much what he said in the official statement from his office.
PETERSON: I see. Did you ask him if he ever talked
to former President Nixon about blocking tax investigations?
ROPIK: Yes, I did, and he said that he had only talked
with the President about tax administration, at which time Nixon
met him on a receiving line at the White House. Alexander said
that the President told him, oh, you're the new Commissioner. Do
your job well and do it honestly. And Alexander, of course, said
today that he has been doing it well, and he claims he has been
doing it honestly.
PETERSON: What about these operations and the meeting
with the so-called Mafia mobsters and so forth?
ROPIK: Well, he denied outright that he ever had any
such meeting in Miami, that he ever planned any such meeting in
Miami, and that he ever even cancelled any such meeting.
PETERSON: Uh-huh. And how about the business of his-the knowledge gained from the Cincinnati law contacts and so forth?
ROPIK: Well, he said that he has absolutely no knowledge whether his former law firm, which does represent many
major corporations, as I understand~-he says he has no knowledge
whether that former law firm has any out-of-the-country bank
accounts, and he said he'd be very surprised to learn that they
did.
PETERSON:

'•,. '

All right .

Thank you very much, David .

---,--~----------------------------------~------------~------~-~~
- ~~.~~======~~~ADJO-TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC .
.3408 VvfSCONSfN AVENUE. N. W.

' 0 ROGRAM:

WASHINGTON. D. C.

20016

-:-

244-8582

DATE:

ABC NEWS
~TATION

-:-

OR NETWORK:

~RIDAY,

SEPT. 26, 1975

TIME:

ABC TELEVISION

7:00 PM, EDT

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATES COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER
HARRY REASONER: There are reports tonight in· Washington
of a·new investigation, this. one involving Donald Alexander,
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. ABC's Sam Donaldson
has details.

SAM DONALDSON: hnat is described as a very serious
investigation of IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander, who has
been commissioner since his appointment by President Nixon in 1973,
wa£ confirmed today by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Subcommitt"ee.
CHAIRMAN OF SUBCO:t-1MITTEE: The Subcommittee of Oversight
of the Ways and Means Committee received a number of allegations
that --concerning Commissioner Alexander, the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service. These allegations were unverified.

DONALDSON: What kind of allegations?
CK~I~~N: Well, the allegations reflected --had to do
with the administration of his office, and some others that came
to the subcommittee.

·,.
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DONALDSON: The investigation is being conducted by top
Treasury Department officials and the FBI. Sources says the
allegations charge Alexander with a whole grab bag of official
misdeeds, in the areas of quashing tax fraud investigations, decisions
to audit or not to audit certain returns, and favorable rulings in
tax cases. Clarence Jones,of ABC affiliate WPLG in Miami,quotes
sources as telling him that one of the allegations has it that
more than 100 top executives in the United States hid hundreds of
millions of dollars in the Bahamas in order to evade U.S. tax
returns, and that Alexander sabotaged the IRS investigation of the
case. Jones reports that it is ·even suggested. that Alexander may
have taken the job in 1973 on the understanding that he. would
protect the executives involved.

.'
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Congressman Vanik stresses that none of - the allegations
his subcommittee received have been verified at all. Late today
the IRS issued a statement that said it may be that .some improper
investigative procedures within the IRS have been used in the past,
in some cases. But Alexander categorically denies that he has done
'anything wrong, and he welcomes an investigation. Sam Donaldson,
ABC News, Washington.
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Internal Revenue Service
Washington, DC
Tel.
For Release:

(202~

20224

9/26/75

964-4021

IR-1511

Immediate

Wash., D.C.--Untrue and unfounded allegations have been made to the news
media about inappropriate interference by Internal Revenue Commissioner Donald
C. Alexander with tax investigations by IRS.
The Commissioner categorically denied these allegations and called for a
complete investigation of these accusations by the proper Congressional oversight committees.
One of the allegations appears to refer to an information gathering
operation called "Operation Tradewinds" and sometimes "Project Haven."
Several cases arising out of this investigation are presently under consideration for prosecution by attorneys of the Office of Chief Counsel and the
Department of Justice.
in the field by the IRS.

Other cases are under active audit and investigation
An internal audit made by IRS indicated that some

improper investigative procedures may have been used in that operation.

As

a consequence, these cases are under review and no new cases will be initiated,
pending a determination as to the effect, if any, on such cases of any improper
procedures .
The Commissioner also categorically denied the allegation that he had
planned to meet improperly, secretly or otherwise, with an individual involved
in a tax case and that the Internal Security or any other branch of the IRS
had informed him of any discovery of any such allegation.
Finally, the Commissioner categorically denied that he had any role in
the dismissal of any Customs case .
X

'.•~

r

~:.

X

X

~~®J~lJt\__~~:~m-w

Ne~vs
~®0®®®@
For ReleaM:

Internal Revenue Service
Washington,

09

20224

Tel. (202) 964-4021

0n Deli very
OPENING RE~lARKS
By Commissioner of Internal Revenue Donald C. Alexander
At News Conference 10:30 AM EDT, 9/29/75

Since I became Commissioner. one of my most important objectives
has been to ensure that the Internal Revenue Service respects individual
rights. that its employees always operate within the law in conducting
investigations. and that the Service confine its activities to those appropriate
to a tax administration and enforcement agency.

I

These objectives have not been shared by some members of the law
enforcement community. including. I believe. a few present and former
IRS employees .

These individuals have reacted by criticizing me personally,

by attempting to block efforts to uncover and eliminate inappropriate
activities by IRS employees and informers. and by circulating scurrilous
rumors about my personal character.

WTOP' s program televised Friday

and Saturday evenings are examples of such allegations. which I have categorically denied.
I intend to continue my efforts to see, to it that IRS powers. information
and resources are properly used in the administration and enforcement of
the tax laws.

I intend to see to it that IRS follows President Ford's directive

to conduct itself with decency. honesty and adherence to the law at all
levels.

If those who disagree with this approach persist in efforts to

discredit me. this is the price that I will have to pay for attempting to

• d'
/>-i

gua~antee

.that law enforcement people always obey the law.

--t .
X

X

X

The Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
October 7, 1975
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Did IRS Clllef Blocl( Pt~oJJe
To Pt~otect 1-Iis Friends?
Bv SAUL FRIEDMAN
Hirild Washintton

Burtau

WASHINGTON - Con.gressionR!
investigators grilled the nation's
top tax collectors Monday on why
they did not follow up on inf ormation that JOO Americans, in clud ing
prominent businessmen, organized
crime figures and possibly public
officials, may have sent money to
the Bahamas to a voi d or evade
taxes.
Rep. Edward Mezvinsky (h.,
low&), &. member of the House <?overnment Operations SubcommJtlee
on monet&ry affairs, told the HeraJd Washington Bureau that th.e
names of the Bahamas bank deposJtors on a Jist obtained by the IRS
include "some very, very prominent
peop!c."
THE LIST which a paid informant gave 'to an IRS agent in
Miami in January 1973, was the
focus of the probing questioning
a.imed at Donald Alexander, conimi.!;sioner of Internal Revenue, and
~even of his top assi stants.
In , addition, the hearing room
was packed with .about 2~0 IRS officials who were m Washmgton for
a conference and were ordered to
attend the session by Alexander.
Several were plucked out of the audience to answer committee questions.
The committee, headed by Rep.
Benjamin Rosenthal (D., N.Y.), is
investigating charges by lower echelon IRS officials and agents that
Alexander, for personal. motives
llnd perhaps to protect fn.ends a!ld
fom1er law clients, has cnppled mtelligence investigations by. th;, IRS.
Alexander repeatedly sa1d, I Vitegorically deny these charges."
And as he has in the past, he
char'ged that some agents. "have le.~
their zeal outrun thetr JUdgment
and have us ed illegal techniques in
gathering information.
A CASE in point was what was
"the briefcase in cident,"
which occured during a broad inycstioation "Operation Tradewind~" - into the use of banks. in
the Bahamas by Americans .to h1de
assets and profits made m lh1s
country from U.S- tax collectors.
· One part of "Operation Trade:winds" was "Project Haven," an inc~Jled

vestigation of the accounts in the
Castle Bank in Nassau.
An IRS informant procured a
woman for an official of the bank
~uring a visit to Miami. A~d while
the official was out of h1s room
with his date, the informant lifted
the contents of his briefcase, which
1RS agents photographed before
they were returned. The con.tents
inCluded the Jist of 300 Amencans
with accounts at the bank.
According to Al exander and
other officials, the IRS has been
pursuing an investigation of the 300
names since 1973. But last Aug. 13,
just as the names were to bl" sent
to district and regional officials for
detailed investigations, the IRS w]th Alexander's approval - held
th em up.
Alexander maintains that the
cases may be tainted beca use the
evidence violated Bahamian bank
secrecy Jaws and perhaps the civil
rights of the bank official.
QUESTIONING by committee
mempers, d isclosed, however. that
potential legal problems in obtaining the list had been discussed several times since January 1973 WJth
IRS and Justice Department attorneys.

Indeed as recently as last July,
IRS officials in charge of the investigation ordered the diss emin ation
of the 300 names to field investJgators for detailed examination.
In reply to Mezvinsky's. questions, IRS Intelligence DIVISIOn
Chief Thomas J. Clancy acknowl·
edged that the list included "some
very prominent Americans an? a
number of syndicate and orgamzed
crime names ." Clancy added that
some "U.S. banks" were on the list.
In addition to businessmen, Mezvinsky sai d, "We're talking ·about
prominent officials, who may have
affected public policy."
Neither he nor the IRS officlal~
gave any further hint as to what he
meant.
Alexander said he has not seen
the list and therefore was not influenced by the names on it when he
approved the decision to hold up a
further investigation of the names.
OTHER IRS offi cia ls to ld the
committee that information·gatherin., in connlction with "Operation
Tr~dewinds" and ~'Project Haven,"
as well as the dissemination to.
IRS officers of the 300 names, was
stopped in reaction to publicity,
a bout lRS spying and other illegal
activities.
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Two Seeki11g
To Join Suit
Against IRS.
By Fred Tuccillo
The special agerrt and the secret informant in .s t~um e ntal in 3
coritroversial Bahamas tax-evasion investigation arc SC'eking to
join six other Internal Revenue Service special agen!.s in 11 pending lawsuit against the IRS and its commissioner, Donald C. Alexander.
US. District Court Judge Edward E. N-eaher ordered the
goveJnment Frida_v to show cause why the IRS agent , Richard E.
Jaffe of Miami, Fla., and the informant, idE'niified only as "T_\V_
24/' should not be allowed to join the original six plain tiffs in the
case. Both their motion and the original case have now been adjourned to Nov. 7 in U.S. District Court, Brooklyn.
The first six agents went to court earlier this year in an effort to overturn a March 17 directive from Alexander which instructed IRS special agents across the United States to m<Jke the
mimes of all their confidential informa'l.ts available to the IRS
internal audit division.
:1'. The governh:ent agreed before US. District Court -JudgP
TI1omas C. Platt ~~ay 28 that it would postpone enforcement of
the directive, pen~ing disposition of the age.'l.ts' suit against Alcxarider and the IRS. Platt warned U.S. Attorney Cyril Hym::m
th~t he would hold the gO\:_ernment in contempt if it did not ad... -.
- .
~
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Garden City, N.Y.
October 30, 1975

here to the agreement , which aLso included a promise not to di -·-

SE~ninai.e the names. af iniormanis or contact tJ1em without fir,;t

nfffying the IRS spe-cial agent.s responsible for them.
~ · Jaffe, 48, was in charge of. "Operation ·Tradrwinds" Rrd
"G)_p.era~icn. Haven," two IRS investigations, beginning in 1965,
ai"~ed at tax evasion by weallliy Americans through banks in lli:!
B~as.
·
"':t Alexander orde~ed the investigatio~· sus~ended in late Au·
g!Bjt;-.saying it had been learned that some evidence had br-en ob~eQ by pilfering documents from a Bahama banker's b;·iefcase
while.the banker was willi a female companion solicited by T.W.

2t' :

; J'"· Th~ suspension ied _to p.ublished alleg~tions that .Alexander
! v.~ :trymg to protect h1s fnends and busmess assoc1ale:'. Two
l cqng:·e.".s-ional committ ees have been probi.:~g those charge~. The
• IRS announced Sunday that it was resuming the investigatio•1,
but rources said that more than 100 investigative leads would remhln"bottl.ed up in IRS headquarters bec_ause of unresolved qncs-ti&.1s"im whethe-r !hey were obtained legally.
.
In their motion to join the six IRS special agents as plaintiffs, Jaffe and T.W. 24 charge:

• That despite Platt's warning to the government in M~~·.
the IRS asked Jaffe in August to "relinquish the names of hi~
confide:~tial informants involved in Operation Tradewi.nd;; or he
would be subject to disciplinary action."
'4t·That T.W. 24 was visited by two members of the IRS inspection department Aug. 19 and was "question~ ... extensively- ... about his involvement" with the Bahamas operaticns with
out any notificati0n to Jaffe.

a

: . ·• ·That J. 'i eX and e r in September discussed the C3.SP in
WashingtoY, press conference and "disclosed ·s ufficient m:1terial
fads so !.'i12.t anyone familiar willh TW. 24 or with his ::JctivHies
would know his true identity."
Because of Alexander's revelations, T.W. 24 is claiminJ that
"he ca.~ no .longer conduct business in the Bahamas . . . where
he .made_ a substantial living" and "is in fear for his personal
safety." The informant is aski.ng $10 million in damages as ;1 re-· ···
·.. '• ., · ·· · ' .· . · .. · ··,)
sult.

~-:!s::.

:-... - ,:v.

J',..

.

.-;xs:..Jr:;
_ ..

'!i'i1- ··~l ~-"'·

C·':'\ ,

Vc- II.

UIL.F.<.!I[R
:.~ C"-.l

·-·1 \'

#

'-"=

' '-.-/

.........

'!':cr-.:~ '.'"f'" t

,!

\' .

·- .

~

I

I

I

•

~.;:1\~IC: ~-~ . '3·11!::~ •

SHf"~:

C· :w- l:K'OI

. !".'~' "'o·lr

C:. · tC:!:l

C1,)ytcn H.

H~ 1 e . J •

.h.

'-~

.. -- .

L__.) '.__/, .

'__./

EX~C:iJTIYE

c~ ·~ ~1 .: ~., ,-:or. tl l

AJ ... ,n

!-le;"'e""

:1 .

'1tJvn ~'"'ditc
;r,. · !'vS S:_ct-u"f"'t"#C"u '~
~~. E r:;'n~oe!

itnd Mrs.c1'':.11P'\C'OU&

~~.-r:t~o 1. JC;,..:s.c" c'"'~ i f"TT''.WW
-~ Ch.u.r: :-1..-nt a:1~n Pl1.ta, Nt~v Yor\t City 1()()1JS
;'\Pt Cr;..a,riL.Uion&
;ue S. Sa·rn, .>-.atrm_...
'!100 Linc..oln CirJ1 io \"Cr,. f;oc hes:a-r 14603
of Es~lrtt\. e""td Tnna

{t~ L ~t.mo'~- C...~•rma.ft
$7 Fi~rh A \I.: rue. 1\'e.,... YorC. City 10022

,...DC'.,.,.,

t from ~t:1'i

· ~vu. M. . ~~:...r. ~eirm..aft ·
?-.:et.'W

, . .·

•
·
Yori: Cit}' 10022

!York S!•te: t"i:.s1U~

~rC'IO"' ~ . F.-·i.f'Y, C P-.lir man

_!t"vO :!a;n P1~t ::. t. S.;.~ffa!o 14Zl2
. ""-' i~ 5Jc~. :~•ir r:un

v:.. ·r

I

S:•H:,

u~ ·=--r

:o.:ew Y odr.

·.
Ct!W" 10005

L \' ,""":-,1 . Co-C'lairma"
.\.,.t:r-vt:. New Vo rl( City 10022

".:.~1-Dn

75
i~

a-,.d Prc :.~ ure

' D·~ Fr,;:- ... l.Of'l, .Jr ., Chairman
. ~ ?>:f\ ~ ... .\.:f:, Ntw Yc•k Ctry

10017

P'r~pf'rty

.. ~~:""!

0 . \Vi",?e''. Ch..airml'n

:' ?ir.e Stre.-t. tJP\". York Ci;y 10005
t;;tf'\iH::ion Poo!:-1c:ms
:{'l-: ~~

G . W".t:t'l. D 2!irman
?\:ew Yo·ll Ci:y 1()()()4

Brc~~~ .

:

.,ortcy
: ~~o·c! L

P 01tet , ChA :.rman

Str~et. 1\:t~·t

) l'ir.t
~u

Vor< C1:y lCY.X>S .

ActTvitiq

.e rrrU:'"I F . lr.,..ry, Chainnan
:..~ l; , S:~l'e1. Roc~este-r

· £a:r:

1461<4

COTI~;,liTTEES:

IAL

· '"Uptcy and lnscf~o~er.cy
;c ~urd J. H :~tl . Ch! ir mlft
...., ~" C":z$t :.~,;, ·L'1ll!t2~ ?l<tu, ,.,;twYork City 10005

JJ;c.,!.-d Rr-:::uns
!:.•r,.~:-1

... vi

K•c."lo"e: .

:'5 ?z·'l< A.-.c.ve.
l •o !i~d

F ot f'ir., ...,
~.-.(" ...

1 P. c-wt"

j')

~i rm an

"'•w Yo rk City

10022

~po.t~iorw

,:!. OlaJ·r:'\atl

Bro.~ S:n.-l':. i'~cw YCt"lc City 10005

~ c1ions f•or:-. Foreig"l lncome
.
f:>rCon 0. t-i .. ,.,1 e r$0,, Oairr:'la" ·
j .: B•NC\~'F ,,,e:.·J Ycrk Cr~y 100()4
~ .• n

Cur re-ne~· Trl ns.acti ons

.

.

J .a'"rv ?. D di !' . Dl H"r.u"
fO Pa•k A,, •.., •• l'i•N Ycrk c;ty 10:J:Z2 .
.C,tn•ft

{e~yl K. :\~~n:Df'. ~ ai rman
Strrr~ .. ~:e~.~ Yo r lt

i3 i."!•ll

City 10005 ·

~t.n .. Cor."\r:. t-rce

H. Pta•s. Cha;,r:"'lft

:::C;":""-M

.

:1 A\le:"lu~ o!

.A:nt"ri:.u. P-.:e\."• Yo r k City 10011
'Vorl( ES"":.Att Tax P roc.e&.. ,...,

;::>l>t?t-:

. ;n ~

H.

: ut!'l. ~ -

Di:;•mln
P lz :a. Sy• DC USoe 132'02

t . ,~,.. ,f'hY.

r.~O"'Y'

·~1'1 ln~

r, .. : .. r:rs.hips

Sch,;. ro, Ol~;,~"

)C P,irlo: A"''- ·" u~. :\:-: \#, York.
1

:~M1:;·~..,,

.JO

City 1CY.l22

of tht Frofruions

!-1.

p,.,.,

Fr i~• ~"'. cn~;,roa,.

1-.'lo: J'!,. t~e .v

Yo rk

~~'t'

1()():72

~" 367 Po:~,d
':. l ~ l '•t C~..··rr.

o .• ;,"'-"' .
,J P.r. • ~ · •rt• . l,,,., Yc•< C;ty
~

'-. -

F-.~ l -• r-.:- "'•11 1

Soc~oy

I C•

r:

• ·•

~.n., (~ r . r•chltr

Sydr •t-Y

D-o-,. lr" ,,.. ... ... -

, _,'J:C •...

1

..

·

,.a:--e<S F. ::>o:t.... ry. ~.a.rrmat
. '; Roc~e'r'~' ' i•u. \.:e-N YOt4r City 10020

~

:

;\

Clifh, NJ. 076.32

,.,..,

,:"5 P1rl.:. .tn-rr•'.K,

I

Jo,., ... C. R •.:: ..... · :h.on

30, 1975

~ ·l· n · :. ·11"""~. Ct-• ·~
.(':t ~ :"': ' != ~· .,.t i'''l.au. Nc-.,.YOtk CitY lOOOC

(n.

....._/ ' - - '"

/I,

..orrt;o.,.

po

\\.__.} ..._j ' - - /

::.-q.nJ

~.;._,

.NDi:\:G C0!\110:1ITEES:

tc. rn~ c,~

I

C:O"/,\IITIU:

:lo·.;,;.~C :~. 0·. ;, :_-rn

Oc to~~~

1:'!" $\ ·..,, ... :.

f,

f--2.(1( D . c: C:f'{---.j{ --

EY1'rtnL . .!Hsv
..!l .... t't B. Uwtt.

D. Lvde

...

...._

t.\fM9(RS ·AT·LAF;Gc Oo

:·?..,nA.Cor rv

C'-~ i- :"'"'\r'ft

'YD""~

:cw-t

\

~-4E;.4

' l<TO 2£G'iE
"'-'C' .........

"

.,-

f"\1

I

~:;1 ~. · .c::.::a.,.-. ':"c~

··~="" r, :r ·

'

1
'YL')(;<
\
P-\
1\
:
-.....;1-QT\r'.
t
\_)
~I

Honorable William E. ·simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Main Treasury Building
~ashington; D. C. 20220
Dear Secretary Simon:
On June 10, .1975 Donald C. Alexander,
the Com.il1issioner of In-terna l Revenue, addresse d
the Executive Co~ittee of the Tax Section of the
New York State Bar Association.
His topi c ~as
the role of the Internal Revenue Service in the
law enforceme nt co~~unity.
In his talk t he
Corainissioner exhibited deep concer n over possible
misuse of powers by agents of the Internal Reven~e
S er vice, and the attendan t risk of impairing ~ t h~
goodwill of the people toward their taxing syst~n."

·.
The positions taken by Commissioner
Alexander as to the proper role of the Internal ·
Revenue Service in the criminal en£orcement function have recently subjected him to widely.
publicized p erso nal criticism and attack.· c "o n.. .
cerned with . the proper functioning 9f the ·tax·. · ·
., ·
system and seriously disturbed by the· nature of
:·· ·:
the .att ac ks made upon the- Comm1ssioner; .the
.-:•.. :
Ex e cutive Committee of the Tax Section 11as· instruct:_ . •
·ed me to communicate its· views·.
·
... ·· ·
• ·.'.

Whether and to what extent t .he Internal : · _·. _:_·
Reve nue Seivice should participate in the criminal ·
'·
enforcement function, _other than strictly in ·th~
area of violations of the tax lav1s·, is a subject of. ··< .·
legitimate. debate.
The Commissioner's. expressed
belief that ·the 's.ervice, ·in alloca .t ing. its resources,.":-:'
must give first priority to the adrnin:lstra!:ion of.· . •.
the tax laws at the l eas t merits respect. The
· · ..
Commissioner's expressed belief that the Service,
in -perform ing a criminal enforcement function or
any othe r enforcement funcition, must do so in a ·
manner consistent with the_statutory .a nd constitu-
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tional rights of taxpayers, is so clearly correct . that it
· cannot -be a subject of legitimate d e bate.
If enforc e ment personnel or other agents of the
Internal Revenue Service use illegal practices, it is the
Commissioner's duty to see to it that these practices are
stopped. It is, we believe, unfair to Commissioner
Alexander, and injurious to the nation's tax system, to
criticize him on a personal level for his efforts to ensure
that the enforcement function is carried out with due
regard to the rights of citizens and the requir e me nts of law.
Sincer ely yours,

- ~~cfl?-/~
Hartin D. Ginsburg
Chairman, Tax Sectioti
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UNITT;D ST,\TES DISTR[CT COURT
CA STC:R:I [l!ST«ICI' OF )lEW YORK

-----------------------------"-----------------X
F fu\~IK J. SCODI\RI , TI!Oi\AS P . CUT.LE:-1 , JR. ,
\II LLIAI'! H. DE'l'T:1ER , III , t'I ILLTA/·1 G . Ri::tCHERT ,
J. MICIIM: L O,\LY and JII:\ES T . liALLl·IORK ,

Pl aintiffs ,
A FFLDAVIT

-·----

- a gainst -

Ci vil Action No.
O O~,'ALD

C.

ALEXA~Io:::R ,

Con,:nissioner of tite

In t~rn.:tl Rev€'nuc Service and t-JILLIA: t E . SH10N ,
Secretary of the T rc~sury,

7 5C8l3

Defend.tn ts.

-----------------------------------------------X
S TATE OF FLORID,;)

I
C OUNTY

0~

DADE

55 . :

)

RICHARD E. JAFC'E ,. b•~Lnp duly

1.

That

iTfiYF

sr:::rJ K'

I~ "m~)loy':'l

by

S\VQrt1 ,

tht~

depos..::s ard 5ilys:

Int0rnal Rc·;E;nuf;: Service

a t Hiar:li , F' lorid.l, as a Spt•ci.ul Agen': since Seple!T..!Jt_,r 1 0, 1956.

2.

That

a~ting

in my officiJl

Cdp.tci~y

as a Special

AgC!nt , on J.:1nuny 15 , 1 973 , I receiv.;xl a qu-}n;,..i.::-.y o f documf:!nts
f or p:lotoyrap:tinc; frO."!l a confiJential infOrmant
T . W. 24 in
3.

Mi~r1i ,

dcGign,!b~d

as

F lo~ida.

That the

circu~stances , ·as

to.w:1ic!1 my

advJtlC~d

a nd photog: . .ltJh~"d, ·.vc::">:.' clc ln',-l in adv.1nce and approved b y my

4.
sequcntly arl~nged in loose leaf book~ ancl taken by Chic! ,

Jntellig~ncc Divi~ion, Register to his c~perior in tl1e P0giona l
Office in Atlanta , Gr:~o1·gia.
lo l·iashir,glon , · D.C.

Be ....:as lhcn ir1slrucled to l<.ll.c t11em

The tr.anncr in which fhe drJCUJTv?nls were

Jntcllig,··nce Division, and the Chief of Opr:rations .
5.

That U-,c n·<:tflr,cr in which .. he docuruc·nts were

obtained was also (·;-:plained in hypotlJ•?licnl

t.t.~rrr~ s

to J.1r .

Al HinY:le of the Chief Counsel's' Office for the pcrpose of
gelling his opinion c.s to the legality of uslJ,(.:J the :infotn.alion
in an official invcstigdlion .

brought to the a l tent ions of 1•)r . Wi 11 i <Jin Lynch a r.d !1r. Ed Joyce

of the Organized Crirr.c and

Racr.r~teeri

ng Sect ion of the Dcpartrrent

of Justice .
6.

were held with

~~at

in ~~ay and June , 1973 , additi~ndl ni~etings

ncp~rtMent

of Jus1·ice officials, ,including

Roberts , Scott P. cran1plon and Fred Ugast .

Rich~rd

At no tiinc Y..'as the

manner in which these docum~n~s w0re photographed concealed from

any officials who had a need to kno.....

1,

in either the Intelligence

Division of The Internal Rc\'enue Service or the D0partrrent of

Justice .
7.

.,. ..,.,,

''

That in the following year when a decision

230

w ~s

mndQ to proceed with a grnnd jury investigation approach

in Project Haven , the events which led to the photographing of
w~s

the documents

ag~in

reviewed by Mr . William Hyatt , an attorney

with the Tax Division , Crlminul Section , t,;nited States Department

April 14 ,

Hyatt preparcJ a l egal

~lr .

of Justice.

j_q/4,

in

v.~hich

me~or~nd~m

on or about

he discussed the mar.ner in which these

docuroents were photographed and concluded that there was no legal
bar to their use by the Internal Revenue Service in their
i nveslig,1lion.

q1..u:!stion~d

Mr. Hyatt

me and I

furnishe:'l him with

all the facts known by me.
8.
month of July,

or more

Th~t

1975,

~pen

the Corr·mir:;ion""r of trte Interncll

cong~~- ~i.o1tal

expos~'

for him to

inforntiltion und belief during the

co1 : ~itt~~5

~o

.

er AlexunrJC>t w-1s

{?.. J)
sllu~~ring

in which Projc:c'

He1.v~n

subs".3}'lently n() l·J
he ultudo--J to u
callt~J

"bri···f

th~m provid~

a for•_lm

a "bcmb sh>-.)11" conc.··rnins- anothPr sc.1nJal

involvi.r.g the Intclli ·•r.-:-e Division.

.

have

R~v-. ..:r:uc

.-:1

to Op•:ration Tradcwind3 and to the manner

\J.J:S ini.ti.nted relative to the photO'jra?hs

st.:tlE:. . ''I"\t to th•:! Vunik Cormi.ttee in which

StJriou.i

CdS~

It is beli.f'veJ that CO[llJ:'Iis~i..:: -

Jl1Jl t~"'r

whi.ch he

ref,.rr~d

to as tht:

~o

i.n~ident."

J

v
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1975, I

Thr.tl on August 7,

9.

I11trrnal qrventlP SPrvice

Jnspt'c~ors

w;Jg

'~-'·.IS

1 T1.1rner of 'iiami , F')oJ .ida , and <tdvis1·d that

,n

~nvcst.ic;ot:lon

of a criT:'Iirtal

con1 oct<"'cl hy

E. }:cith Don:10r ilnd C. C.
the [;Ubjl'ct

concerning the' :"tanner in

h•hjct,

the

docu:ncnt s rcJ.:Jt ing Ln the forJT,at~on of Proj(·Cl Jl<Jvc·n Wt.·re

1 furni~~~·-d them \Jii.h il}>f•TO:dmalpJy 1.\·.'CJJty-tHO

(22) d0CUTtf'lltS

and a cnn.(.:it11.:ru1Jlc a::tounl o.f inforrr,:Jtion re]utivc lO lhc ;'1ill1cr .

taxr:-ayers have> bern
10,

<)p)et.r... d)

.

Thol on the follm:ing coy, 1\;qusL 8 , ]975 ,

resumed t..he int r->tVi€' 1d v.'ith Inspectors P.on11er and Turner .
that int.crv.icw,
charg<~s

v;ere.

I

During

I nsY.r·d theJ'l v1hat the contc ,rl;:>]ated cr:ininal
Inspector Bonner said that he dirl JJOt }:r:ow ond that

the r(-'~ding of rights 'vh~S being done out of an ovurah;nCance of
aJ ~o as}:c·d .if

any

a1'a' kc.i

o~1J(:jni

strative t1ct ions ,.,..-,u)d he

CLp_

tat:cn agc>i~st me> , if I~:~: '··):self of MY ri!]hts and dPclined
to ansvJ(~r rlny Si.JPcific questions .

Ins!)r•ctor

~onner

rcplic>d that

he did not Y.n0\·1 the ansh·er to that and thu.t he v1ould huvc to
consult with his superiors in Atlanta .

The inl~rvicw was the n

terMin,:Jted to give theM an O?portunity to consult wilh their

I'"'""'"

!ly J'1cmoran0um of that interview is

~ttacherl

hereto

li

~f.,

-.

23.5

as E::<:htbi.t " B" .

11.

inforn·,at~on

That upon

and belief ,

it is my

u nderstanding that Conwi~sioner Alczand~r during this period

c ontacted the Dep~rttnent of Justice and atterrpted to have tl1e1n
in itiate.an iDvGstigation of

for~cr

I

Director Intel l igence Divisior

rz'/)
J ohn Olsze·..;sk i,

former Chief Op0rat io:1s Branch , Lc yoy Vcnab lc,

"'yself:" oz:cp

f ormer Chief Inte l ligence G. T. R!;;gi.ster , Jr ., a nd ~.1;--&.<-''-·.....,..,._

~~CEe'J·'dl.y viola~~'fe criminal
with

di~closing

Depart~r.~nt

details of the Project Hav0n documents to the

Justic~

of

by T . W.

int~rvie~crJ

I was

24 and adviscj that he hQd bAe:1 contacted and

At no tL;-;-::- prior to Au;u:.=;t 19 ,

l97S,

had

a'1y notifi.c:~lion from nnyocw from tho? Interndl R.c:-ve:-·-.uC>

Service a!'king me or info:r:;,ing mf:'
w hom I

1 975 ,

by Insp~ctors Bonrl~r· anrl Hehir of the Internal

Revenue Ser·1ice .
r eco;:i.ve.~

in 1973.

That on or about August 19 ,

1 2.
cont~cted

disclosure statute in conneoti'on

had worked for n'any years ,

th e Inspct:"tion

Scrvil':'e.

after it had been

13 .

tha~-

Y..'dS

T . H.

24 , an infor;p.1.nt with

go i n9 to be

I,.Pi.rl not lnJ.rn' of this

int~rview

unti 1

.. ~ w
constJnhtel.
That on

,.

s~ptcrbcr

Denuty Co:l'o\ission,or \Villit,;n 8.

1975, Donnld C.

29 ,

\1illia.,s;

Dir~c:tor

of

Alex~ncl•,r,

Inso•c~tion
.

!!

Se-rvice, Assistur1t Conmission"'r Harro:::·n A . ButPS; and Chir·f Co11n.s•_l

I

He.Jd
J,t,C IC 9

h'hi.tta'l.:·~r

hr::l.J a

full

sc.:tl·~

pr~"S"i

confcrrnt·f! .J.t I.R.S.

SOl

7<t -3JI 0 - iti · lll

·.
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5ufficienl ck:oils r•clative to Lh<> rran,.,.r in which th" dc>c''""nls
...,c·re ob'..ainGd and photo.Jrapl1c>d in a publjc st.etU:·Jl·C'nt so

it u r;irrlc ;-altf'r for
7Jtlven

c--.~sc

I

1

!:

or

c,J·..

jr·ctidfo

~o

pr:->r~c~ns

L.-Jv.ing

jd-:--:ontify T.,·L

}(ern T . H .

~o;r;c

?:4

aS

24'~ irl;;~ntit.y

as

;15

I

Lo r·.ukc,

};ncv,le(>.:1c of f!Juject
t.Lc
the

inioJ:-n<~nt

ln the

in:o1rant

)n lhG

suLj•:·cl of a

19 ,

bf·~n

ndvis~d

by

~n

attorney for

That I

16 .

That I h;:±ve rL•Cc-nt.Jy appc:ared as a ....,:itn(·Ss

17 .

That lhe subj(•ct ffiatter of these inq11irics is

]975 .

I
an

l~ave

15 .

inc~d~nt

which occurred in

Janunry,~ ~ 973 ,

~)Y

whio::h

w2s

fully

J<"S)!?I,Wtf',.m.y

authorized by my superiors, ~.--W....._~ ....,,as/ ft<lly reviewed by my
sup~riors,

authorit)·

and w11ich I participated in within ll1e
a~

a Special

Aqe~t

in

tl1~

Intcllig~nce

~cope

of my

G~t~1ering

rield .

I

I

...

'
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18.

That i t shou l d be ~oted that be9inning on

J\u gust 11, 1 975 in a written memorandum , a copy o f which i s
at tached as Exhibit

11

0 11

,

(a l so other re l at~d nklterin l)

I

r equeste

di sclosute authority to discuss al l of the facts wit h my attorney
n ecessary for him to def·')nd

charges.

111e

against the current l y u nstated

Despite repe~tAd verbal and subsequent written requests

a nd despite the pub l ic staten : ~nt of ~Jation,1 l I. R . S. Officia l s

i n their appe<.1r~"l.·:e before the Roscn~-ha l Corr.:ni.ttee on October

6,

1975 , I did n~t rPceive this disclo~ure aut~ority u ntil

October 31,

1 975 .

( exhibit "E ")

Therefore , I was u nable t o

c onsult with my attorney about this rr~tlcr until j ust hours
b efore ~y app~3r~~cn before the Rosenth~ l Con~ittec on TucsJ~y
morning ,

Nov~~nb~~r

19 .
d cni~d

4 , 1 975 .
That i t app~~r~ to m~ increiiblo that I was

disclos,Jre at1thority to discuss privately with my attorn~y

fo r a pcr_iocl of more than eleven wcel-:s , matters. which •,.Jere

bl atantly disclose-::! by t he Commissioner and h is associates in
a press conf0rencc on

20 .

Scpterrb~r

T tt~t

th e actua l occur~~:tce ,
s ituation in whicl--1 nl l

now , t wo
I

2 9 , 1975 .
ye~rs

and e l even months after

f i nd myself in this pr.:-Jicamcnt.

A

the rulns of the g;"tr•.e have been changed

a nd app l ic . . l to rr~ rctro;u:;tivcly b:z· a corr.mission~:r who did not

'····"
•.'

I-·

?.38

even

t~ke

office unti l
21.

a)Jr~gcd

criminal

five monlhs after the

Th"l allhough
invcstigatio~.

Agcrlt invPsligating a general

~m·

in,..irJ(~nt

occurred .

the subject of an

ht1\'C bern worY.:lng as a Spr•r;)a l

progr~n'

type of case.

•r•-t,c,... r?c,9

I have

ll'lV?st
nol bce::n. invo'1 ved in lhc fu rt }y:-·r ~ 0f J (•<..<}s ycnen~:~Led by
P1ojc-ct JlavC>n .
h""!JCHCJ-OJ~B.

your (';<::>ponent

re~~pt?clful)y

r<:>qut:.sts

l
Swotn to lJefore me this

coj·sn·

or n ..;nE .

STl It OFT LORJDA

SS.

N?

34548

l

....
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Ad dr~~

any tC;'lly to:

Oatoe

1 tnre;~/yr11/.-rlu

Received volu~es 1 through 4, consisting of photocopies of docunents
in re Castle Bank & Tr~~t Company furnished by confid~ntial infor~a r1 t
Tl<-24 in Janu,ry, 1973.
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t·D~ring an election ·year: . ·:.' .-r :. ~ , •. • ~
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L ·No eonti·oversial people allowed
i: On~ sacrifiCial Iamb. cu~rentlybe;~g readi~ '-. · ,

,

~~

. ·- .

, _for the altar of Gerald Ford's political difficul' ties is Donald Alexander, commissioner or
:..
Internal Revenue.
·
... ·

.

'

'

..
.·- ·J tAt ·

A familiar line comes
from those well-worn, anonymous . spokesmen at
· the White House. It goes
~.
like this: Alexander hasn't
r
.
done anythlng wrong. but'.
he has gotten so Controversial that he Is a li· :
'ability to the Pre:,ident. Who needs that in an .
election year? · . _., . . ..
;,"•:

, FaUe .
.! • • •

: The disgusting thing is that nobody sta.nds up
to challenge this Illogic. The major wire serv- ·

'·

jces and the Wall Street Journal have r~ported .
the \Vhite House spokesman's views and
1
.o ne has responded to them.
. · · ·, · · .; f ·

no

....

What did Alexander . do to . become
C:Ontroversial?
,. ,.
' .,: : ·
I

•

~

f

'

HE TRIED TO CLEAN UP the abuses in the
IRS Intelligence operation. He told his operatives to restrict their snooping 'to tax. matters
and not to get intrigued with the sex or drink- r
ing habits of people whose live$ they happened
to come across. - ' ·.
·
~ This brought' ~~;;;e 0_.f 'the. operatives do~e to
·.- .__
;'
. "_...__ . · ,. .._-: .- ' . -... ':·~-,--: -· - --:-· mutiny, espeCially in the Miami offiCe where
,i. Oper~tion Leprechaun apparently had strayed
· ( far af1eld from legitimate IRS inquiries.
:·
i_ , Soon Alexander found himself
pan.
:·
00
• f:eak~d stories reached print attempting to tie ·

Alexander at the altar , .
. ::.~~_.... _:::_~~ ~·
ALL WITH-THi -<AJsr6MARY slap at thei

media for having "oversensationaJi.zed " the~
story in the first place.
· · · ·:,)_
Well, that's politiCal "hard ball,"' as
Nixon operators liked to say. Alexander is
useful target for those who want to
th~ administration. He has· offended the IRS bu~:
reaucracy and made enemies within it who can''
provide politicians with ammunition for at;_;
tacking him while themselves enjoying the im-'.
munity of civil service and anonymity. · Jc ·: · ~
Meanwhile, nobody has proved him wrong ;
=--..:- - - .
.-'.. - · .·•.
.
_ ,. about anything. Every charge against him_ baS~
him and ~s CinCinnati Jaw firm to an 'iRs tar:~; been der:ied and remains completely/i
get
. .
. . , bank m the Bahamas. .
' ..tl1 unsubstantiated.. - . ,. . ,.. , ..
. ·•,·'
A subcommittee of the House Way 1 d' ' · Yet. simply because of the noise, just about ...
Means committee, headed by Charles ~ \ , everybody h: W~hington takes it for granted .. · ·
1
It : · tha~ he wi~l.be sacked. How's that for modern .
. (Democrat of Cleveland), got into the
. l.
just1ce, pohtJc~l style?
.
·"
produced a report accusing Alexander of
: reacting to Operation Leprechaun and ~~~n . .. .....~ .. _yo~-,~ __,··...:-.:. .:_.:. __ -.- :-·~--- > - ··· ·.. even. ~ave Leprechal.J.n a clean bill of health as
j. a leg1t1mate tax Inquiry~
. - ~~:-

the;

tar a:

the

a:

...

'

I

I

•

;J •• · Depa rt men t· seek.S
~~-,

··· ·· ·- •

~

;·

~-·· t ·<iv -rr

. · -·

'7 > '

· ::.:c":'=:.· -:·~-: :;>,·~ ~

' US tIC e

' 1 suspension:told .aHousesubcommittee last October that the decision had

been Traino_r's aJone ~nd that Train_or
had not consulted WJth the coilllil.lSsioner. .
.
After IRS suspension oi Project
Haven, it was disclosed that the
I
,
._
· name and phone number of Alexan~ Will Ask Grand Juries to· Inquire Into Suspension · .' der's former Cincinnati law finn
were in the files of Castle Bank &
Trust Co., Ltd., of Nassau, a focal
of
of
Tax
Other Charges
point of the prpbe.
Alexander and the law firm denied
BY
ROBERT
L.
.
J
ACKSON
and
GAYLORD
SHAW
.' any dealings with the bank, but The
'
·' Times 'Staff Writers
Times subsequently revealed that the
~ '\VASHLNGTON-:-The· ~psti~ Qe- -~ merit on the Ale~ande; investigation. law firm had once represented a
as did Leon Levine, an IRS spokes- company m<maged by Castle in a $1
~ -partment,.Q_as decided to ask two fednullion debt collection case.
.
~ .eral gi'fu1d M'ies to investigate aileman. - ···'··-.·..
The Caribbean tax haven investiAlexander has repeatedly denied
! gations involving Internal Revenue
a.ny wrongdoing. He. was charged . gation, shut down for 10 weeks by ·
~ Service Commissioner · Donald c-C.
IRS h eadqu arters, has since been re·that he is the target of "faceless liars"
, AJexander, The Times learned Friday.
sumed and expanded under the direcand "a small goon squad of congres;. The department's cecision to bring
tion of Justice Department attorneys.
sional investigators:"
• witnesses before the grand juriesAside from the suspen sion quesAside
from
the
Justice'
Department
one based in Washington and anothtion, FBI agents have conduc~ f~
investigation,
.Alexander's
stewarder in Miami- marks an escalation of
flung interviews to deternune if
ship of the IRS is being examined by
a three-month--old FBI inquiry into
two
House
subcommittees.
These
inAJexander's conduct as the nation's
AJexander had once pl anned to met::. ~
quiries are partly the result of a
chief tax collector. • ·
a convicted swindler, Mark H. Kroll, ,
long~running controversy over the
The FBI haS b een-.examining the
·IRS intelligence division's operations, · · and several associates aboard a luxusworn congressional testimony of
ry yacht in Florida.
which AJexander has curtailed on
AJexander and other IRS officials ·
Without mentioning names, Alex_Please Turn to Page 4, O>L-1 ..
about the agency's m spension last
ander last September denied in a
: . . <·_:..' .· :
written statement that he had
August of .a Caribbean tax haven in- ~ -r --:- --· ~..-..:..·;.· ~ ..
vestigation. ·
·
.
"planned to meet improperly, secret-~
C~t~~ucdfrom Firs! Page
.
ly or otherwise with an individual in·• FBI agents
alw been ·checkgr~ds f-hat some activities have
volved in a tax case."
: .
ing out an infonnant's report that a
been Improper.
. .
con\icted swindler arranged to meet · · Government sources said Alexan· AJexander also denied a further alwith Alexander aooard a yacht to der. might eventually be invited to
legation-still being probed by the·
discuss the ex-convict's income tax testify before grand jurors. . .,
.
FBI-that the internal security divi-;
debt. Apparently, there never was
sai'J:'hat's on the horizon," one official
sion of IRS had tipped him off that i
such · a meeting but agents have
sought to learn if one was canceled ! . The Times disclosed earlier this
the yacht had been placed under sur-,
veillance.
_
·
at the last moment. .
:week that AJexander had advance
In
the
last
three
months,
Times re, Several sources said the purpose of knowledge of the suspension of
porters have interviewed Kroll and I~
these grand juries wouJd be to unrav- ~roject Haven, a probe of tax evaothers who have been questioned by l
,; el conflicting statements. . : ·
SJOn schemes by wealthy Americans
the FBI aoout the yacht allegations ..
The investigation is not ·at the who use Caribbean trust acconuts
have d_enied to reporters that any j
All
~iage where evidence is being predespite his sworn testimony that h~
such meetmg ever was planned.
!
. sen ted for the purpose of returning , hag no foreknowledge of the suspenThe
basis
for
the
inquiry
was
a
reSJOn.. '.. ~
.
.
·
indktments, one source said.
,- ·
Robert J. Havel, a Justice Depart- '. . In the wake of this disclosure IRS 1 port from one of several Florida IRS
1 informants last April that a Kroll~
ment spokesman, refused to com- officials acknowledged that the ~om
Alexander meeting was being
missioner _gave his approval to · the ~
planned aboard the J 19~foot oceansuspension Jess than an hour before it
going yacht "Chanticleer." The yacht
_waS · implemented last Aug. 1~. ·
was berthed at the Frances Langford
Ho:w~ver, these officials said Alexan,
Outrigger Resort at Jensen's Beach,
.d~r d1d not order the suspension . .
t · about 100 miles north of Miami.
Alexander and Edwin Trainor the
IRS official who implemented' the

InvestigationS of IRS Chief
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Department of the TREASURY
WASHINGTON. D. C. 2022 0

TELEPHONE W04-20 41

•. -

FOR H1.t-1EDIATE RELEASE

February 5 , 1976

The Secretary of the Treasury , William E. Simon ,
stated today that the Commissioner and other senior officials
of the Internal Revenue Service wil l voluntarily appear before
a sitting Grand Jury in Washington , D. C., next ~eek at the
invitation of the Justice Department .
In commenting on this
prospective appearance , the SP.cretary reaffirmed his complete
confidence in the Commissioner and his integrity 1 in the
Internal Revenue Service .
8 ,., cl
The Secretary said that this investigation into the
allegations made against the Commissioner and the Service
is an old matter that has been dragging on for months, and
it is important that the allegations be pursued to a conclusion
or laid to rest . The Secretary pointed out that the use of
a Grand Jury by the Justice Department is a routine investigative
procedure , and he is unaware of any other purpose for this
particular inquiry . He emphasized that the Treasury and the
Internal kevenue Service are cooperating in every ~ay with the
Justice Department . He added that the Treasury has previously
investigated a number of the allegations and shared the results
of its investigation with the appropriate committees of Congress ,
and the Justice Department . He said he hoped that the Justice
Department investigation would conc l ude the matter .
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FOR IM1'1EDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 5,

1976

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIJ.lON
SECRETARY OF TJ{E TREASURY

The whole purpose for this is to expedite the process
of investigation.

We cannot allow this investigation to drag

on while Don Alexander and his senior associ a tes are
subjected to leaks, innuendos and vilification
invisible bureaucracy.

by a mindless,

Through these unsavory tactics, men

such as Don Alexander are subjected to calumnious attacks on
their character and integrity .

~.Ve

must remember that the

overriding principle in this great country remains that a
man is innocent until proven guilty.
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rAn l.R .s .. okesmah ..wotlt~i ' . "'~e. ~f l.he lnte'~al .I.R.S. in-1
· sp
.
vesttgat10ns to wh1ch Secretary,
say ~nly t1at, all the ;a~ous -al- Simon referred today was an
leg~tJOns of , mpropr.e~) raJsedl inquiry into the origin and ,
,p .
t
.
agamst Mr. Alexander m recent scope ;,f Lepr&ehau
h' h
months "have no su~s~nce.~ had as- hs targets a n~m:e/~f
. Mr. Alexander, a CJncmnatJ Dade County officials and three
. , tax Ja·wyer who was named by Federal jud£es
.. . .
.
;
· i President Nixon to head the tax 1
·
- ·
j agency in May 1973, has pre- ·
ilexander Will Testify on ' -viously complained that he is I r . Mr. Afeximder told essootrally I
j l.he victim of dis gruntled pre- ; fhat ·story .tO a House · Gov~rn, Charges of Irregularities
sent an,d former I.R.S. em- i ment Operations subc ommiutee
-Simon Supports Him
ployees intent on discrediting ' ;last year. One Justice Departhim through leaks of erroneous 'men-t source pointe <>ut today
1
.·· _, __ .
info rm<tion to reporters.
fwhat he called the ·~improLabiMr. Simon referred in
· By JOHN M. CREWDSON
s tatement today to the "leaks, llity" of Mr. .Alexander's asser- 1
Spt>dLI to Th• N,., -.:or< Tim••
inn_uendos .and vilification" !O , ;tion that he had not been as ked :
appr<>ve the decision hjmself,j:
WASHINGTON Feb s~o- wh1ch Mr. Alexander and rus ;
senior associates at I.R.S. had
since Mr. Trainor was imply I
n_ald C. Alexander, the Com!TllS;- been subjected by ...3 rnindlss, ftliing in for · a Yaca~ioning
Sloner of Internal Revenue, 1-fas ~mv i sible bureaucracy."
: I.R.S. officia at Uhe time . . ·
1
agreed to a request .from thel
The Treasury Department and
· The source said that the 1
the IRs h
grand jury would carefully exa- !
Department (}f Justice that ne·· .
·- · ·· e sal·ct· 11 ad a 1rea d Y mine
the testimony .given by1 1•
.
. _ ·
rnvest1 gated some <>f the chartestify be-fore a Federal g_r and . es raised against Mr~ Alexan- ' Mr. A•lexander to the Housel,
jury here next week about sev-· · d_ er and_ had shared_ their ,find· !· subcommittee, which included
th
some statements . that · ihe
eral alleged irregularities in his rngs WI
the Justice Depart- source described as "less than
.d m· • t
.
f
th
.
~-•
lment,
which
he
said
he
hopd
·
d'd 'th
.
d
a
mJs ratJO~ 0 , e 1nt.,,lA1 would Jay the matter to rest. can ~ W1 a VIew towar pes Revenue Service.
; : .
";" Although
the
Secretary
ible prosecution for perjury,
1
h
Mr. Trainor, who has s ince
Secretary of the ·Treasury :termed ~ e alle~ations against . returned to his post as .a· region- '
1
William E. Simon in announc- :Mr. Alexander an ? d matter · al J.R.S chief in Chicago, ·.repor-1
~~hat has been draggmg on for
dl
d
·
I
.
•
,;
mg what h€ termed the volun- months," Justice Departmen . te Y en ed the dis semination
~ ta~"' appearances before .the sources took a considerably · ¢ · intelligen·~ , information I
'-'
picked up by the Haven' project!
: grand jury of Mr. Alexander more serious .V:iew of the case. · after he learned of the purloin.
.
. ·.
One source sa1d that although ·
f
b · f
b 1
and other umt1ent1f1ed I.R.S. of- Mr. Alexander had not been . mg o a ne case · e onging to
fidals,_ asserted his continuing subpoenaed by the grand jury
a Bahamanian Citiz-en by I.R.S.
.d · · th Co
· ·
had been given a "clear indica ' infornlants in Miami.·
j
con f 1 ence m
e
mmJSSlOD·
th h
.
.
1
One Govern-merit source 5-aid l
er's integritv and said that he
ion
at is testimony was re 1 today that Mr. Trainor was l
quired." ,
among· the· other I.R.s. · officialsj
"
hoped his testimony would exTwo Agencies a.t Odds
who had b~ei;J ~umlfioned by
pedite the investigation.
.
the· rand jury·: .. '·
,
Justice Department and I.R.S .
·
. That investigation, some as- officials havfl been at odds with
The r.'R.S~ report on that inpects or which have been under one another in recent months
vestigation laid responsibility
way for several months, -~s prin- over Mr. Alexander's decision for ,Leprechaun --on a single
cipally concerned wi~h a deci- to curtail the use of revenue
I.R.S. special agent and . made
agents by the Justice Departlittle mention of what · J.R.S
·sion last August, in whicll Mr. .ment's .organized crime strike
higher-ups knew of the proAlexander conncurred, . to sits- forces,' a dispute in which both
ram. Some members of Conress s.aid that the report covpe~d key eiemen_ts of a.·n I.R.S . . agencies reached an uneasy
truce last month.
red up more about the operaperation, code-named ~ "Hav- . Mr. Alexander's move, V.'hich
ion than it disclosed.
len," ;inten-ded to gather infor- was considered a severe 'blow
rnat'ion a:bout secret foreign
by organized crime lawyers in . House Testimo'n y Recalled
One I.R.S. official suggested
i ba~k
·held y' _A meri- the department, came after the
1
"'
disclosure last March of th
today that in the case of the
cans seeking to avoid Federal gathering by IR.S. informers of
Haven
project,
previously
tax payments. :.. ·::- ·
..
details of the sexual and drinkknown as Operation Tradewinds, Mr. Alexander would tell
'...AIIegatlons -D_e~."_. ed, ' .. ·;.;. ing habits of prominent Miami
~ · ·
,
citizens. ·
··
· .· ·
the grand jury that the decision
.That occurred in connectiun
. Th~-- Justice Depart~ent deto terminate an import ant part
cl.ined to comment on the pros- with an operation code-named
of the program l1ad been made f
·
· d • · '· · ·· Leprechaun, a joint- effort inby Edwin ~rainor, an .Acting :
pectlve gral! Jury appt;arances ·volving ,the I.R.S. and the Jus-\ Assistant· IXS. C01r1111issioner.
of Mr. Alexander and ·the oth· .tice Department's Miami strike I
ers; This is the first
in force. Mr. Alexander initially
recent menioty that high I.R.S. 'ass e rted that Justice had had
officials }lave b'een summ oned
over-all. ·control of the Lepre-~
to testify about possible crimin- ch alin program, but later cona! wrongdoin gs in which they
ceded tha't the rev~nue service)
may_naye been inyolve~; j-.-~:;:
had directed . the day-to-day
oper'a ti Qns 'of its Leprech~un in-J
f qnn er,s • .. , ( r , r ..
·' ' ~ . .

TAX CHIEF TO TALK·l
~ TO AGRAND JURY:

l

I

his'

·

'

·

. ·j

.
I

'l

l

Mr. Alexander told. e~Sffltia\ly
at _story to a Hou.se Governent Operation:s subcOmmitt~ \
st year One Justice Depart·\
m ent· source pointe out today,
1whllt he called the ·:improuabi- :
lity" of Mr. Alexander's asser- :
iion that he had not been asked
approve 'the decision· hi;:nself, j
since Mr. Trainor was . 1m ply 1
filling in for a vacationing !
. J
I.R.S . offi ci a at the tirrre.
. The source s·aid 'lthat .the
grand jury would carefully exa- 1
mine the testimony given by i
Mr. Al exander to th.e .Housel
subco mmittee, which. included
some statements that ·the
source described as ''less than
jcandid with a view toward possible pros ecution for perjury . . ·
Mr. Trainor, who has since
•returned to his p.:Jst as a region!a! I.R.S chief in Chi cago, repor-~
!tectly ended the disse-mination
•of -intell ig ence
information
,picked up by the Haven 'project ;
I after fle lea rn ed of the purloining ·or a briefca&e belonglng·.;,ol
a Bahamanian citizen by LR.S. j
info rmants in Miami. .: ... · · ... · 1
/ One G<>vernmelit source said ,
:today fhat ·Mr. Trainor wa;; :
among the other .I.R.S. officials :
who had been summoned by
the grand jury. · ~
- · ' · ··
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chief feels the pressure .
- '

·

By Phil Gailey
]1t.Quiter Wallhtngton 1:?ureaw.

WASHINGTON - If it is any com·
Tort to the millions of Americans
struggling over their federal tax returns, the nation's chief tax collector
is l:iving a miserable life these -days.
Donald C. Alexander, the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), bas become the target of
the anonymous leak - one of the
deadliest weapons in this town.
Recent aUega~ns have appeared
. in print implying that Alexander is a
· corrupt government official, a "godfather" to organized crime, a friend
of wealthy tax cheats, an oppressor
?f the average taxpayer and a per;urer.
9 The · besieged ·· commissioner is
_1lllder investigation by the FBI, two
; "COngressional committees and fed. era] grand juries here and in Miami.
Treasury Secretary William Simon
·announced Thursday that Alexander
had volunteered to go before a fed-

· ,.
less liars" and "a goon squad of congressional investigators."
. Alexander is clearly ;'{jffering.
Hi 1
. s u cer, quiescent for 20 years, is
actmg up again; but Alexander, a
former tax lawyer in Cincinnati, appears determined to stick it out at
least until his name is cleared 'and
his integrity defeats the challenges.
· "I'm surprised he didn't resign
thre~ months_ ago," said a sympathetic Repub!Jcan congressman. "The
(See ALEXANDER ori 4-A) _
ALEXA.~'DER,

From 1-A .

guy has grit in his craw or he'd have
broken by now. I think he is the target of one of the most vicious attempts at character assassination
I've ever seen in this place."
Ironically, the congressman added,
in a strange way Alexander may be
a casualty of the post-Watergate at·
mosphere pervading Washington.
While his counterparts at the FBI
and the CIA have been critiCized for
not doing enough to clean up their
agencies, Alexander may have gone
era! grand jury here this week to ex- too far in reform efforts - too far, at
pedite the investigation.
least, for some IRS employes.
. Simon reiterated · his ·"complete
Dis.gruntled IRS agents are beconf!dence" in the commissioner's in- lieved to be sources of the leaks.
teg~ity. Alexander, he added, is being :
When Alexander arrived here in
subjected to "leaks, innuendos and i
vilification by .a mindless invisible ; mid-1973 to become the IRS chief, the
seams were ·already coming unravbureaucracy . " .
'
.
Il
eled on the Watergate scandal.
The charges against Al exa1;der are ·1
Like some other government agenthat he:
· ,
• Suspended an IRS probe of a
ci~s, ft w~s revealed, the IRS had
Caribbean tax haven for . weRlthy
been politicized. Its powers had been
Americans.
abused. The agency had been used to
spy upon, harass and punish taxpay• Planned - but canceled at the
· last moment-a meeting with a con- ers listed as enemies of the Vlhite
House.
victed tax swindler in Florida to dis: cuss his tax problem.
Alexander acted s\viftly. He dis:~ • Halted a sensitive in~estigation banded a controversial intelligenceinto tl1e
returns qf Syn. Joseph ga'thering unit known as the Special
Montoya .(D., N.M.), chali'lnan of an ' Services staff that had kept files on
IRS ovcr?ight subcommittee.
·
hundreds of persons and organizaAlexander has denied the accusa- tions not involved in tax law vio·
tions. In a r are public outburst of lations.
temper, the commis~ioner said · last.
week that he \l' iiS the target of a
smear campaign conducted by "face-.:

i

I

tax

".

- He . established-tight controls for
providing the White House and the
Justice Department with income tax
files, and h_e emphasized the hiring of
persons w1th an accounting back· ground _ as opposed to law enforcement- as special agents.
Last March, the story of Operation
Leprechaun, was disclosed. It was an
IRS intelligence-gathering operation

~n wutb Florida involving the use of

informer~; to spy on the sex lives and
drinking habits of prominent Miami
residents, including some public offi·
cials.
Calling Leprechaun · ~ "gutter af- :
fair" and an improper use of IRS re_sources, Alexander slapped new restrictions on the agency's intelligence-gathering activities, the use of
confidential informers and the ·role of
the IRS in Justice Department Strike
Force operations.
That was when Alexander's 'troubles began.
Agents within the IRS and the Justice Department complained that
Alexander's actions had crippled
~ir investigations of , organized
cnme, white-collar criminals and
political corruption.
Rep. Charles Vanik (D., bhio)
chairm~n of the House oversight su~

committee investigating the IRS, expressed concern that "the pendulum
' may have swung too far against'the
legitimate role of the lRS as a lawenforcement agency."
He said be was concerned that
"some white-collar and organized
crime individuals who may be failing
to report their income and pay their
taxes are no longer subject to full
IRS scrutiny."
·

Decisiolz denounced
Vanik also said his subcommittee's
investig atio n had determine~ th'at
Alexander and other senior ,,RS offi: cials had reached "prcn1a'ture and
· unfortunate" conclusions about the
Leprccsaun operation.

STORy

(!fit irfiilab~lpfiia llnquirer
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~··
Leprechaun,
the
congressman
added, ~ a legitimate IRS investigation of "political corruption, bribery, extortion arid other offenses"
that had resulted in actual or paten~ tial tax claims of $7 million.
';
Vanik said the actions Alexander
had taken in response to ·Leprechaun
"have brought the collection of taxrelated information to a virtual
standstill, -discouraged informants
from imparting information on a paid
or voluntary basis and demoralized
the intelligence division - and may
constitute a free pass to organized
crime figures and others seeking to
evade the payment of federal taxes."
Vanik's statement leaves a serious
implication: That Alexander is making life easier for wealthy tax cheats
and organized crime while the IRS .
concentrates its resources on ordinary taxpayers.
· Is there ct connection between the
"overreaction'' by the IRS national
office to Leprechaun and events
leading to the suspension last August of Project Haven, an lRS investigation of tax-evasion schemes by
wealthy Americans in setting up
secret trust accounts in foreign
banks?
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Ford Aides Said to Defer /
Suspension of I.R.S. Chief
t

.. -

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
WASHINGTON, . F"eb. - 1-4The White House has consid·
ered but shelved "for the time
being" a proposal that Donald
C. Alexander be suspended as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue until grand jury inquiries
into his activities have been
eompleted, Government sources
said today.
One well-placed source said
that after top-level strategy
sessions, White House officials
agreed that suspension CYf Mr.
Alexander "might well imply
prejudice," but that the officials were closely . watching
the investigation being conducted by the Justice Department.
1
This is the first indication
that the Ford Administration 1
has given any serious thought 1
to removing the controversial
tax official.
- He said that "in the end"
White House officials ·had
agreed that the suspen9ion
might imply prejudice. But several Administration officials
:said that they were concerned
ithat for nearly a year Mr. Alexander's stewardship at the revenue service had been, as one
source put it, "distracted" by
constantly having to deal with
internal critics, Congressional
committees and, since November, a Justice Department investigation.
'No Comment' by Alexander
A spokesman for Mr. Alexander said that it this juncture
the commissioner would have
· "no comment" because several
matters were before a grand
jury. But over the last year
Mr. Alexander ·has denied any
wrongdoing and has said that
the "malicious" accusations he
faced came from a "goon
squad" of Congressional investigators and dissident former
members of the I.R.S. intelligence divisi-on.
Mr. A lexande.r · has curtailed
the investigative activities of
special intelligence agents in
several areas on the ground
that the revenue service was
violating the civil liberties of
taxpoyers and h~d been deflect-~
ed ·from its main purpose of
collec(ing _taxes into the en- .
for cement o_r gc_neral criminal!
sta tutes.
,
·
·
;

..

'. Tne

Spt'CiJJ to Tbt Nrw York

Tf.ttvo_c,

Federal ·grand jury is !
expected to question Mr. Alexander on the following two
matters: His role in the curtailment of Operation Haven, a :
nationwide investigation
of
Americans who have placed
·money in secret Bahamian bank
·- accounts, and an allegation
that Mr. Alexander arranged
{ to meet a convicted swindler
r to discuss reducing a tax lien
against the man.
The latter charge, which was
reported to internal ·revenue
agents in Miami las.!. •.4,.pril !8 1
by a confidential informant,
has resulted in an investigation
by the inspection division of
the revenue service 'B.nd a later
inquiry by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
The confidential informant
. had been supplying internal
f revenue agents with informa. tion on Mark H. Kroll, a former
Cincinnati businessman, who
was convicted and served a
prison sentence for a $9.5 mil- .
lion realty swindle in the mid-~·
1960's.
$150,000 in Liens Placed
The revenue service has
placed liens of more than $150,- ;
000 against Mr. Kroll in an
effort to collect back tax s.
The I.R.S. investigators, according to Government sources,
were trying to establish whether Mr. Kroll had " hidden
assets.
On April 18, the informant
told the agent who had charge
of him that he had overheard
Mr. Kroll say ·he had planned
a boat trip from Florida to
the Bahamas on April 26 on
· which a group of prominent
'Cincinnati resfdents and Mr.
Alexander had been invited. Mr. Alexander was a wellknown Cincinnati tax lawyer
· b'efore befng appointed to head
the I.R.S. by President Nixon.
The informant said that Mr.
Alexander would be urged to
help Mr. Kroll with his tax
problem.
.
. .
The informant had the names
of the alleged guests jumbled, 1
~- but late( the list of men_ to 'l
be interviewed by the F.B.I. ,
included Jo seph H. Kilnter, a '
i nationally known builier and
' business executive, Man·in
Warner, a former partner · of
· Mr. Kanter's and a leading CinCinnati . .Q~i)der; . Ambro_?e, H .

L.l

..

• Lindhorst, Mr. Kroll's lawyer
and prominent figure in Ohio
' Re-publi can politics, Mr. and
, Mrs. Alvin Barker, a Cincinnati
couple now living in Miami,
Mr. Al exander, and Mr. Kroll.
The F.B.I. has interviewed
~Jl the persons named by the
mformant except for Mr. Lindhorst, according to Government
sources, a,oQ.. !hey have all said
that they_..knew
u a oat
trip on that date.

-

-

CORRECTION NOTICE
The word "NOTHING"
erroneously ommitted here. The
reporter, Nicholas M. Horrock,
confirmed this on Sunday when
we called it to his attention .
He was horrified and characterized
it as a "very serious" error. He
promised to have it corrected in
next Sunday's N.Y. Times and to
immediately inform all subscribers
to the N.Y. Times Service for a
"must" correction notice today.
It should read:
they knew NOTHING about a
boat trip on that date.
We are following this up
directly with all papers that
pick up the N.Y. Times error.
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Mr. Kante, Mr. Warner, and
Mr. Barker were · all reached
by the New York Times and
all said that they had never
be€n invited on such a boat
trip.
However, all of those named
have told the F.B.I. that they
know Mr. Alexander. Mr. Kroll
told agents that Mr. Alexand~r
had given him some tax advice
in the 1950's and Mr. Al exa nder
represented Mr. Kroll's first
wife in a tax matter .in 1958.
Mr. Kanter told The Times
that Mr. Al exander's fomer law.
firm had sone some tax work
for his organi zatio n in Cincinnati. Mr. Lindhorst did not re, turn any telephone calls and
. Mr. Kroll has an unlisted telephone in Miami. But both men
have been qu i quoted in othe;·
news accounts as hav'11,g said
that they had no knowledge
of the boat trip:
According to Government
!iOuces, the national office of
the revenue service learned of
the. proposed yacht trip on
Apnl 21, 1975, Sometime between the 21st and the 26th
the inspection division ap~
parently opened a case based
o~ this information, one source
sa1d.
. It ordered its inspectors to
d1scover whether there had
been "preferential treatment"
of Mr. Kroll and whether Mr.
AJexand_er had had an imprope~
assoc1at10n. There is no indication that the I.R.'S. ever ' inter:
viewed the guests who had
reportedly gone on the trip.
The internal revenue agents
watc~ed the . ll2-foot yacht
chanticleer wh1ch had allegedly
been chart~red for. the trip.
When she d1d not sa1l on April
26, this was reported to the
~.R.S. the surveillance reports
m the files of the rev enue
service indicated that the yacht
appeared to be preparing for
.·
·
.·.
.
sea. ·According to c~rtai~ Gove~n
ment sources, Mr. Alexander
may have learn ed he was under
investigation between the April
21 and April 26 because of
a question fzom Burk!! Will s~y.

then assistant to the commissioner. Mr. Willsey, these sources -said, asked Mr. Alexander
if he knew either Mr. Kroll
or Mr. Lindhorst.
Mr. Alexander, the sources
said, acknowledged that he
knew both men.
f ..Forewarning Hinted
~- These sources said that being
asked about the two men might
have "forewarned" Mr. Alexander and resulted in his calling
off the trip. Mr. Willsey said
n in a telephone interview that
he had "at no time had advised
Mr. Alexander of any meeting."
he declined to comment further
since the matter was before
a grand jury. : Last June, the revenue service
reported to the Treasury Department that it believed the
allegation of impropriety in
connection with the trip was
~roundless and the matter appeared to have ended. ·
But, later, staff members of
the Oversight subcommittee of
the House Ways .and Means
Committee reviewed the handling of the case and reported
to the subcommittee chairman,
Representative Charles A. Va•nik, an Ohio Democrat, that
:the internal inspection by the
revenue service had not been
thorough enough ..
The committe€ . referred the
matter in September to William
E. Simon, the s Secretary of
the Treasury.
· ·
• Mr. Simon, in turn sent the
'lease to the Departme~t of Jus.
tice .and a .field investigation
has been conducted by th€'
F.B.I. Justice Department sources
:have said that the lachting in·
cident will be of secondary
concern in tl1e grand jury to
.questions about th ecurtailment
of Operation Haven.
But law enforcement sources
within the department and the
IR.S said they were perplexed
a~ to why an informalit would
construct such an ;ntricate

!':tory for no apoarent rea.o;on.
One former official of the revelnue service suggested that thP
'in formant might simo1y havf'
overheard someone "boasting"
about influential people he
knew and his ability to "fix"
a tax matter.
The yachting incident is not
the only cincinnati matter about
which Mr. Alexander has been
criticized.
Earlier this year it was disclosed that the name of Mr.
Alexander's 'former law firm in
Cincinnati was in· the files of
the Ca stle Bank and Trust
Company, Ltd. of Nassau , the
Bahamas. Many ·depositors in
this bank are under investigaticm on tax matters in' connec. tion with Operation Haven.
It was a list of some 300 depositors at this bank that was
one of the first major leads that .
opened up the Haven project.
P resumably, the Justice Department is trying to ascertain
whether Mr. Alexander took an
undisclosed role in curtailing
the tax investigation and, if he
did, whether his firm's connecltion might have been part of an
impetus for any curtailment.
Mr. Simon voiced the Administration's concern last week
when he announced the grand
jury inquiry. .
"The whole. purpose for this
is to expedite the process of the
investigation," he ·said." We
cannot allow this investigation
to drag on while Don Alexanassociates are subjected to
leaks, innuendos and vilification
by a mindless, invisible bureaucracy."
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Attorney Gen e ral Edward H. Levi today issued the following
statement:
The Oep<lrtment of Justice has concluded its investigation
of several previously publicized

allegation~

of criminal

conduct involving IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander.

An

intensive investigation by agents of the FBI and attorneys
assigned to the Department's Criminal Division has revealed
no evidence to · support any of these allegations.
i

•

The investigation formally began on October 30, 1975,

and at that time involved essentially

~wo

allegations:

that a subject of a pending tax investigation tried to resolve
his tax difficulties by attempting to make

conta~~s

with

Commissioner Alexander; and that Commissioner Alexander had
planned a boat trip with this particular subject and others for
the weekend of April 26, 1975.

While this investigation was in progress, the Treasury
Department referred two other related allegations
Department:

~o

the Justice

that Commis.sioner Alexander acted improperly in

halting the so-called "Haven" tax investigation ln order to
protect clients of his former law firm; and that he and other
IRS officials testified falsely bef?re a Congressional Committee
regarding the termination of the Haven investigation.
(MORE)

i

The investigation of these allegations involved numerous
interviews of witnesses, grand jury proceedings in two separate
jurisdictions, and review of nwnerous records and other relevant
documents.

Commissioner Alexander and other IRS officials

volunt~rily

appe~red

before the Federal grand jury and cooperated

fully with the Justice Department.
concluded on April 9, 1976.
any of these allegations.

The investigation was

It revealed no evidence to support
Consequently, the investigation

has been closed.
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